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INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH
1400 20th Street, NW, Suite 104
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 785-5100

LOW-WAGE JOBS AND WORKERS; TRENDS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

FINAL REPORT OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

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Displaced Homemakers Network
1411 K Street, N.W., Suite 930
Washington, D.C. 20005

by

Institute for Women's Policy Research
1400 20th Street, N.W., Suite 104
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 785-5100

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INTRODUCTION

The nineteen-seventies and eighties have seen three important shifts in American society: the continuing shift from a manufacturing-dominated to a service-dominated economy, a demographic shift as the workforce includes increasing numbers of women and minorities, and a policy shift that emphasizes employment as an alternative to long-term dependence on welfare. First, the proportion of primary sector manufacturing jobs that are largely male, relatively highly unionized, and enjoy relatively high wages and benefits has declined while the proportion of service sector jobs in finance, real estate, insurance, health, business and professional services has grown. Second, the labor force participation rates of women with children have increased steadily while marriage rates declined and divorce rates have increased. As a result, more than two-thirds of mothers who are single heads of households and more than three-fifths of women in dual-parent households are in the labor force. Finally, welfare policy shifted from an emphasis on income support to families with dependent children to a conception of welfare as a short-term transition program that facilitates the entry into paid employment, even at low wages, of all parents, including women with very young children.

Each of these three shifts has sparked debates about what these trends mean for income distribution, and for the economic well-being of American families.

One important debate concerns the number and distribution of low, middle, and higher wage jobs and the consequences for the possibility of middle class living standards for American families. Opinion differs as to whether the middle class has declined as a result of the diminution of jobs that can provide a middle class standard of living. A prominent study for the Joint Economic Committee (Bluestone and Harrison, 1986) argues that the share of jobs paying enough to purchase a middle class lifestyle has declined, and has been replaced by a growing number of low-wage jobs. To keep family income at pre-1973 levels requires the earnings of two, rather than one worker. In this view, the increase in married women in the labor force is a result of the decline of middle-income jobs for men and the availability of low-income jobs for women. The findings of some researchers support Bluestone and Harrison's contentions (Bradbury, 1986; Lawrence, 1984), while others argue that the loss of middle income households has been evenly distributed between the upper and lower income tiers (Thurow, 1984). Still other researchers argue that middle class families have gone to the upper not the lower class (Horrigan and Haugen, 1988; Kosters and Ross, 1987). The lack of agreement can be attributed to the use of different units of analysis (families versus workers) and to variations in the definition and measurement of the tiers. Although there are further debates as to whether these changes are structural or cyclical, all of these researchers agree that the relative size of the low-income tier has not decreased since the late 1960s.

The meaning of a large low-income labor force and the efficacy of strategies to move families out of poverty through low-wage work is also fiercely debated, especially as white men become a smaller proportion of the workforce and their employment patterns become less dominant. According to some analysts, a large proportion of the new service sector jobs being created are low-wage, dead-end jobs without the fringe benefits generally taken for granted by higher-wage workers (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988, Smith, 1989). These researchers emphasize that low-wage, low-benefit jobs will not keep workers' families off of welfare in the long run. Between 1979 and 1987, according to Mishel and Simon (1988:41), the number of Americans working full time but living below the poverty line increased by 14 percent. According to these researchers, a growing number of workers appear to violate the stereotype that if poor people only worked they would not be in poverty (Mishel and Simon, 1988:41). In contrast, other researchers claim that the incidence of low-wage work reflects the choices of new and returning entrants into the labor force, principally students, first-time employees, mothers and post-retirement workers as well as the need of employers for a flexible, part-time work force. These researchers conclude that "low earnings that result from worker choices reflect a highly desirable variation in job opportunities structured to suit the needs and interests of workers and their employers" (Kosters and Ross, 1987:53).

Labor force researchers not only debate about the distribution of income and wages but also the availability of occupations and jobs for low-wage workers, especially given U.S. Department of Labor predictions of the growth of highly technical jobs in the Workforce 2000 (Personick, 1987; Silvestri and Lukasiewicz, 1987). Other researchers question predictions of the prevalence of highly technical jobs, arguing that the occupational composition of the workforce will change slowly (Levitan, 1987).

Those researchers investigating the impact of Workforce 2000 predictions for gender and race equity are especially concerned with the implications of changes for women, and especially minority women, given current gender and race occupational segregation of the workforce and resulting pay inequities. By the year 2000 the U.S. labor force is projected to be 47 percent female with more than 66 percent of all jobs provided by service sector industries (Kutscher, 1987). Projections of a propensity of jobs to occur in the service sector--traditionally dominated by low-wage, female jobs--can be construed to imply that women's, and especially minority women's, status will not improve. In addition some researchers (Smith, 1989) have found that the new black and women workers in desirable goods-manufacturing jobs are extremely vulnerable to layoffs as these industries restructure. As a result of economic restructuring these workers chances may grow worse unless there are rigorous efforts to create jobs that offer better wages, benefits, and opportunities for advancement and women are encouraged to prepare for them.

The current study, Low-Wage Jobs and Workers: Trends and Options for Change, investigates both trends in the prevalence and characteristics of low-wage workers and the current terrain of low-wage jobs in order to develop a realistic basis for policy and program development that will improve the incentives and work opportunities for low-wage workers.

Part I of this report first focusses on trends over time and examines whether the low-wage labor force has increased, whether the middle and high wage employment tier has declined, whether the characteristics of workers in these tiers have changed, and the changing importance of low-wage employment to family well-being. In answering these questions, Part I.A traces the labor force experience of all adult householders, including those who are not currently employed; this wider view allows for shifts in labor-force participation and unemployment levels to become part of the picture. It does not assume, as do previously cited studies, that the expansion of one group of workers--such as low-wage workers--necessarily means the contraction of another group of workers--such as medium- or high-wage workers. Shifts in the distribution of low-wage work may instead involve labor force participation of adults who were not previously employed. Part I.B then examines the dynamics of low-wage employment and also, what happens to the economic status of individuals and their families before, during, and after they experience a spell of low-wage employment. In this part of the study, the unit of analysis is the spell of low-wage employment rather than the individual.

Part II of the report focuses on the current terrain of low-wage jobs and characteristics of low-wage workers, and especially concentrates on a group of workers who we refer to as year-long low-wage workers. Part II investigates whether these workers fit current stereotypes that portray them as casual members of the labor force with relatively little education and experience, without family responsibilities, working in small firms and in certain occupations and industries. To investigate these questions Part II provides two kinds of analysis. Part II.A provides a descriptive analysis that examines the characteristics of low-wage workers, and the differences among them by gender and race-ethnicity. It includes a description of their demographic and human capital attributes and the characteristics of their jobs. The characteristics of three particular groups of low-wage workers are also examined: (1) those receiving welfare; (2) those whose families are still in poverty despite the workers' earnings; and (3) displaced homemakers. Part II.B uses multivariate regression analysis to measure the relative effects of the demographic and human capital characteristics of workers and the characteristics of their jobs on wages in general and on the differential risk of being a low-wage worker.

In examining the trends and current characteristics of low-wage workers and low-wage jobs, the first part of the report focuses on changes over the last decade in the extent of low-wage employment, and the characteristics of low-wage work and workers. Rather than ask whether there is a "disappearing middle," it addresses the question, "Is there an expanding bottom, and if so, who is in it?" The second part of the report focuses on the heterogeneity of the low-wage work force, and the characteristics of their jobs. It investigates whether and when low-wage jobs are able to bring families out of poverty, and measures the effects of worker and job characteristics on wages, and on the risk of being a low-wage worker in order to suggest policies that could result in higher wages.

Heterogeneity and Inequalities Among Low-Wage Workers

Assumptions about the characteristics of low-wage work, low-wage workers, and changes over time are empirical questions that need to be tested. Based on previous research by the authors and other studies on the changing composition and growing heterogeneity of minimum and low-wage workers even in "high tech" industries (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988), this study hypothesizes that, while younger workers and less educated and experienced workers are still the majority of low-wage workers, low-wage jobs and workers are more heterogeneous than common assumptions would suggest. Knowledge of this heterogeneity would lead to more effective public policies to improve opportunities and incentives for these workers.

This study focuses on trends in the distribution of low-wage work among gender/race-ethnic groups in the population, the extent to which women, and people of color, bear a disproportionate share of the burden of low-wage employment, and how this has changed in recent years. Rather than describing the characteristics of the "average" low-wage worker and the jobs held by these workers, this study disaggregates findings by gender and race-ethnicity and treats gender and race-ethnicity as intertwined rather than analytically distinct categories. Rather than investigating men versus women and whites versus minorities, this study reports findings for white men, black men, white women, black women, Hispanic men, Hispanic women, Asian men and Asian women. Workers are disaggregated for two reasons: first, to analyze differences and inequalities in the distribution of low-wage work; and, second, to analyze the differential impact of low-wage work on family poverty. We find that differences by gender and race-ethnicity are extremely important, and becoming more so, in understanding the distribution of low-wage work and changes over time. We conclude that without a race and gendered analysis, debates about "the declining middle class" and the meaning of low-wage work are misleading.

Poverty Avoidance and Family Well-Being

Given evidence that children are now the major victims of poverty (currently one out of four children live in households with incomes below the poverty line), perhaps the most important policy question concerning low-wage jobs and workers is the extent to which these jobs represent an effective strategy for families' to avoid poverty. These low-wage jobs are often advertised as being ideal for young workers, for mothers, or for any workers portrayed as not having a strong commitment to the labor force, and who are likely to be desirous of flexible and short-term work. This study focuses on the portion of low-wage workers who work long hours and for much of the year, and are responsible for families, yet do not earn enough to move their families out of poverty. Given the emphasis in current welfare policy on employment, even at low-wages, as an alternative to welfare, this study provides evidence on whether the receipt of government transfer income has increased and to what extent low-wage work and receipt of welfare payments are mutually exclusive rather than overlapping activities.

This report first describes the study's research design and definitions, followed by findings for Part I--Trends over Time, and then, Part II--The Terrain of Low-Wage Jobs and Workers, and finally, study conclusions and suggested policy options directed to the varying sub-populations of low-wage workers.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In order both to examine trends over time and to focus on longer term low-wage workers, we use two different data sets and develop two research designs. Although this research strategy results in some duplication of findings, the positive side of this duplication is the high degree of replication the two data sets provide.

Methodology for Part I: Using the PSID to Analyze Trends Over Time

The findings reported in Part I are based on research using a panel study, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, (or PSID) a longitudinal study begun in 1968 by the University of Michigan. In that year approximately 5000 families were interviewed; the sample drawn was disproportionately low-income. (All the figures reported here are weighted to compensate for this oversampling of low-income families.) Every year since 1968, these families have been reinterviewed; because of divorces, separations, and new households formed as children grow up and leave home, there are now about 7000 families and about 21,000 individuals in the sample. After the first several years, the drop-out rates stabilized; on the average, 97 percent of the previous year's sample were interviewed in the following year.

Although the survey began in 1968, we chose a later starting point of 1975 because the data gathered before 1975 on the labor force participation patterns of married women was insufficient for analysis. We end with 1984, the most recent year available, which provides a decade of change. Because there were a number of significant public policy changes in 1980, we also report data for that year, although with a few exceptions that are noted, the 1980 data serve generally as the mid-point in the 1975-1984 trend.

Changes in national demographic patterns that have occurred since 1968 are not reflected in this sample. Thus, Hispanics, and to some extent, Asians, are underrepresented in the current sample frame compared to their proportion in the United States as a whole today.

Because the focus of this study is on the nature of low-wage employment, and its efficacy as a means of supporting families, it was decided that only adult householders who have major responsibility for their own and/or their children's economic well-being, would be included. This decision includes all husbands and wives as well as single men and women living on their own, but excludes adult children (mostly in their late teens and early twenties) living with their parents. (Others excluded, but in much smaller numbers, include grandparents, adult siblings of householders, etc.) These excluded adults are about 14.3 percent of all adults in the PSID.

In the analysis that follows, adult householders are divided into three groups, based on their labor force participation pattern, and wage rate, over the year. The first group is the

Not Employed category and is basically any adult householder who has not been in paid employment for at least 500 hours over the year (that is approximately three months, full-time, or 10 hours per week for 50 weeks a year.) This category thus includes not only the unemployed, but also students, retirees, the disabled, housewives, and laid off workers. Those who are employed are divided into low-wage or medium and high-wage workers. The cut-off used for the low-wage category is $5.30 per hour in 1984, which is the wage at which, working full-time and all year, a worker could support a family of four at the poverty line. The 1980 and 1975 cut-offs of $4.20 and $2.75, respectively, are the levels equivalent to the 1984 figure, using the CPI to deflate the 1984 figure. The hourly wage-rates used here were obtained by dividing total earnings for the year by total hours worked. These earnings and hours include all jobs held concurrently (e.g., moonlighting), as well as jobs held consecutively. Thus, it is an average wage rate for the year, and does not reflect month to month changes in wage rate status.

Methodology for Part II: Using the SIPP to Describe Low-Wage Jobs and Workers

Data Set

The second part of this report uses the 1984 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. This representative nationwide panel survey (started in 1983) is designed to provide comprehensive information on the changing economic situation of households and persons in the U.S.--including information on labor force status, participation in government transfer programs, and cash and non-cash income. The 1984 panel includes approximately 64,000 persons. The sample size is large enough such that the low-wage and low-income populations can be disaggregated by gender/race-ethnicity, family type and other critical analytic variables.

The primary feature of the SIPP survey design is that a sample of households (and all the members of that household age 15 and over) are interviewed three times a year, each time giving retrospective information on the past four months on a month by month basis. They are interviewed over a period of approximately two and one-half years, resulting in a highly detailed record for each individual and for members of his/her family or household. A set of core questions are asked in each interview wave with additional topical questions asked in supplementary modules.[1]

The richness and sophistication of the SIPP data and methodology are balanced by the complexity and size of the data set and the cost of using it. For example, to obtain an annual income figure for an individual requires selecting and adding up at least 12 monthly income variables from four SIPP interview waves. In conducting this study, many time-consuming and difficult decisions had to be made concerning which waves, which supplementary modules, which individuals, and which variables are best used for this particular analysis. These decisions are discussed in the Technical Appendix.

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[1] For a more detailed discussion of how the SIPP survey design works see Dawn Nelson, D.B. McMillen, and Daniel Kasprzyk, "An Overview of the Survey of Income and Program Participation: Update 1," SIPP Working Paper Series No. 8401. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985.

Definition of Low-Wage Workers

As Harrison and Bluestone note "All definitions of low and high [wage] are necessarily arbitrary" (1988:3). To make our definitions somewhat less arbitrary we use a series of wage-based and time-based (length of time working at low-wage jobs in a given year) measures. Following the methodology used by the Senate Budget Committee (1988) we categorized a worker as low-wage if the income from working year round, full-time for a family of four would provide less than the poverty level ($11,611 in 1987 dollars or $5.80 an hour). Translated into 1984 dollars (the year for which we have data) this comes to $5.30. We choose to use a wage measure in constant dollars because the purchasing power of wages is a primary component of workers' living standards. We use an hourly wage measure rather than an annual earnings measure so as not to assume that those with low annual earnings are necessarily low-wage workers.

Hourly Wage Variable

We created an hourly wage variable by dividing monthly earnings by hours of paid work in the month. Thus, unlike many studies of minimum wage workers (see, for example, Smith and Vavricheck, 1987), this study is not limited to those who are actually paid on an hourly basis but also includes low-wage salaried workers. We also included the earnings and hours associated with secondary jobs in the hourly wage calculations (in other words, the hourly wage figure is an average wage across both jobs held).

Months of Low-Wage Work

We divided low-wage workers into two categories those with six or fewer months of low-wage work and those with seven or more months. We refer to the first group as temporary, intermittent, or transitional low-wage workers and the second group as year-long low-wage workers.[2] Workers grouped into the transitional category include a portion of workers who would fit into the year-long category if additional months of data were included, but, in general, they are likely to have fewer months of labor force participation, more months at higher-wage jobs, and are more likely to be students temporarily in the labor force. In contrast, the longer-term category includes relatively few such transitional workers. Although the workers in this longer-term category do not necessarily work all twelve months, the months in which they do not work at low-wage jobs tend to be months of unemployment rather than months of higher-wage work. To further insure that the sample was limited to low-wage workers, we required that workers in the seven months or more category be low-wage workers each of the seven months rather than having an average of $5.30 per hour across the seven months. Because of this restrictive definition of year-long low-wage workers, the estimates throughout this study for total numbers are very likely to be an undercount of the actual number of year-long low-wage workers.

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[2] The decisions concerning the number of months to be included in each of these categories of low-wage workers is based on an analysis of the differences in employment characteristics (e.g. months in the labor force, weeks of unemployment, months of higher-wage work) between workers with greater or fewer months of low-wage work.

We compare transitional and year-long low-wage workers to those workers with no months of low-wage work. (Along with those with 0 months of low-wage work we included those workers with one (1) month of low-wage work in this category in order to deal with the possibility that because of irregular calendar cycles workers did not receive their full pay in a given month).

Variables and Indicators

In comparing categories of workers we use the above-described measures along with a series of variables and indicators to describe the demographic and human capital attributes of categories of workers, the characteristics of low-wage jobs, the relation of low-wage work and family poverty, and the effects of these characteristics on wages and on the risk of being a low-wage worker.

FINDINGS

Part I.A: Trends Over Time

The findings presented here address the issues of who low-wage workers are, their demographics, how those demographics have been changing, and the implications of these trends for the economic status of low-wage workers and their families. Knowing that labor force participation has been increasing, particularly among women, and that the economy has been shifting towards the generally low-paying service sector, we expect to find an expansion of low-wage employment, particularly among women. At the same time, because the minimum wage has not been raised since 1981, and thus has in constant dollars lost more than a third of its value, we expect that the earnings of low-wage workers will have become less effective by 1984 in lifting them and their families out of poverty. Because of eligibility and other policy changes in welfare programs instituted in 1981, we expect that income support programs will play less of a role in providing complementary or substitute income support for families of inadequate earnings.

Throughout our analysis, we highlight the differences by gender, race, and family status, for we expect that trends such as the "declining middle" and the expansion of low-wage and service sector employment, will impact very differently on different groups. Too often it has been assumed that problems of different groups. Too often it has been assumed that problems or benefits from economic changes are shared equally; as we shall see, there are often striking differences between groups, differences which are not only interesting, but have important policy ramifications as well.

Are There More Low-Wage Workers Now, and If So, Who Are The "New" Low-Wage Workers?

A number of economists and others have maintained the U.S. economy is suffering from a "disappearing middle," with two consequences: the number of people in very high wage jobs is increasing, and the number of people in very low-wage jobs is increasing.

As can be seen in Table 1.1, over the decade 1975-1984, there has been a substantial shift of non-employed adult householders, 4.3 percent of the population, into low-wage employment. In contrast, the overall proportion of adults in medium and high wage employment has stayed virtually unchanged over this decade.

The patterns of men and women over this decade are quite different, however. Women, of course, have continued to enter the labor market in disproportionate numbers, while men have been *decreasing* their labor force participation by modest amounts. Thus, almost ten percent more women were employed at the end of the decade than at the beginning, and about 2.3 percent fewer men were employed than ten years ago. About 60 percent of the women

1984, 21.1 percent of all women, more than one third of women workers, were low-wage workers. In contrast, the changes among men have led to fewer men who were classified as medium and high wage workers; about half of this shift shows up as an increase in the low-wage category, and about half as increase of those not employed.[3] The changes for men, however, have been much smaller in scale than for women, so that the proportion of men who are low-wage workers in 1984 was still only 13.1 percent, and the proportion of all male workers who are low-wage is about 16 percent, or one out of six male workers.

The trends by gender and race are shown in Table 1.2. Although at a lesser rate than whites, or members of other groups,[4] blacks also moved from non-employment to employment status, mostly as low-wage workers, over the decade, 1975-1984. (Indeed, there is a slight net loss of blacks in the medium and high wage category; see Table 1.2). This happened in spite of the fact that 5.8 percent of black men left employment over the decade, for black women continued to enter the labor force at even higher rates than black men were leaving.[5] It should be noted that there is a similar contrast among whites: white men decreased their labor force participation over the decade by about two percent, while about ten percent of white women entered employment. About one-third of the increase in employment among white women occurred in jobs with medium and high wages, and about two-thirds of the net increase in employment for black women occurred at higher level wages.

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[3] It should be noted that a decrease in the medium-high wage category does not necessarily mean that the wages received by this group have decreased. Indeed, coupled with the increase in the proportion of men who are not employed, it is probable that the decrease in the proportion of men in the medium-high wage category is due to retirement of better-paid workers; likewise, some of the increase in the proportion of men who are low-wage workers probably reflects, at least in part, the wages of newly entering young men, not decreased wages of already employed men.

[4] "Other" includes American Indian, Eskimos, Aleuts, Pacific Islanders, Asians and others. It does not include Hispanics. A Hispanic identity question was not asked in 1975 nor in 1980: separating out those who identified themselves as Hispanic in 1984 would lead to non-comparable results over the decade.

The small numbers in the "other" category, and its heterogeneity, make generalizing hazardous, but the trends are generally similar to those of blacks and whites: more were employed with women entering employment in larger numbers than men. In contrast to blacks and whites, men in the "other" category end the decade with a larger proportion in the medium and high wage category, and "other" women made even greater gains in this category than did black or white women.

Altogether, the differences in employment patterns are greater by gender than by race. That is, in general, women--both black and white--are entering employment, while men--both black and white (but not "other")--are leaving employment.

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[5] Note also that virtually all of the change in black male labor force participation occurred between 1975 and 1980 (see Table 2, third column.)

shown.[6] Clearly, women have increased their proportion of low-wage employment (by 4.1 percent over the decade), so that as of 1984, two out of three low-wage workers were women. At the same time, the proportion of women at higher wage levels also increased (by 4.7 percent) to just under 40 percent of all workers in this group. Together, these two categories reflect the general shift from non-employed to employed status of women generally, as discussed above.[7]

In Table 1.4, the distribution of low-wage employment by race and gender is given for the three years, 1975, 1980, and 1984. Black women actually decreased their share of low-wage employment over the decade and substantially increased their share (4.3 percent compared to 3.1 percent in 1975) of medium and high wage employment.[8]

Both black and white men decreased their shares of low-wage employment. At the same time, they also decreased their employment at medium and high wages. In other words, over this share (4.3 percent compared to 3.1 percent in 1975) of medium and high wage employment.[8]

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[6] In general, the tables labelled "Distribution of...." are percentaged across rather than down, and address the issue of the redistribution of low-wage employment between groups such as men and women, as opposed to shifts within groups, e.g., as shown in Table 1, the shift among women from Not Employed to Low-wage Employment.

[7] Note that in the PSID sample generally, there is a slight increase over the decade in the proportion who are women; this is largely a result of the fact that after divorce, more ex-husbands than ex-wives are lost from the sample.

[8] Some of this increase is due to the increased percentage of women in the PSID sample, especially black women; see bottom section of Table 4.

Both black and white men decreased their shares of low-wage employment. At the same time, they also decreased their employment at medium and high wages. In other words, over this decade, both black and white men left employment, and increased their proportion in the non-employed category by .9 percent, and 4.8 percent, respectively. (It should be noted that even with women's dramatic increases in labor force attachment, women still predominate among the non-employed: 64.1 percent of the non-employed are white women and another 8.5 percent are black women, compared to the proportions for white men, 22.9 percent, and black men, 3.3 percent; see Table 1.4.)

Have Mothers or Fathers, Married or Single, or Those Without Children Shifted into Low-Wage Employment?

In Table 1.5, these employment trends are examined within marital status, family status, and gender groups. We look first at adults with responsibility for children less than 18. Among women, although all groups entered employment at increasing rates, the most dramatic change occurred among married women with children; over 20 percent entered employment over the decade 1975-1984, with slightly over half this number employed at low-wage jobs (11.5 percent) and slightly less than half at medium and high wages (9.0 percent). Although the net increase in employment was less for single women with children (only five percent), together with losses of medium and high wage employment, single mothers increased the~~ir~~ proportion of low-wage employment by ten percentage points over the decade. Altogether, about one fourth of mothers are low-wage workers.

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[8] Some of this increase is due to the increased percentage of women in the PSID sample, especially black women; see bottom section of Table 4.

Married men with children also experienced a downward shift in their wage levels, but at about half the rate of single mothers. Single men with children experienced the most dramatic shift from non-employed, and to a lesser extent, medium and high wage employment status, to low-wage employment, but these percentages are based on a relatively small sample and are therefore less reliable.[9]

Adult women without children increased their labor force participation, regardless of marital status, but while married women mostly entered low-wage employment, the net increase in employment for single women occurred almost entirely at the upper wage levels.

Among men, there was a stark contrast by marital status. While married men decreased their employment at all wage levels, particularly medium and high wage employment, single men entered employment, particularly medium and high wage employment. (This probably reflects retirement and disability among the married men, and the younger age of single men; see discussions below on age and disability.)

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[9] Because there are so few single fathers with children-- less than 10 percent of single parents are single fathers--they have been combined in subsequent analyses with single mothers, and labelled single parents.

In sum, contrary to some portrayals, the shift to low-wage employment had been mostly among adults with the responsibility of supporting children. In particular, it is mothers who have disproportionately moved into low-wage employment, (Married fathers also shifted into low-wage employment, but at almost half the rate for all mothers; single fathers with children did so too, but the numbers in this category are very small; and are not shown separately; see footnote 7.)

When these trends are examined separately for blacks and whites, there is a general similarity. While married and single black mothers entered employment at the same rate, married black mothers secured higher wage employment (about three-fourths of their net employment increase over the decade was in medium and high wage jobs), while single parents secured mostly low-wage employment (about three-fourths of their net employment increase over the decade was in low-wage employment.) In spite of these differences, the net result is that just over one-fourth of black mothers, both married and single, are in low-wage employment, which is very close to the figures for white mothers.
(See Tables 1.25 and 1.26).

While both white and black married men with children experienced a net decrease in employment at medium and high wage level, white married fathers increased their low-wage employment, while for black married fathers, most of the change showed up as a net increase in the non-employed category. Paradoxically, married white men without children also left employment (both low and higher wage levels), while married black men without children entered medium and high wage jobs (and left the non-employment and low-wage category.) At the same time, single white men (without children) experienced a shift similar to married black men--they decreased their numbers of non-employed, and increased their high wage employment, and single black men acted like married white men, only more so, for their proportion in medium and high wage employment dropped by almost 12 percent, with two-thirds of that change showing up in an increase in the non-employed category.

Has the Proportion of Low-Wage Workers who are Parents and/or Married Changed?

In Table 1.6 we examine the distribution of low-wage employment by gender and marital/family status groups. Again, we can see that, over the decade 1975-1984, the increase in the proportion of low-wage workers who are women, has been concentrated among women who are mothers, both married and single. As can be seen from the bottom of the table (the ALL section), there has been a general shift in the distribution of adult households, with fewer who are married with children, both men and women, and more who do not have children, particularly single adults without children. Given the decline in the proportion who are married mothers, their increased share of low-wage employment is all the more striking. Single parents also increased their share of low-wage employment, although a third of that increase reflects the demographic change towards more single parents in the population (see last line of Table 1.6.) Married men without children decreased their share of low-wage employment by almost four percentage points.

There are important racial differences in the redistribution of low-wage employment, as shown in Tables 1.7 and 1.8. Thus, black married mothers *decreased* their proportion of low-wage employment over the decade (by 5.3 percentage points, but most of this is in line with the decreased percentage (-4.9) generally of black women who are married with children. In contrast, white married mothers with children *increased* their share of low-wage employment, in *spite* of a similar overall decline in the proportion of whites who are married mothers.

Conversely, black single parents increased their proportion of low-wage employment by over 11 percentage points, more than double their increase in the overall distribution of blacks. White single parents also increased their population of low-wage employment, over their increase in the white population, but not by as much. Because of the much higher prevalence of women-maintained families among black families with children about 27 percent of black low-wage workers are single parents, and about 18 percent are married mothers. In contrast, we find that about 29 percent of white low-wage workers are married mothers, and another six percent are single parents.

To control for the changing demographics over this period--more single-parent families, more single adults--we compare the proportion of each gender and marital family status who are low-wage workers with their proportion of the whole population in that year. If low-wage employment were distributed equally, we would expect to find that, for example, if 21.9 percent of adult households in 1975 were married women with children, then 21.9 percent of low-wage workers would be married women with children. In fact, 24.6 percent of low-wage workers in 1975 were married mothers, or 12 percent more than the expected proportion ([24.6-21.9]/21.9) x 100).

And by 1984, the proportion of married mothers who were low-wage workers was 51 percent greater than expected according to their proportion in the 1984 population. Calculating similar ratios for each group of households reveals that:

- Both married mothers and single parents increased their share of low-wage employment to 151 percent and 149 percent, respectively, of their expected share, based on their proportion of the adult householder population.
- Married men with children increased their share of low-wage employment over the decade, but it was still only 82 percent of the expected share.
- Between 1975 and 1984, all groups of adult householders without children reduced their share of low-wage employment to below the expected proportion; married men without children had the lowest share, only 56 percent of the share expected based on their proportion of adult householders.

What Differences Are There in the Patterns of Low-Wage Employment Between Parents with Young Children, and those with Only Older Children?

In Table 1.9, we examine the trends in more detail for adult householders with children. As noted above, married mothers have the most dramatic increase in employment, over 20 percent. Interestingly, married mothers with young children, i.e., children less than six years old were more likely to enter employment at medium and high wages (about half of the increase in employment is in medium and high wage employment), while married mothers with no young children, were somewhat more likely to enter low-wage employment (about 60 percent of the increase in employment for this group was low-wage.)

Among single parents, there were much stronger differences by the age of the children. Over the decade single parents with children less than six years old increased their labor force participation by nearly 16 percentage points, with virtually all of the increase occurring in low-wage employment. Single parents with no young children barely increased their proportion employed over the decade[10], but did experience a larger shift from high and medium wage to low-wage employment. Married fathers also experienced almost no change in employment levels, which were already very high. Although both groups of married fathers increased their low-wage employment those with young children less than six years old experienced less increase in low-wage employment (+3 percent) than those with older children (+6 percent).

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[10] Note however, that in 1984, the proportion of single parents who were employed at all wage levels was higher for those with no young children--about 68 percent--than for those with children less than six (about 62 percent).

Has Educational Attainment Increased for Low-Wage Workers?

The changing distributions of low-wage employment has not resulted, by and large, in significant changes in the educational attainment levels of low-wage workers, compared to the adult population generally. In Table 1.10, the changes over the decade in the average educational level are given by gender and marital status, As can be seen at the bottom of the table, there has been a general, but modest, increase in educational attainment of adult householders of about one-third of a year. Focussing on low-wage workers, we can see that married men, married women, and single women have experienced an average increase of almost half a year in educational attachment over the decade, slightly higher than the overall average. Only the category of single men saw a decrease in educational attainment. As there has been a net loss in this category in terms of numbers that may reflect the loss of relatively well-educated men to medium and high wage employment, rather than an influx of lesser-educated single men.

Has the Proportion of Low-Wage workers with Work-affecting Disability Changed?

In Table 1.11, the percentages are shown of adult householders who report a disability serious enough to affect their ability to work. Over the decade, those percentages have increased slightly for married men and women, and decreased for single men and women. But the absolute levels of work affecting disabilities are the highest, and the increases the largest, for those groups who are not employed. At the same time, all gender/marital status groups decreased their proportion of low-wage workers with work affecting disabilities. In sum, the last decade has generally seen a modest increase in the educational level of low-wage workers, and a modest decrease in the proportion with work-affecting disabilities.

Have Younger and Older Workers Entered into Low-Wage Employment Disproportionately?

It is generally believed that low-wage work is becoming more characteristic of the youngest and oldest workers. In Table 1.12, the changing distribution of employment statuses by age for householders without children is shown. Younger workers (those less than 40 years old), have increased their labor force participation over the decade mostly as low-wage workers. Middle-aged workers (41-60 years old), have increased their labor force participation the most, with about 60 percent of the increase going into medium and high wage employment. Older workers (those over 61 years old) have decreased their labor force participation, equally from low-wage and medium and high-wage employment.

Has the Geographic Distribution of Low-Wage Employment Changed?

Although there has been an overall increase in low-wage employment over the decade, 1975-1984, this increase has not been evenly distributed. Tables 1.13 and 1.14 show the geographic distribution of low-wage employment, contrasted with medium and high wage employment, and those not employed. In Table 1.13 an examination of the "change" row shows that only one region has substantially increased its share of low-wage employment--the Middle Atlantic (+2.7 percent), and only one region has lost a substantial share, the Pacific region (-2.5 percent).

Shifts between regions in the redistribution of low-wage employment may reflect internal demographic changes, (e.g. difference in population, migration between regions, an influx of retired persons), or job/industry mix or some combination. Since these different factors may cancel each other out, between region shifts are often small and difficult to interpret. In Table 1.14, we examine just one of these factors, within-region shifts in employment distribution. The most striking pattern immediately apparent is that almost every region experienced a decrease in the proportion of adult householders who are not employed, and every region experienced an increase in low-wage employment. Several patterns, and magnitudes, of low-wage employment gains are apparent. In the New England, Middle Atlantic, and West and North Central regions most of the gain in low-wage employment came in from a reduction in the Not Employed category. All three of these regions had quite small gains in middle and high wage employment. In the second pattern, apparent in the South Atlantic and East South Central regions, low-wage employment gains are drawn roughly equally from decreases in the Not Employed and decreases in the medium and high wage employment categories. The East North Central region halfway fits this pattern, for its gain in low-wage employment also comes from a loss in medium and high wage employment, but not from a decrease in the Not Employed category. A third pattern found in the West South Central and Mountain regions, shows gains in low-wage employment that are quite small, and somewhat larger gains in medium and high wage employment, both of which draw on decreases in the Not Employed category. The Pacific region is the most extreme, with almost all of the shift from the Not Employed pattern going into medium and high wage employment.

Is Low-Wage Work Part-Time and/or Seasonal, and Has it Become More So?

It is generally known that low-wage work is disproportionately part-time and seasonal. But has this tendency changed over the past decade? In Table 1.15, Panel A, are displayed the average hours worked per week (only for weeks when employed), by gender and marital/family status. In general, there was a tendency toward increased hours of work for all groups, except for those with the highest means, married men with children.

Just as women have increased their labor force participation, most women increased their hours worked over the 1975-1984 decade. Likewise, it was married mothers, and single women (without children), and women who were low-wage workers, who have increased their hours the most (for example, low-wage married mothers increased their average work week over the decade by 2.2 hours, married women without children by 1.5 hours, and single women without children by 5.5 hours.)

The average work week for all groups of women by 1984 was over 35 hours, or full time. At the same time, men in general have longer work weeks, roughly one eight-hour day longer. This is particularly true of men employed in low-wage work, whose average work week in 1984 was over 48 hours (53.7 hours for married men with children, 50.2 hours for married men without children, and 48.4 hours for single men). This difference held even though the various groups of men either did not change their work hours significantly, or decreased their average hours of work.

Although low-wage jobs may be disproportionately part-time, it is clear that low-wage workers are increasingly working full-time weeks, although this may be accomplished through two or three jobs per worker. Even single parents are working more that 40 hours per week on the average.

In Table 1.15, Panel B, we address the issue of weeks worked over the year. As with the hours per week, most groups have increased their annual weeks worked with women showing the most significant increases over the decade (particularly women without children, both married and single.) Two phenomena are apparent from the figures in Table 1.15, Panel B. First, the differences between men and women, those with and without children, and single and married, are quite small: the mean annual weeks worked ranges from 40.6 for married women without children to 47.1 for married fathers, or from about nine and one-half months to ten and three-quarters months. Among adults without children, the differences were minimal, as women worked an average of about 43 weeks, and men about 47 weeks per year. Second, there seems to be little difference, within gender and marital/family status groups, in the annual weeks worked, between those who worked at low wages, and those who worked at medium and high wages. That is, on the average, low-wage work is not particularly part-year compared to employment at higher wage levels.

In sum, the tendency for convergence between men and women, and the relatively long average work weeks and annual weeks worked by all groups, suggest that, in terms of average hours and average weeks worked, low-wage employment is not all that different from employment at higher wage levels.

To paraphrase the adage, "The rich are different: they have more money," this analysis suggests that "Low-wage work is different: [not because it is part-time, or part-year, but simply because] it pays less."

Has the Importance of Low-Wage Employment to Family Well-being, and its Poverty-avoiding Efficacy Changed?

The next set of tables presents analyses that describe the impact of these changing patterns of employment, and the distribution of low-wage employment, on family and individual well-being. In the first two tables, Tables 1.16 and 1.17, we look at the average wage of low-wage and medium/high-wage workers, and how these have changed over time. In Table 1.16, the mean wages are given (in current dollars) for each gender/marital/family status group, by worker status. This table shows the "floor" effect of minimum wages on mean wages of low-wage workers, for there is relatively little difference between gender/marital/family status groups. The lowest means are for mothers (married mothers in 1980 and 1984, and single parents in 1975), and the highest means are for married fathers. But the difference is not great--38 cents in 1984, or about 12 percent higher for the highest paid low-wage group (married fathers at $3.68 per hour) compared to the lowest (married mothers, $3.30 per hour). Among medium and high-wage workers, in contrast, there are much larger differences between groups, particularly by gender.

In Table 1.17, the mean wages for each group are shown as a ratio to that year's low-wage definition of work (as defined in this study). Since the definitions of low-wage were adjusted over time by using the CPI (see above), this analysis also provides a measure of how each group's mean wages are faring in constant dollars. These ratios show a striking pattern: almost all groups of low-wage adult householders have experienced a decrease in mean wages over the decade, 1975-1984. The greatest decline was experienced by low-wage married women, both mothers and those without children, followed by low-wage married men. Overall (see last column, Total), for all groups, the mean wage of low-wage workers declined in worth about six percent over the 1975-1984 decade. In contrast, medium and high-wage workers, except single parents, experienced over the decade a relative increase in wages that averaged about four percent above inflation.

It should be noted that in the next few tables, we examine the impact of one factor--low-wage versus medium and high wage employment--on household economics, even though we know that other factors (such as AFDC or the wages of other household members), may have a much larger impact. This is particularly true of those who are married householders.

Table 1.18 shows the average proportion of household income which comes from the householder's wages--whether employment is low-wage, or medium and high-wage--for each gender and marital/family status group. The most dramatic changes over the decade, 1975-1984, have occurred among married men who are low-wage workers: the proportion of income that is contributed from their low-wage employment has dropped 21 percentage points for those with children and 18 percentage points for married men without children. This reflects two concurrent phenomena, the increasing labor force participation (in terms of both entry, and hours worked) of wives (see discussion above, p.21) and the decreasing real value of low wages. Married men who earn medium and high wages have also seen a decrease, but a much smaller one, in their contribution to household income. (Three percentage points for those with children, and six percentage points for those without children; see Table 1.18.)

Women, on the other hand, have generally increased their contribution to household income. This is most true of low-wage single parents, who increased their proportion of household income from earnings by nine percentage points over the decade, followed by married mothers and single parents in medium and high wage employment (+7 and +5 points, respectively), single women (+5 points) and married women without children (+4 points.) This is clearly an effect of the increased labor force participation of women generally, particularly mothers. At the same time, the small absolute levels (of the mean proportion of household income), even with the decade's increases, indicate that women's wage levels did not increase substantially over this period. Indeed, since more of the increased labor force participation was in low-wage employment than in medium and high wage employment (see above, p.18) and married men's wages are a decreasing proportion of household income (or absent altogether, except for child support/alimony, for single women), we are drawn to the conclusion that households, and individual women, are becoming more dependent on women's wages even though those wages are not rising proportionately.

The impact of low-wage employment on household poverty status is shown in Table 1.19. It should be noted that in this table, as with Table 1.18, we are looking at only one factor, the differential impact of low versus higher wage employment, on poverty status, whereas we know that family poverty status is determined by many other factors beyond the purview of this table (changing household size, employment of other household members, etc.) Particularly for those groups, such as married low-wage mothers, whose contribution to household income is less (see Table 1.18), we must be quite cautious in drawing conclusions about the changing impact of, e.g., low-wage employment. For these reasons, we focus on those groups who provide a substantial portion of household income from their wages: married men, single parents, and single men and women.

Even though the proportion of household income contributed by low-wage married men substantially decreased over the decade (as shown in Table 1.18), their households' poverty incidence did not increase but decreased slightly (by 1.6 percent for married fathers, and 3.0 percent for married men without children.) This suggests that the decreasing value to the household of married men's low wages has been more than made up by other sources of income, including the earnings of wives and other family members.

The largest increase in poverty incidence occurred for low-wage single parents: almost ten percent more of their families were poor by the end of the decade (see Table 1.19.) Since they also experienced the largest increase in the proportion of income contributed by their earnings (seven percentage points, see Table 1.18), this means that the increasing labor force participation of single parents has been accompanied by an increase, not a decrease, in the poverty rate. At a minimum, increased low-wage employment has not made up for decreases in other income to these households (such as transfer income or others' earnings). It is probably reasonable to conclude further, on the basis of this data, that, at least for single parents, low-wage employment over the decade became less effective as a means to achieve above-poverty level income for their families.

In Table 1.20, the proportion of families within each gender and martial/status group for whom the householders' wages make the difference between being poor, and not being poor, is shown. It should be noted that those families for whom the householder's earnings do not raise them out of poverty include both those who would be poor anyway (see Table 1.19) and those who would not be poor anyway, i.e., those whose other sources of income are what makes the difference being poor and not poor. As shown in the previous two tables, the impact of the earnings of low-wage married men on family income had declined in the last two decades, so it is not surprising that the percentage of their households removed from poverty by their earnings has also declined. Since poverty rates for households of low-wage married men actually decreased, however, other sources of income (others' wages, transfers, etc.) must have increased to more than make up the loss from the decreased poverty reduction effect of male wages.

Single parents who were low-wage workers show a contrasting experience: in spite of increasing their proportion of income from their wages over the decade, (Table 1.18), their poverty increased (Table 1.19); what Table 1.20 shows is that about half of this increased poverty was due to the decreased anti-poverty effectiveness of their low-wage earnings (the percent of single parent families who were removed from poverty by low-wage earnings decreased 4.5 percent over the decade. (Table 1.20), while the percentage of single parent households which were in poverty increased 9.9 percentage points over the decade.)

Adult householders without children showed less change over the decade. Married women without children showed little change in their contribution to household income (Table 1.18), a small increase in poverty (Table 1.19), and a small decrease--to an already quite small average--in the proportion of their households which are not poor due to their earnings. (Table 1.20). Because the proportion of household income for married women is quite low (see Table 1.18), it is hazardous to attribute the average in Table 1.20 to changes in married women's earnings.

Single women who are low-wage workers increased their proportion of income from earnings (Table 1.18), decreased their poverty rate (Table 1.19), and increased their proportion of households removed from poverty (Table 1.20), all by magnitudes that are quite similar. Since single women do provide the majority of income, on the average for their households, it is probably reasonable to conclude that single women over this decade have modestly increased their economic position, mostly through increased dependence on their low wages. Single men in contrast, moved in the opposite direction: single men decreased their contribution to household income from low-wage employment (Table 1.18), experienced an increase in poverty (Table 1.19), and a substantial reduction in the percentage of their households removed from poverty by their earnings (Table 1.20). Because single men are the most dependent on their own earnings of any group, it is likely that the reduced antipoverty effectiveness of low-wage earnings (e.g., the erosion of the value of the minimum wage by inflation in the 1980s) accounts for much of the 17.7 percentage point drop in the proportion removed shown in Table 1.20.

While not directly of interest here, it should be noted that for the most part, there was little change among medium and high-wage groups of workers, in terms of percentage of household income that comes from their earnings (Table 1.18) their household poverty rate (Table 1.19), or the anti-poverty effectiveness of their wages (Table 1.20.) The one exception is that of married men, both those with and without children, which is discussed above.

Has the Receipt of Transfer Income Increased, and for Which Groups?

In the next set of tables, the impact of transfer income, both public and private, is traced for each of the gender and marital/family status groups. Table 1.21 shows the percent in each group receiving AFDC.[11] Since this is a program for families with children, and in half the states, only single parent families, it is not surprising that only adult householders with children have any significant receipt of AFDC. While the proportions of married fathers who are not employed, who receive AFDC may seem high (at about 16 percent in all three years), the base for this percentage is very small; only about one percent (weighted) of adult householders are married fathers who are not employed. Single parents, who are not employed however, are a larger percentage of the sample, and their share is increasing. Given the cutbacks in eligibility and benefit levels, particularly those mandated by the federal 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), it is surprising that the percent of single parent households receiving AFDC has increased. For single parents who are not employed, this could be explained in part by their entrance, over this decade, into employment (see Table 1.5 and accompanying discussion.) But this leaves unexplained the increase in AFDC receipt (6.7 percentage points, see Table 1.13) among single parents who are low-wage workers. One provision of the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act was to strictly limit the ability of low-wage single parents to combine employment with AFDC, even minimal amounts of welfare.[12] Given these strictures, the expansion of AFDC receipt among low-wage single parents could be due to (1) increased cycling between AFDC receipt and low-wage employment within a year (2) earnings from low-wage employment that have become so low that they do not affect eligibility, (3) an increase in the "off-the books" low-wage employment in this group which is reported in the PSID, but not to welfare officials, or (4) some other explanation. These possibilities can be and will be tested in the further work to be done in this project, and results will be reported in the final report.

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[11] While this includes everyone who received any AFDC, even very small amounts, most of those who receive AFDC, receive a significant amount and/or for most of the year.

In Table 1.22, the changes in the food stamp receipt over this decade indicate similar, somewhat puzzling, trends. Single parents who are not employed increased their receipt, similar to AFDC; low-wage single parents experienced an even greater increase, 18 percentage points, while medium and high-wage single parents decreased their receipt of food stamps. Since food stamps are not limited to families with children, and are intended to go to very low-income workers' families as well as those on welfare or not employed, the increase in receipt among low-wage single parent householders--and the decrease among higher wage single parents--is not inconsistent with public policy in the eighties (which attempted to decrease eligibility among groups not deemed in need, such as students.) Thus, decreased food stamp receipt among all groups of medium and high wage workers is consistent. But for the same reasons, the decrease in food stamp receipt among low-wage single men and women and married fathers, who are likely to be eligible, is contrary to expectations.

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[12] Basically, after four months, AFDC payment levels are reduced almost a dollar for each dollar earned; before 1981, welfare recipients could keep roughly 40% of their earnings, plus expenses such as child care, with no time limit, up to an overall limit, of course.

There are other sources of public income assistance, such as general assistance (GA, GPA, PA, etc.), for single adults, but these reach a relatively small proportion of the population. Moreover, there have been few significant changes over the decade (see Appendix Table 1.27)

As with welfare, there has been a decrease in both coverage and level of benefits in unemployment compensation and in workers compensation.[13] These figures are shown in Table 1.23, in which it can be seen that, overall, there is a small but consistent decrease in the receipt of these benefits for virtually all groups. The decrease in receipt of benefits among those not employed, particularly married fathers, probably largely reflects one important change, the virtual demise in the early 1980s of the federally-subsidized extended benefits program, that used to provide benefits to long-term unemployed who had exhausted their state eligibility, usually six months, but were still unemployed. (With a few such exceptions, most unemployment and worker's compensation programs are state-provided benefits.)

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[13] About three-fourths of those receiving either of these benefits in 1984 were receiving unemployment compensation. Because receipt of these two benefits was only ascertained in a single combined question in 1975, it was necessary to combine the separate questions for 1980 and 1984 to get a consistent trend. Also, since wives were not asked about by these benefits in 1975 and 1980 on their own behalf, receipt here reflects receipt by husbands or single household heads only in all three years.

The decrease in unemployment receipt among those who are employed, at all wage levels, is less easy to interpret. It could reflect less need, i.e., fewer workers find themselves unemployed part of the year; alternatively, it could mean that a greater proportion of workers, particularly low-wage single men, married women without children, and married fathers (see Table 1.15) do not meet their states' eligibility requirements when they become unemployed or injured.

In the final table in this series, Table 1.24, the figures show the trend in receipt of the major private income transfer system, that of child support and alimony. Receipt of child support or alimony is not connected to labor force participation, past or present, and thus is most relevant in explaining poverty or welfare receipt. It is interesting to note that the proportion of single parents who receive child support has gone down overall by a modest amount, in spite of increased efforts in the 1980s to enforce child support obligations. (Many of these efforts, however, including the federal Child Support Enforcement Act and the Family Security Act, occurred during 1984 or after.)

Part I.A: Conclusions

The findings presented here document that the changing employment patterns in the American economy are impacting quite differently on different groups. Low-wage employment is increasing, mostly by drawing into the labor force adults who were not previously employed. These new entrants have been disproportionately women; indeed, men have experienced a net decrease in labor force participation.

Among women, mothers are the most likely to become low-wage workers. Married mothers have increased their proportion of low-wage workers more than any other group, but over the 1975-1984 decade, single parents (most with young children under the age of six) also increased their proportion in the low-wage labor force by ten percentage points. Black women, particularly married mothers, increased their labor force participation in medium and high wage employment more than white mothers, but the higher proportion of single parents among blacks increased their proportion of low-wage workers. Thus 45 percent of black low-wage workers in 1984 were mothers, while 35 percent of white low-wage workers were mothers.

Married women without children also increased their employment, mostly in low-wage work, while single women (without children) as well as single men, mostly entered medium and high wage employment. Married black fathers, single black men (without children), and married white men without children, tended to decrease their employment at all wage levels.

Altogether, mothers, both single and married, average 50 percent more than their "share"--based on their proportion among adult householders of low-wage employment, while married men average only 56 percent of their share of low-wage employment.

The shifting demographics of low-wage employment have not led to a change in the characteristics of low-wage workers. Educational attainment of low-wage workers has increased at slightly higher rates than that of the population as a whole, and the proportion with work-affecting disabilities has decreased slightly. The influx of women, and mothers of even very young children has not led to a decrease in the average hours and average weeks worked, but instead a small increase for these groups. In fact, they were surprisingly long, and not all that different from those working at higher wages; in fact, some groups of men, such as married fathers, worked longer hours if they were low-wage than if they were medium or high-wage workers.

The most surprising findings are in the economic impact on families of low-wage employment. First, although increasing over the decade, the mean wage of low-wage workers has actually decreased about six percent in constant dollars. Second, although the proportion of household income contributed by low-wage employment increased for women workers, those most dependent on that income, single parents, found that their poverty also increased. At the same time, although the proportion of family income contributed by married men fell, their poverty rates did not increase, suggesting that the contribution of wives' income was crucial to these families' well-being. Altogether, these changes suggest that low-wage employment has become more important to families' economic well-being, especially those of women, and simultaneously, less effective in meeting family needs and avoiding poverty.

Part I.B: The Dynamics of Low-Wage Employment: Analysis of Spells

In the analyses above, we learned that an increasing number of Americans are engaged in low-wage employment, and that a substantial and increasing minority of these workers are poor in spite of their employment. In the analyses to follow we look at these phenomena at the individual level. We look at the dynamics of low-wage employment, and ask under what circumstances, and for whom, is low-wage employment associated with improvements in the economic status of householders and their families?

There are basically three models of how low-wage employment impacts the economic status of workers and their families. These are not mutually exclusive, but different analyses tend to emphasize different models. The first model conceives of low-wage employment as a first step into the world of work for entering or re-entering workers. In this view, low-wage employment provides "new" workers with the means to acquire skills and experience, which can and is then used to move into higher-wage employment. Thus low-wage work is seen in this first model as a bridge, a transitional status for most workers. This perspective is particularly prominent in discussions of minimum wage work, in which the use of minimum-waged work as entry/training work is emphasized (Mellor, 1987). It is also implicit in much of the policy analysis around welfare reform, such as is found in the Babbitt Commission report on welfare reform (Meyer, 1988).

A second model of low-wage employment conceives of it as a source of extra income for those who have a different source of income to provide the primary source of support for the individual or household, such as students who are still dependents of their parents, and as support for those moving from employment into retirement. An implicit assumption in this model of low-wage employment is that for most low-wage workers, the low earnings from this employment are not problematic because they are adequate to the needs of the individual, or are being met by other sources of income (such as scholarships or pensions) and/or other members of the household.

The third model of low-wage employment is much less sanguine; it sees low-wage employment not as temporary or transitional, but increasingly permanent. In this conceptualization, those experiencing low-wage employment do not find it a stepping-stone to better things, economically speaking, but a more or less permanent status which alternates only with periods of non-employment, welfare receipt, etc. Those who espouse this perspective see the relative permanence of low-wage worker status, the increasing size of the lower-earning portion of the workforce, and the declining middle as phenomena that are linked together, as part of the overall restructuring of the American economy and labor market (Bluestone and Harrison, 1986; see also Cain's review of segmented labor market theories, 1975).

To analyze the impact of low-wage employment on the economic status of individual low-wage workers, and their families, we examine spells of low-wage employment. This analysis begins by identifying valid and complete spells of low-wage employment, that is, spells which have an identifiable beginning, middle and end. Then we examine the status of the individual just before entering the spell, e.g., unemployed, on welfare, and so forth. Next we look at individual statuses after the low-wage spell, whether for example they moved into higher wage employment, were not employed, and so forth. Using the entry and exit status, we develop five spell types, reflecting the different kinds of impact a spell of low wage employment has on individual employment status and family economic status, such as that it improves economic status, has little or no impact, etc. Finally, we look at those individuals who had more than one spell, and determine the character of their experience with low-wage employment.

Identifying Spells of Low-Wage Employment

Because the PSID measures employment and earnings on an annual basis, the "spells" of low-wage employment are measured in years. Thus what constitutes a "year" of low-wage employment is crucial. That is, how many weeks of work in a year, at low wages, would be required for the year to be counted towards a spell of low-wage employment? On the one hand, the nature of low-wage employment makes full-year work (50-52 weeks) clearly too strict a standard. On the other hand, working only half a year or less is on the face of it not a "year" of low-wage work. A compromise between these two splits the difference, with a standard of 40 or more weeks of low-wage work, part or full-time.

Having determined what constitutes a year of low-wage employment, the next issue is that of what to do with censored spells, i.e., those which began before the study period began, or are still going in the last year of the study.[14] That is, some individuals had a year of low-wage employment in the first year of the study, 1968; this could of course be the first year in a spell, or it could be the second, or tenth. Without information about the previous year(s), it is not possible to determine when this spell actually began. Similar problems arise for those who join the study already working at low wages, for those in the midst of a spell who leave the study (i.e., they drop out), and for those in the midst of a spell when the study ended (the last interview year was 1985).[15]

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[14] Censoring also occurs to those who are low-wage workers in the year in which they joined, (e.g., through marriage) or left, the PSID sample.

The problem of spells that are censored, or truncated, is not only that we do not have complete information on their length and outcomes (or pre-spell characteristics for those that are left-censored), but that by eliminating these censored spells, we are systematically biasing the findings. Thus these spells might be longer, or they might be preceded or followed by different statuses or events, or they might be experienced by a different group of people.

To estimate the extent of bias caused by using only completed spells, we made three comparisons. First, we examined the number of censored versus non-censored spells; if the number of censored spells is relatively small, then even if they are different in character, or the individuals are different, the bias introduced by excluding them is relatively small. Second, we determined the race and gender distribution of censored versus non-censored spells of those experiencing them, to determine if elimination of censored spells would introduce race and/or gender bias. Finally, in examining the statuses of individuals just before entering a spell of low-wage employment, we did the analysis first with non-censored spells only, and then with right-censored spells included (i.e., spells which have identified beginnings but the individual left the study or the study ended before the spell was complete).

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[15] The sample of householders eligible to have low-wage spells was limited to those who were in the study for at least three years. This was done because, by definition, to have a non-censored spell, individuals must be in the study for a minimum of at least three consecutive years (one year not in low-wage employment, one year in low- wage employment, followed by one year not in low-wage employment). To do otherwise would introduce a bias; particularly at the beginning and the end of the study period, there would be many individuals who would be eligible only for censored spells because they were only in the study one or two years.

In Table 1.33 the number of spells in this PSID sample is given, divided into those that are censored and those that are not censored. The majority, almost three-fourths of the spells, are not censored in any of the ways described above. This is a direct consequence of the most striking finding in Table 1.33. Most spells of low-wage employment are very short: 63.5 percent (of non-censored spells) are only one year long, and four out of five last two years or less.

Some of the censored spells of a given length probably actually began simultaneously with the beginning of the study or the entry of the individual, or actually ended at the same time as the exit of the individual or the end of the study, even though we lack the information on the subsequent or previous year necessary to confirm that fact. For example, of all spells which began in the last year of the study, a percentage also probably ended in that year, i.e., were one-year spells. Likewise, a percentage of spells that occurred in the last two years of the study were probably in fact two-year spells, and did not continue beyond our last observation point. Using the distribution of non-censored spells (63.5 percent are one-year, etc.), we estimated the number of censored spells which were probably genuinely one-year, two-year, and so forth in length. [16] Altogether, we estimated the length of 39 percent of the censored spells. In terms of length, through this estimation procedure we have accounted for 83 percent of the spells in the study (72.1 percent of the non-censored spells plus 10.9 percent of the censored spells). Thus at least in terms of the crucial variable of length, we have a relatively small minority of spells for which we do not have information about their length, and thus the probable bias introduced by using only non-censored spells is not one of excluding large numbers of spells.

It should be noted that the trend noted earlier, towards an increasing proportion of adults who hold low-wage jobs, also shows up in the increasing numbers of low-wage spells which occur in the later years of the study.[17] Altogether, this gives somewhat more weight to later than earlier spells of low-wage employment; it also means that a large proportion of the censored spells are truncated by the end of the study period and individual exits (right-censored), than by the beginning of the study and individual entries (left-censored; see table 1.33).

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[16] Thus, for example, of the spells that at are (left-) censored because the individuals were already in them (i.e., were already low-wage workers) when the study began in 1967, 47.5% are one year long. (see row 4, Table 1.33) If we estimate that, since 63.5% of non-censored spells are one year long, then 63.5% x 47.5% = 30.2% of these left censored spells are really one-year long. These estimates are shown as "estimated true length" in table 1.33.

[17] The natural increase in the size of the study, e.g., as children in the original sample start their own households as adults, also increases the number of spells. Because of weighing, however, this increase is proportionate to the sample as a whole; that is, there is also an increase in medium-high wage spells, etc.

Finally, an analysis of year by year trends found that the proportion of low-wage spells which are short has increased slightly: for example, the proportion of low-wage spells begun in 1968 which were one year long was 56 percent, while the proportion of spells begun in 1981 which were one year long had increased to 59 percent.[18] Combined with the increased number of low-wage spells in the latter years of the study, this suggests that inferences about the longevity of spells of low-wage employment which are drawn from these estimates of spell length are probably conservative, and overestimate actual spell length. That is, today's spells of low-wage employment are at least as short, and probably shorter, than the spells analyzed here.

Exclusion of censored spells does not seem to result in a significantly different distribution, by race and gender, of those experiencing a spell of low-wage employment. As shown in Table 1.34, both white and black men have slightly higher percentages of censored than non-censored spells, but the differences are not great. White and black women account for a higher proportion of the non-censored spells than their proportion of all spells; but somewhat contradictorily, the average (non-censored) spell length is slightly longer for women of both races than for men. Longer spells should increase the chances, ceteris paribus, of a spell being censored, but apparently other factors counteract this tendency in this case.

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[18] One cannot compare mean spell length because spells begun in latter years have not had the opportunity to be completed by the end of the study period. Thus of spells begun in 1981, only one, two, and three year spells could be measured before the end of the study period.

In sum, we have found that limiting our analysis to low-wage spells that are completed within the study period does not result in a sample that is substantially different either in the length of spells, or in the demographic characteristics of the people experiencing them. Moreover, since only a minority of spells are censored, we have a substantial number of completed spells of low-wage employment to analyze, over 8,000.

Low-Wage Spells: Length

As noted above, average length of a completed spell is quite short, only 1.74 years. At any one point in time, however, the proportion of those who are in the midst of short spells is smaller than the proportion of all spells that are short. This can be seen by analogy to a jail.[19] For the sake of simplicity, we can imagine that there are two types of prisoners, those with one-day sentences, and those with one-week sentences, and that the jail has only two equal-sized cells. If one of the cells houses prisoners who have the week-long sentences, and the other cell houses those with one-day sentences, then over a week, the one-week cell would house the same people, while the one-day cell would have different people in it each day. On any one day, one-half the prisoners would be one-week prisoners, but over the week as a whole, seven-eighths of the spells would be one-day spells and one-eight would be one-week spells, and the average (jail) spell length would be only 1.75 days.

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[19] Bane and Ellwood (1986) use the analogy of a hospital, and chronic versus acutely ill patients.

In Table 1.35, we have calculated similar statistics for low-wage spells. Even when one is examining what the distribution of spells are that are being experienced in any one year, one finds that they are, for the most part, quite short. Almost three out of five persons experiencing a low-wage spell in a given year are in the midst of a one or two year spell, and only one in eight is in the midst of a spell that is six or more years long.

Not only are low-wage spells generally short, but there is almost no variation in length by race or gender. Women, both black and white, have low-wage spells that are slightly longer than those experienced by men, which if anything runs counter to the portrayal of women as more quickly entering and leaving the labor force (See Duncan, et al, 1984 who found that women were not more likely than men to experience work interruptions).

This finding contrasts strongly with those who are experiencing medium and high wage employment on the one hand, and those who are poor, on the other. In Table 1.36, we give the figures for spells of medium and high wage employment. We include information on censored spells because a much larger proportion of spells of medium/high wage employment spells are censored, more than half. While non-censored spells are only 2.57 years long on the average, this clearly underestimates the true length of medium/high wage spells of employment, for the longer spells are more likely to be censored. Thus the average length of censored spells is over six years, and obviously, the real length is longer. Even of the non-censored spells, over 15 percent are five years or longer, compared to less than five percent of low-wage spells that are that long.

In Table 1.37, we calculate the comparable figures for spells of poverty, using data from Bane and Ellwood (1987). These figures are also drawn from the PSID, but are not limited to husbands and wives and single heads of household; there are other methodological differences as well, but these numbers do give a rough basis of comparison. Again, the proportion with short one and two year spells of poverty is small, and half of those experiencing a spell of poverty in a given year are in the midst of an eight year or longer spell of poverty. In contrast, the average person experiencing a spell of low-wage employment is in the midst of a two-year spell.

One possible explanation for this finding, that the vast majority of low-wage spells are short, is that the criterion for a spell--40 or more weeks of work at or below the low-wage threshold--was too strict. To test for this possibility, we examined the pattern of low-wage spells using a "liberal" definition of a year of low-wage work: three or more months (13 weeks) of employment at or below the low-wage threshold. This could conceivably add years onto a spell--and fill in years--when weeks worked fell below the strict, but not the liberal threshold; alternatively, it could add "little" spells of one or two years in which a person worked between three and nine months at low wages. Both of these phenomena are apparent in the figures in Table 1.38. The number of spells observed is increased by one-third, the length of spells only increases slightly, by one-tenth of a year. Overall, the distribution in terms of the number of spells which are one-year long, two-years long, and so forth, is virtually unchanged. Thus most of the change is in the number of spells. This suggests that the distribution of low-wage spells by length in months is probably continuous, so that whatever cut-off is used to define a "year" of low-wage employment, most low-wage spells will be short.

When contrasted with the findings on both medium/high wage spells, and spells of poverty, one is struck by the inherent instability of low-wage employment. It is not so much that the experience of low-wage employment is fleeting--although for some it clearly is as we shall see below--but rather that those who are "low-wage workers" by and large experience low-wage employment at best intermittently, interspersed with periods of unemployment and/or out of the labor force statuses. It is ironic that those who are better off, in medium/high wage employment and those who are worse off, in poverty, experience considerably more "stability" than do low-wage workers. The shortness of spells of low-wage employment also suggests that low-wage workers should not be assumed to be actually employed at low-wage work on a more or less indefinite, on-going basis. While the demographic characteristics of those in low-wage employment may be stable from year to year, the individuals who are actually employed at low-wage employment clearly vary from year to year to a great extent.

Entering Low-Wage Employment

Given the shortness of spells of low-wage employment, what precedes and follows low-wage employment becomes crucial. In this section we examine what people bring to low-wage employment, that is, what their previous status in or out of the labor force has been in the year(s) previous to becoming a low-wage worker. In the next section we look at what people do after their spell of low-wage employment, and then we put these two analyses, of spell entry and exit statuses, together into an analysis of spell types.

Before people begin a spell of low-wage employment, they may be classified into one of several statuses; the classifications used here are mutually exclusive categories. In Table 1.39 the distribution of pre-low wage statuses is shown, arranged roughly from completely out of the labor force statuses through various degrees and recency of employment experience, to part and full-year employment. The first status, that of "child," means that in the year before the person started a spell of low-wage employment, he/she was a dependent in a family, and became independent (that is, became a head or co-head of a household) in the first year of low-wage employment.[20] In similar fashion, those who were in institutions (including hospitals, jails, etc.), or were students, but not employed, were categorized in the second category. Likewise, the third category includes those who were (self-)classified as disabled, or who had retired but are now returning to employment.

The second group of statuses distinguishes between those who are not currently employed but have been, or could have been, employed in the past. Those who received 50 percent or more of their income from welfare, including AFDC, General Assistance and other welfare, in the year previous to the beginning of the spell of low-wage employment, were classified as on welfare; welfare was a priority code, that is, it superceded the other statuses (see below for a more detailed analysis of welfare and low-wage employment). The first group are those who have not worked recently (within the last two years), and have not ever worked more than two years since they were 18 years old. The second group also has been unemployed for at least two years, but has worked in the past for three or more years.[21] The third group are those who are unemployed in the year previous to the beginning of the spell of low-wage employment, but were employed the year before.

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[20] Such a person may have already been working as a low-wage worker while a dependent, but would not have been in our sample until they became an adult head or co-head of household.

[21] These two categories were coded using data from the pre-spell years of the PSID, plus information from a retrospective question that asked about lifetime work experience. This

The third group of status categories classifies part-year workers by their wage rates, as either low-wage or medium/high wage. Part-year workers worked at least three but not more than nine months in the year previous to the beginning of the low-wage spell.

The largest single pre-spell status category is that of full-year medium/high wage employment, which accounts for over a third of those entering low-wage employment. Next in importance are the part-year statuses, which account for a little over one-fourth of the pre-spell statuses. Together, these categories account for close to two-thirds of those entering low-wage spells; clearly, most low-wage workers have been working, although not necessarily steadily or full-time.

Another fifth of those entering low-wage employment, though currently unemployed, have been employed, some as recently as the previous year. Although most of the remaining group have little or no work experience, among those who enter a spell of low-wage employment from a non-employed status, almost one out of five do so as newly-independent adults. Finally, only 1.6 percent of

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question was asked of all PSID respondents in 1974 and 1976, and of all new respondents in their first year in the study. If the respondent had not worked in the two years before entering the low-wage spell, and dropped out or died, etc., before 1974, and was not asked the work history question, and there was no other evidence of previous work history, then he/she was assumed to be long term unemployed, with little or no work history.

those entering low-wage employment were previously dependent on welfare for half or more of their income.

In Table 1.40 we examine the pre-spell distribution of statuses by gender, marital and family status. As one would expect, among single adults with no children, a large percentage enter low-wage employment from "child"/dependent status: 20.7 percent of single men, and 14.0 percent of single women, compared to 6.8 percent overall. Likewise, two-thirds of married fathers enter low-wage employment from a previous status of medium/high wage employment, and another one-fifth from working part of the year at either low or medium/high wages.

Almost half of married mothers (almost five times the overall average) enter low-wage employment with little or no employment experience, especially recently. In contrast, relatively few single parents have been out of the labor force for as long as married mothers (a little over a fifth), while a third have been working part of the year, and over a fifth have been working nine months or more at medium/high wages.

Almost a fifth of married women without children enter low-wage employment without recent work experience, almost twice the overall average. This probably reflects not only the rise in labor force participation of women overall, but also the concentration in low-wage employment among women entering and re-entering the labor market noted above. Married men without children, on the other hand, are like married fathers, and disproportionately enter low-wage employment from other employed statuses, having been medium/high wage workers, or having worked part of the previous year.

Differences by race, shown in Table 1.41, largely reflect the overall higher and more secure status of white males in the labor market. Thus among married fathers entering a spell of low-wage employment, white fathers are more likely than black fathers to have been part-year workers at medium/high wages (12.5 percent vs. 9.5 percent), or full-year medium/high wage workers (68.0 percent vs. 63.1 percent). Black fathers were more likely to have been part-year low-wage workers (12.9 percent vs. 8.9 percent of white fathers).

Although earnings and income are lower for black women compared to white women, their higher rates of labor force participation are reflected in a higher percentage of black women, particularly married women, entering from employed statuses than for white women. Thus married black mothers are more likely to enter a spell of low-wage employment from full-year medium/high wage employment (23.5 percent vs. 20.6 percent for white married mothers), or part-year medium/high wage employment (12.2 percent vs. 9.2 percent), while white married mothers are more likely to have had little or no previous work history (13.7 percent vs. 9.6 percent for black mothers.)

Single parents, most of whom are women, show somewhat different patterns by race. While white single parents are more likely to enter low-wage employment with little work experience at all (9.4 percent vs. 7.2 percent), or no recent employment

(11.8 percent vs. 5.2 percent), black single parents are more likely to have been recently employed (6.2 percent vs. 3.9 percent), but are also more likely to have been on welfare (16.2 percent vs. 8.1 percent) or have been a dependent "child" (10.2 percent vs. 4.3 percent). The latter finding means that about one in ten single black parents entering low-wage employment are doing so at the same time as they are setting up independent households for themselves and their children. They may also have just started the families that made them single parents; at the least, even if they had started their family while residing with their own parents, their children are very young.

The similarities among single parents as well as the differences should be noted: while a sizable minority of single parents enter low-wage employment without recent work experience (from welfare or dependent/child status for blacks, from little or no work history for whites), the majority of both black and white single parents enter low-wage employment from an employed status, either part-year or full-year.

In Appendix Table 1.2A the distribution of entry statuses is given for all spells with a valid observable beginning but not necessarily observed ending; thus this table includes completed spells (as in Table 1.40), plus spells censored either by the end of the study, or by the individual leaving the study. The distribution by entry statuses, for all groups, and for gender, marital and family status groups, is nearly identical to the distribution reported in Table 1.40 for completed spells only:

of 70 cells (ten entry statuses, seven family/marital/gender groups), only four differ by more than one percent between the two tables, and none by more than two percent. In short, the exclusion of censored spells does not result in a substantially different distribution of entry statuses.

How does changing the definition of a low-wage spell to the more liberal, three months or more employment at low-wage, affect the distribution of entry statuses? Basically, the "liberal" definition of a low-wage spell eliminates the entry status of "part-year, low-wage work" by making that a valid year of low-wage work. (To be consistent, medium/high wage work as a pre-entry status was coded using the "liberal" criterion of three months or more.) With fewer categories, all of the proportions increase. But as can be seen in Table 1.42, some increase much more than others: while there is a slight increase in the number of entries from the out of the labor force categories (child, student, welfare, and so forth), the largest increases are in those with no recent employment, with and without earlier work experience, followed by those recently unemployed. (Medium/high wage employment, when part-year and full-year categories in Table 1.40 are combined, as they are in Table 1.42, has virtually no change in its proportion of entry statuses). Since the length of "liberal" low-wage spells is almost the same as the stricter definition, an average of 1.8 versus 1.7 years long, the effect of the changed definition is clearly to mostly add new spells. These additional spells are apparently concentrated among those who have not experienced recent employment, and may in fact have very little work experience.

Within specific gender/marital/family status groups this same distribution is generally found. (These data are reported in Appendix Table 1.3). The exceptions, however, are striking. Thus 86.6 percent of married fathers enter a spell of low-wage employment, as defined "liberally", from medium/high wage employment; the percentage of married men without children is nearly as high at 60.7 percent. In contrast, only 31.9 percent of married mothers, 35.8 percent of single parents (the vast majority of whom are women), and 41.8 percent of married women without children enter low-wage employment spells from medium/high wage employment. Rather, approximately two-thirds of married mothers, one-third of single parents, and almost half of married women without children, enter liberally-defined spells from non-employed statuses, most with little or no recent work experience. Altogether, the contrasts between men and women, and by marital and family status, are greater when the liberal definition of a low-wage spell is used.

Exiting Low-Wage Employment

Exit statuses parallel entry statuses, with some important and obvious exceptions. Although theoretically a young adult could return to his/her family of origin, and become a "child"/ dependent again, in the PSID that person would continue to be coded as an independent adult; thus child/dependent is not exit status. On the other hand, a small number of spells are ended by the death of the respondent. In addition, because we do not have information for all spells on subsequent post-spell years, e.g., two, three etc. years after the spell noted (particularly for the later spells), the distinction between short and long-term unemployment made for entry statuses cannot be made for exits.

Even given the differences noted above, there is a substantial difference in the exit distribution of low-wage spells: more people exit to employment status from a spell of low-wage employment, particularly medium/high wage employment, than entered low-wage employment from an employed status (77.9 percent vs. 63.6 percent; see Table 1.43.) All of that increase, moreover, is in full-year, medium/high wage employment; the proportions in part-year low-wage and part-year medium/high-wage employment are almost identical before and after a spell of low-wage employment. The corresponding decreases are split between non-working statuses, and out of the labor force statuses. The most dramatic difference is that far more people enter low-wage employment as youth than exit through death. There are also many more who enter low-wage employment from student status or an institution, than exit to either of these statuses.
Surprisingly, there is only a very slight increase in the number of people who exit low-wage employment into retirement, or with a disability, than entered from that status, suggesting that use of low-wage employment as a transition out of employment is not

nearly as common as its use as a transition into the labor force.

In Table 1.44, the distribution of exit statuses is given for marital/family and gender groups. The differences between groups parallel those found with the entry statuses, with the overall differences--of increased employment and decreased unemployment and out of the labor force statuses--shared proportionately. Perhaps the most dramatic difference is found in the single parent group: those not employed dropped from 22.4 percent before a spell of low-wage employment to 12.8 percent afterwards, and those with full-year (more than nine months) jobs paying medium/high wages increased from 22.6 percent before the low-wage spell to 41.2 percent afterwards.

Finally, in Table 1.45 the distribution of exit statuses is given for exits, using the liberal definition of a low-wage spell, i.e., three months or more at low-wage employment. As with the distribution of the liberal-definition entry statuses, there is a larger proportion of spells ending in employment than with the strict definition of a low-wage spell. But the increase between entry and exit in employment status almost exactly parallels that found above when the strict definition is used. That is, using the liberal definition of a low-wage spell of employment, 47.8 percent of those entering a low-wage spell were working, part or full-year, at medium/high wage employment, but that proportion increased to 63.1 percent after the spell. Finally, the distributions by gender, marital, and family status groups also parallel the findings detailed above for the strict definition of a low-wage spell; these distributions can be found in Appendix Table 1.4.

Spells of Low-Wage Employment

A Typology of Low-Wage Spells

The above analysis suggests that low-wage employment acts as a transition for youth, or others with little work experience, into more stable, and better-paying jobs. At the same time, there are clearly some groups or sub-groups for whom low-wage employment is not a step up; thus there are approximately as many single parents who return to welfare after a spell of low-wage employment as there are who leave welfare for low-wage employment. There is also the technical, but important problem that marital and family status may change over the course of a spell, so that those who were single parents at entry to low-wage employment may not be single parents after the spell ends, at exit, and vice versa. Thus we may not be looking at the same people in a particular sub-group when comparisons are made between entry and exit status.

To examine these issues we divided the low-wage spells into five types on the basis of the entry and exit statuses. The five types are: A. Medium/High-wage Interrupted, B. Upwardly Mobile, C. Status Unchanged/Ambiguous, D. Downwardly Mobile, and E. Non-work Interrupted. The definition of the five types and spells, and how each entry-exit combination was classified, are given in Chart 1.1.

Type A, Medium/High Wage Interrupted spells are those who worked at medium/high wages both before and after the spell of low-wage employment, in most cases full-year both before and afterwards. In fact 25 percent of the spells are ones in which the person worked full-year at medium/high wages both before and after the low-wage spell. (The percentage of spells of each entry-exit combination, and the spell type classification, are given in Table 1.46.)

Type B spells, Upwardly Mobile, are ones in which the individual moved from being out of the labor force entirely, or unemployed, through the spell of low-wage employment, into medium/high wage employment, part or full year. Type B also includes those who worked part of the year, at low or medium/high wages, before the spell of low-wage employment, but after the spell of low-wage employment, worked at either medium/high wages, or full-year, or both. Thus Type B spells are ones in which the individual experiencing it has higher wages and/or more employment after than before the low-wage spell, and has moved "up."

Type C spells, Status Unchanged/Ambiguous are unclear as to their outcome. While individuals experiencing these spells moved from non-employed statuses, or part-year low-wage employment, into full-year employment with the low-wage spell, their employment status after the low-wage spell is somewhat of a step backwards, or downward, as they end up in only part-year low-wage employment. Altogether, Type C spells are ambiguous because those who experience them are neither clearly better off, nor clearly worse off, as a result of the low-wage spell.

Type D spells, Downwardly Mobile are the opposite of Type B spells: individuals experiencing them are clearly worse off, in employment status, after the low-wage spell as compared to before the spell. Thus individuals experiencing Type D spells were employed, part or full-year, at low or medium/high wages before the low-wage spell, but afterwards are in a not-employed status, either out of the labor force, e.g., retired, on welfare, or simply not working.

Type E spells, Non-work Interrupted, are in a sense, the mirror image of Type A spells. In the case of Type E spells, the spell of low-wage employment interrupts a non-employed status. Thus individuals experiencing Type E spells were not employed before the low-wage spell, and are not working afterwards, so that the work done at low-wages during the spell "interrupts" a non-work pattern. Type E spells include youth who become students after the spell, retirees who return to retirement, and those on welfare who return to welfare.

The Distribution of Low-Wage Spells

In Table 1.47, the distributions of the five spell types are shown, by race and gender. We have included mean spell length in this table to show the variation by spell type, race and gender. While there is a clear progression from shorter to longer, as one moves from the more successful (Type A and Type B) to the less successful spell types, the overall difference is small: Type A spells are roughly three months shorter, on the average, than Type E spells. Likewise, there is also a tendency for women to have longer spells than men, regardless of race. (Because these differences are small, mean spell length is not shown in subsequent text tables, but can be found in the appendix tables). Also, we do not show breakdowns in subsequent tables, for those of other race or ethnic groups (Hispanic, Asian), as the numbers become too small, although these individuals are included in the "all" totals.

The figures in Table 1.47 make clear that the majority of low-wage spells result in the individual ending up better off than during the low-wage spell, at least in terms of wage rates. Thus 30 percent of the spells are Type A, Medium/High Wage Interrupted,[22] and about 30 percent were Type B, Upwardly Mobile.

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[22] It is possible that the movement into, and/or out of, a spell of low-wage employment involves a very small change, for example, in wages; since the low-wage threshold used here changes each year to reflect inflation, it is possible that a person could begin a low-wage spell (or even end it), without any change in his/her wage. This is particularly an issue with Type A spells, which by definition involve a "change" from medium/high wage rates to wages below the low-wage threshold, and at the end of the spell, from low wages to wages above the threshold. Thus technically, one could begin a spell in 1984 by moving from an average wage of just over $5.30 per hour in 1983, to just under $5.30 per hour in 1984, or from $5.31 to $5.29 per hour. To determine how many spell beginnings and endings involve such minimal changes, two analyses were done, with the first determining how many spell beginnings or endings involved changes in the ratios of the wage to that year's threshold of less than 10%, and the second looking at changes of less than 20 percent. These are much wider bands of course, than the 2 cents in the example above, e.g., it would include changes in wages of about 53 cents or less between 1983 and 1984.

Using the 10 percent or less change criterion for Type A

The other three spells roughly divide the remaining 40 percent, with Type C Status Unchanged/Ambiguous spells accounting for about 12 percent, Type D Downwardly Mobile spells 14 percent, and Type E spells--Non-work Interrupted--about 13 percent of all spells.

An examination of these distributions by race, and particularly gender, reveal quite different distributions. In general, men, including black as well as white men in most instances, have a higher percentage of the more successful spells, while women's experience with low-wage employment is much more likely to be ambiguous, or negative in its impact on their employment status. Thus 46.6 percent of men (47.5 percent of white men and 41.3 percent of black men) have Type A spells, compared to 21.1 percent of women (20.7 percent of white women and 23.7 percent of black women). At the other extreme, women are much more likely to have a low-wage spell interrupt, but not affect, their non-work status: about 17.5 percent of Type E spells are experienced by women (17.2 percent of white and 19.2 percent of black women) but only 5.2 percent by men (7.0 percent of the white, and 4.8 percent of the black men). While the pattern is not clear-cut with the Upwardly and Downwardly Mobile Spell types (Types B and D), almost twice the proportion of Type

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spells only, about 7 percent of spell beginnings, and about 5 percent of exits, but less than 2 percent of both entries and exits involve changes of less than 10 percent. Using the 20 percent or less change criterion, about 24 percent of spell beginnings, and 15 percent of spell endings, but less than 9 percent of both the spells beginning and ending involve changes that are less than 20 percent.

C spells, Status Unchanged/Ambiguous, happen to women compared to men (14.1 percent compared to about 7.3 percent of men; see Table 1.47).

Our next analysis looks even closer at who has what kind of spells, this time dividing the spells by marital and family status. Unlike gender and race, however, marital and/or family status may change between the pre-spell and post-spell year; thus we analyze separately the distribution of spells for those whose marital and family status did not change, and those who did.

The first analysis is of those with unchanged marital status: 84.2 percent of all spells were experienced by individuals whose marital and/or family status did not change. The distribution of spell types by marital and family status is shown in Table 1.48. The differences are quite striking. Almost two-thirds of married fathers have Type A spells, the largest proportion; married men without children also had a disproportionate number of Type A spells, which account for 44 percent of all spells experienced by this group. In contrast, mothers had very few Type A spells--one out of six spells among married mothers, and one out of five among single parents were Type A spells. The incidence of Type B spells, Upwardly Mobile, compensates in part, but not completely, for this inequality; that is, spells experienced by mothers, both married and single, are more likely to be Type B (34.9 percent and 34.1 percent, respectively) than those experienced by married men, fathers or not (21.0 percent and 21.4 percent). In part, this reflects the greater likelihood of women to be out of the labor force, unemployed, or in low-wage (part-year) employment, so that a spell of low-wage employment is in fact a bridge between a non-employed status and a higher-waged employed status. But it is also true that the highest proportion of Type B spells are experienced by single men with no children (43.8 percent of spells experienced by childless single men are of Type B); for many of these men, this is a bridge from youth/student or similar statuses (See above).

Examination of the incidence of spell types C, D, and E make these findings even clearer. While only about 15 percent of spells experienced by married fathers are one of these types, almost half of the spells experienced by married mothers, single parents, and married and single women without children, are one of these three types. Since those who experience these types of spells end up no better off (Type C), or worse off than they were before or during the low-wage spell (Types D and E), it is clear that the model of low-wage employment as a steppingstone to better employment status is one which is much more applicable to men, particularly married fathers and young single men (without children). Put another way, most men who experience low-wage employment either find it is a back-up or transition between two better-paying jobs (especially true of married fathers), or that it is a transition into better employment; in contrast, women (especially mothers, married or single) who experience low-wage employment are more likely than men to find it is an interruption, and an "unsuccessful" one, in a pattern of non-employment, or that it has no impact, positive or negative, on their employment status (married and single mothers, and single women without children). At the same time, and somewhat counter to this broad gender difference, women who have a spell of low-wage employment are more likely then men to experience upward mobility as a result (Type B spells), particularly again if they are mothers (See Table 1.48).

The same patterns appear when these groupings are divided by race, with some notable exceptions (data are in Appendix Tables 1.6B and 1.6C). In general, the strong differences by gender are less apparent among blacks than among whites. For example, among whites, 65.4 percent of the spells experienced by married fathers are Type A spells compared to only 16.0 percent of the spells experienced by married mothers, while among blacks the percentages are 55.1 percent and 19.1 percent, respectively. A second difference is that, controlling for marital and family status, blacks of either gender are less likely to experience Type B, Upwardly Mobile, spells; thus 46.5 percent of spells experienced by white single men are Type B spells, while 32.7 percent of spells experienced by black single men are Type B. Among single parents, the percentage of Type B spells is 39.3 percent for whites and 27.0 percent for blacks.

With the less successful spell types, the pattern reverses, with black men more likely to experience Spells of Type D, Downwardly Mobile, than white men, controlling for marital and family status. Type E spells, Interrupted Non-Work, occur most often to white married mothers, black single parents, and black single men. These three groups probably reflect very different dynamics. The white married mothers are probably moving between unpaid work in the home and paid employment, and back, but are in families in which the most of the resources do not come from their own earnings (See above). Black single parents, however, are probably alternating between their own employment and other sources of support, including public assistance. Finally, the disproportionate number of Type E spells experienced by black single men simply underscores the high rates of unemployment and unsuccessful attempts of many black men to get into regular employment.

In Table 1.49, the distribution of spell types is shown for those who experienced a change in marital and/or family status during the spell of low-wage employment.[23] While the gender differences described above are apparent here as well, there are important differences.[24] Unlike men in general, particularly married fathers, men who experience the beginning of a marriage or a family during the spell of low-wage employment are much less likely to experience Type A spells, but are much more likely to experience Type B, Upwardly Mobile spells. This probably reflects their relatively recent entry into the labor force as young men/new fathers. Interestingly, men who are experiencing the end of marriage, or the loss of children (which could be through divorce, or their reaching adulthood), are disproportionately likely to experience a Type A spell, an interruption in medium/high wage employment. (The distribution of other spell types is not substantially different for men undergoing marital and/or family status change, compared to men whose status is unchanged; compare figures in Tables 1.48 and 1.49.)

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[23] In some cases both kinds of change may have occurred. "During the spell" includes changes that happened between the year before the spell began and any year during the spell, or the year afterwards.

[24] Because spells which occurred concurrently with a change in marital and/or family status include only about 15 percent of all spells, these detailed breakdowns provide less stable estimates of the true incidence and distribution.

The incidence of Type A spells among women who get married, or separated/divorced, however, are very similar to those of married and single women, respectively. Indeed, for women, change in marital or family status, of any kind, does not result in substantially different distributions of spell types, compared to the closest similar unchanged marital/family status categories for those experiencing low-wage spells of employment. (Compare, for example, the incidence of spell types of women becoming separated/divorced in Table 1.49, with single parents in Table 1.48).

Finally, although the underlying sample sizes for individual categories are small, there is a consistent pattern whereby those who experience a change in marital/family status, generally experience longer spells, of every type, than those whose marital and family status did not change (See Table 1.49 and Appendix Tables 1.7A, 1.7B, 1.7C and 1.7D).

The Economic Impact of Spells of Low-Wage Employment: Family Income

What is the impact of a spell of low-wage employment on the economic status of a worker's family? We answer that question with two different types of analyses. First, we look at the percentage of family income contributed (from his/her earnings) before, during, and after the spell by the worker experiencing the spell; second, we look at the family's poverty status before and after the low-wage spell.

Not surprisingly, the type of low-wage spell makes a big difference in terms of its impact on family economics, as shown in Table 1.50. Thus for those who experienced Type A spells, their average contribution to family income fell during the spell--from 62 percent to 53 percent, and then rose again to 59 percent, because these individuals had higher wages both before and after the spell than during the spell. Type B spells, upwardly mobile, show an average increase in the percentage of family income that is contributed by earnings: from 27 percent of family income before the spell, to 45 percent during the spell, to 52 percent after the spell. Thus, on the average, those who experience Type B spells not only enhance their employment status, but also increase their contribution to the family exchequer. Type C spells, Status Unchanged/Ambiguous, show more positive impacts than might be assumed from the impact on individual employment status. Thus individuals experiencing Type C spells substantially increase their contribution to family income when they begin the spell, from 19 percent to 30 percent, then drop back to 26 percent after the spell, resulting in a net increase in the contribution to family income.

Those who experience Type D spells, Downwardly Mobile, experience a slight decrease in their average percentage of family income from what it was before the spell--from 37 percent to 34 percent--but a substantial decrease after the spell, to only 15 percent of family income. This loss is especially troubling because the level of the pre-spell contribution for Type D spells had been high, higher than any other spell type except Type A.

Individuals who experience Type E spells, Non-work Interrupted, contribute relatively little to family income before and after the spell (three percent and four percent, respectively), and their contribution during the spell, though an increase, is still only a modest 13 percent of family income.

Before leaving Table 1.50, it should be noted that the percentage of family income contributed by low-wage employment during the spell--when presumably everyone is equal because all are employed full-year at low wage--is nevertheless higher for the "better" (in terms of employment status outcome) spell types (A and B), and worse for Type E, the least successful. This suggests that even during the spell, the subsequent status--where one is heading--is apparent in such an economic indicator as contribution to family income. Especially since the average spells are so short, this further suggests that what is happening before, and what happens afterward, as well as what happens during low-wage employment itself, are equally important in understanding when low-wage employment works, and when it does not. In short, what goes before and what comes afterwards is all of a piece with the low-wage spell itself.

In Table 1.51, the impact on family income of different spell types is shown for blacks and whites, men and women. While in general, the patterns are similar to those described above, there are some important differences. First, men who experience Type A spells generally end up with a smaller contribution to family income than when they started. In contrast, women, both black and white, end up contributing more to family income after experiencing a Type A low-wage spell. Second, while all four race gender groups experiencing Type B spells end up contributing more to family income than when they started, white men and black women experienced the largest increases in their contributions to family income over the spell at 29 percent each (See Table 1.51). Third, of those who experience Type C spells, blacks--both men and women--are more likely than whites to almost maintain their contribution to family income at the level it achieved during the spell. Fourth, while both blacks and whites experience a decrease in family contributions if they experience Type D spells, the decrease is greater for blacks. Finally, whites who experience Type E spells increase their contribution to family income during the spell, but not afterwards, and do so from a very low base. Black men, in contrast, already contribute substantially to family income (from only three months or less employment) and greatly increase that contribution during, but not after, the low-wage spell. Black women, although starting and ending with a low base--an average of three percent of family income before and after the spell--increase that contribution during the spell significantly, to over 26 percent. Given the low earnings obtainable from low-wage employment, by definition, these dramatic changes in contributions to family income reflect the lower average family income of black compared to white families, and the lack of substantial non-earnings sources of income (child support, unemployment compensation), or other earners in these families (wives, adult children).

The Economic Impact of Spells of Low-Wage Employment: Poverty

Although the threshold for low-wage was set at the poverty line for a family of four (that is, the wage at which a person working full-time and year-round would be able to support a family of four at the poverty line), most of those who experience a spell of low-wage employment are never poor. As can be seen in Table 1.52, the incidence of poverty is, as was true of the contribution of family income, closely related to the type of low-wage spell. Only 2.7 percent of those who experienced Type A spells were ever poor, before or after the spell (or both before and after). At the other extreme, 27.5 percent, more than one in four, of those experiencing Type E spells were poor before, after, or both before and after the spell.

Likewise, when one is poor follows the expected pattern. Those who had Type B spells, Upwardly Mobile, were much more likely to be poor before but not after the spell--10.9 percent vs. 0.8 percent, while the reverse was true of those with Type D spells, of whom 2.5 percent were poor before, and 12.6 percent were poor afterwards. Likewise, Type C and E spells, which as we have seen have much smaller impacts on individual employment status and family income, also do not see dramatic changes in poverty status as individuals go through the spells: in Type C spells, 9.6 percent were poor before, 8.2 percent were poor afterwards, and 8.5 percent were poor both before and afterwards. Type E spells had similar patterns, with little difference between before and after in the incidence of poverty, but a high percentage, 12.6 percent, who remained poor both before and after, and despite the low-wage employment spell.

In Table 1.53 we have collapsed the distinctions as to when poverty occurred (before, after, or both before and after), and have looked at the incidence of ever-poor, by race and gender, and spell type. Not surprisingly, black men have two times the incidence of poverty compared to white men experiencing the same type spell. For men, these racial differences reflect race differentials in wages and, particularly in Type E spells, the differential in labor force participation rates between black and white men.

The contrasts between black and white women are even more striking, with black women averaging over three times the poverty incidence compared to white women. Since there is much less difference in wages by race among women than men (and some of that difference is made up by the larger number of hours worked by black than white women), the difference in poverty incidence is probably due to the much larger proportion of white women compared to black women who are wives. Thus even when they experience less positive types of low-wage spells, such as Type D, Downwardly Mobile, white women are less likely to be poor because of earnings and other income from their husbands and/or other members of the family. (The same is also probably true of white men--their wives' income prevents their families from being poor--but is less important than for married women.) Unfortunately, this suggests that the low incidence of poverty associated with spells experienced by white women is probably in spite of, not because, of the low-wage spells. When, as with black men and black women, there is greater dependence on one earner, and the possible poverty impact is unmitigated by others' earnings or income, it is clear that there is a substantial incidence of poverty associated with low-wage spells.

Low-Wage Employment Spells and Welfare

Much of the debate on welfare reform in the eighties has been about how to increase employment, usually at low wages, of those on welfare. Although research by Bane and Ellwood (1983) and others found that only about a third of recipients left welfare because of increased earnings--a larger proportion left because of ineligibility due to marriage or children growing up--employment has received increased emphasis for the simple reason that it is seen as the one means of reducing the welfare rolls that can be impacted by public policy intervention (MacDonald and Sawhill, 1978). Thus many of the provisions of the Family Support Act enacted in September 1988 are aimed at increasing the employability of welfare recipients through education, training, and employment programs, as well as making the transition to employment easier financially by extending medical and child care support for up to a year afterwards.

The emphasis on the employment solution is based on a number of assumptions about the way in which employment operates as both a viable alternative to welfare, and as a means to economic self-sufficiency--if not immediately, then eventually. Three of these assumptions are particularly important. First, it is usually assumed that employment, other things being equal, will at least lead to higher income, and hopefully, a lessened incidence of poverty. Although this may not lead to dramatic and immediate increases in income, it is assumed it will happen eventually, because it is also assumed that those who enter low-wage employment will find that it is a bridge to higher-waged employment. Finally, these assumptions about employment as an alternative to welfare presume that for most welfare recipients, paid work is virtually absent as a current, and in many cases past, source of income. Thus, leaving welfare and entering employment would substantially change the basic income source for the households of these recipients.

In part, these assumptions reflect the increasing evidence of the inadequacy of Depression-era social insurance programs to deal with the sudden drops in income, and increasing incidence of poverty, that women experience as a result of such events as divorce, widowhood, and the birth of children (Burkhauser and Duncan, 1988; Bane, 1986.) In other words, if social insurance programs, such as welfare, social security, and so forth do not provide an adequate safety net against income loss and poverty, surely employment is better.

What direct, rather than indirect, empirical evidence there has been to support these assumptions about the viability of employment as an alternative to welfare has derived from studies of welfare recipients (Hutchens, 1981; Plotnick, 1983), particularly those of Bane and Ellwood (1983; 1986). These studies ask such questions as "What proportion of welfare recipients enter welfare because of a drop in earnings, and what proportion leave welfare because of employment, and what enhances that percentage?" Thus Bane and Ellwood (1983) found that relatively few enter welfare because of a drop in earnings, that about a third leave welfare because of employment, and that the presence of pre-school children (controlling for the number of children) was not an important barrier preventing welfare exits via employment. MDRC (Gueron, 1986) found that participation in employment and training programs enhanced somewhat the wages in jobs acquired immediately after leaving welfare. Although these studies do not paint an unduly rosy picture of the impact of employment on income--e.g., a third of recipients leaving welfare for employment are still poor in spite of their earnings in the Bane and Ellwood sample (1983)--the lack of evidence regarding either the length of employment, or subsequent income levels leaves unexamined the assumption of the eventual positive impact of employment on income and poverty. Finally, no recent study examines the assumptions that those on welfare are not working and/or have little or no recent work experience, and that those who enter employment no longer receive welfare. Rein and Rainwater (1978) did look at "income packaging" among welfare recipients; they found that welfare recipients, particularly those who are long-term, are likely to include earnings as well as other types of welfare in their income packages. But their analysis was limited to those currently on welfare, and did not explore either the eventual impact of employment earnings on income, poverty, and welfare receipt, nor the length of employment and its eventual outcome (higher-waged employment, return to welfare, etc.).

In the analysis presented here, we move the focus from those currently on welfare to those entering low-wage employment from welfare and/or returning to welfare from low-wage employment. Starting from low-wage employment, rather than welfare, we explore the circumstances under which low-wage employment does, and does not, provide a viable alternative to welfare. Because we do not assume that those entering low-wage employment have left welfare or that they were not working at all before the spell began, current and past employment is included as one of those circumstances.

In order to more fully capture the relationship between welfare and low-wage employment, we broadened the definition of welfare receipt to include all those who received at least 25 percent of the year's family income from welfare, rather than the 50 percent used above to determine pre-spell status. (This is in fact still a stricter definition than those used by Bane and Ellwood in their studies, which were $400 or one month of welfare; see Bane and Ellwood, 1983, 1986.) Also, many welfare recipients, particularly those who have been or are entering employment, combine welfare with other statuses, either serially (work part of the year, on welfare part of the year), or concurrently (on welfare and working a small amount, but not enough earnings to become ineligible). In order to understand the relationship between welfare and low-wage employment we need to know the pre-spell status, particularly previous labor force experience, and how these are related to spell type and spell outcomes.

We begin this analysis by looking at the pre-spell statuses, in terms of labor force experience and/or current status concurrent with their status as welfare recipients, using the 25 percent of family income criterion.[25] In this analysis, we have taken all those classified as "welfare" in terms of their pre-, or post-spell analysis, and, rather than assume that they are not working, etc., looked at their concurrent statuses, including employment. These figures are shown in Table 1.56, Panel A. While as one would expect, the majority of welfare recipients are not working in the year before they enter a spell of low-wage employment, a substantial percentage, almost one-third, are working either part-year or full-year, and almost half of these (14.3 percent) have medium/high wages (See Table 1.56). (This compares to 63.6 percent of the sample as a whole whose pre-spell status was that of employed; see Table 1.39.) The proportion of black compared to white spellees who are both employed and receiving welfare in the year before the low-wage spell is somewhat lower (26.8 percent versus 43.9 percent), reflecting the general tendency for black single parents to be less employed than white single parents.[26]

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[25] This analysis is confined to women-maintained families because the number of two-parent families on welfare, both nationally and in the PSID sample is very small (less than 10 percent of the caseload), and therefore not large enough to provide stable and accurate estimates.

An even higher percentage, 45.2 percent, of those who receive welfare in the year after ending a low-wage spell, are also employed in that year. Again, that proportion is somewhat lower for blacks compared to whites: 37.6 percent and 50.2 percent, respectively are both employed and receiving welfare in the year after the low-wage spell of employment. But for both races, the number employed is substantial. Clearly, the dichotomy that is often drawn between being on welfare, and working, is at best inadequate, and certainly misleading. Thus welfare recipients who enter employment are not necessarily moving from a non-employed to an employed status, but rather changing the wages or hours worked.

Just as it cannot be assumed that those who were receiving welfare before or after beginning a spell of low-wage employment were not also employed, the converse cannot also be assumed, that is, that those who have begun a spell of low-wage employment have left welfare. In fact, 42.1 percent of those receiving welfare in the year before the low-wage spell began, continued to receive it during the spell; likewise, 35.2 percent of those who received welfare after their spells ended had been receiving welfare during the spell. As can be seen in the two panels of Table 1.57, those who continued to receive welfare during the low-wage spell are less likely to have been working before the spell: 24.2 percent were employed compared to 32.8 percent of all spellees who received welfare before the low-wage spell. Paradoxically, as can be seen in Panel B, those who received welfare during the year after the low-wage spell ended as well as during the low-wage spell, were more likely to be employed than was true of all spellees who received welfare in the year after the spell ended (52.0 percent and 45.2 percent, respectively; see Table 1.56, Panel B, and Table 1.57, Panel B; in both cases, however, the underlying sample numbers are quite small).[27] But whatever the exact proportions, these numbers underscore again that a movement from welfare into low-wage employment does not preclude continued receipt of welfare, nor does the movement from (a spell of) low-wage employment to the receipt of welfare preclude concurrent employment.

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[26] Also, black women receiving welfare are more likely to be young, to have become a parent as a teenager, to have never been married, and to not have finished high school, compared to white welfare recipients; all of these characteristics are correlated with lower rates of labor force participation (see Committee on Ways and Means, 1989).

At the same time that there is considerable overlap between welfare receipt and low-wage employment, there are some for whom the low-wage spell is either the entry or exit vehicle to/from welfare. In Table 1.58, we look at the proportions for whom low-wage spells of employment provide an avenue out of welfare, using the spell typology developed above. The first two spell types by definition are "successful," that is, the spellee's family was not receiving (more than 50 percent of family income from) welfare after the low-wage spell; these two spell types account for almost 30 percent of all those who ever received welfare.[28] This proportion varies very little by race (the proportion of white women welfare recipients with Types A and B spells is 27.9 percent and for blacks, it is 28.6 percent).[29]

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[27] Welfare receipt was defined as receiving an overall average of 25 percent or more of family income from welfare during the years of the spell.

A relatively small proportion, about one out of six recipients, experience Type D, Downwardly Mobile low-wage spells, in which essentially they did not receive welfare before, but did receive it after the low-wage spell. This is probably not due to the effect of the low-wage spell, but rather reflects life events that are likely to lead to welfare receipt, such as becoming a single parent; in data analysis not shown here, most of those welfare recipients who experienced Type D spells, also experienced a change in marital or family status (such as becoming a parent or getting divorced).

Almost a quarter of welfare-low-wage spells are of Type C, in which a low, but employed, status is not improved, but also not worsened, by the low-wage spell; for example, a spellee may work part-year at low-wage, and receive welfare, and subsequent to the spell, return to part-year low-wage employment, with or without welfare. Likewise, for a substantial minority, over 30 percent of ever-welfare recipients, a spell of low-wage employment merely "interrupts" their non-employed status, and probably does not end, or in some cases even interrupt, their receipt of welfare. Finally, we should note that, of the net increase in the percent employed concurrently with welfare receipt--32.8 percent before the low-wage spell and 45.2 percent afterwards, a difference of 12.4 percentage points--almost all of it is in part-year employment (10.5 percentage points); in other words, even among those welfare recipients who successfully improve their employment status via low-wage employment (by becoming medium/high-wage workers) and who have Type A or B spells, few achieve full-year employment.

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[28] Since the criterion for "ever having received welfare" used in this section is 25 percent or more of family income, and that used to define pre- or post-spell status used to determine spell type is 50 percent or more of family income, there are some who have "successful" spell types, but may still be receiving welfare, i.e., if it is less than 50 percent of family income. All of those who have Type A spells have welfare that amounted to more than 25 percent, but less than 50 percent of family income; this number is necessarily small, and hence is a small proportion of the spells experienced by ever-welfare recipients, as well as a small proportion of Type A spells.

[29] These do not average to the overall average because the latter includes those of Other races.

The limited impact of a spell of low-wage employment on those receiving welfare is even more clear when we look at these same patterns using the "liberal" definition of a spell year--three months or more of low-wage employment. Of course, this incorporates all those working part-year either before or after the spell, as well as adds spells that are only part-year low-wage employment. As can be seen in Table 1.59, this eliminates most of those concurrently working and on welfare as pre- or post-spell status; relatively few individuals could work at medium/high wages, even for part of the year and/or part-time and still be eligible for welfare, much less receive more than 25 percent of family income from it.[30] Thus only 9.7 percent of those receiving welfare before their low-wage spells, and 12.3 percent afterwards, were also working. The percentages are similar for those who received welfare both before and during, and during and after, the low-wage spell (See Table 1.60). Finally, in spite of these differences when the liberal definition of a spell year of low-wage employment is used, the proportion of welfare recipients who have Type A or B spells (Medium/High Wage Interrupted and Upwardly Mobile) is almost the same as when the regular definition of low-wage employment was used (See above and Table 1.58). Thus altogether, a substantial majority of those who receive welfare concurrently before and/or after their low-wage spells, are not able to improve their employment status, or even achieve employment of any kind, as a result of a spell of low-wage employment.

This data clearly suggests that public policy reform that is centered on an employment strategy--which in fact is nearly always low-wage employment (Sanders, 1988)--is based on unwarranted and unexamined optimism, on two counts. Low-wage employment does not reduce welfare receipt substantially: as we have seen above, a substantial number of people combine welfare and low-wage employment, and roughly as many spellees exit from a spell of low-wage employment and go onto welfare as enter low-wage spells from welfare. Secondly, relatively few welfare recipients who experience a spell of low-wage employment subsequently achieve better waged employment, and most of those who do only work part-year (three to nine months.)

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[30] In 1984, for example, working at the lowest medium/high wage of $5.31 per hour, one would be ineligible for benefits in the average (median) state if one worked more than about 15 hours per week.

Low-Wage Spells and Persons

Up until now, we have analyzed low-wage employment by looking at spells as the cases. Some persons, of course, have more than one spell. Surprisingly, however, the majority of spells, three-fourths (76.5 percent), are the only low-wage spells that the individual had.

To determine if those who had more than one spell were significantly different in their patterns than those who did not, we looked at what the first two spells looked like for all those who had two or more spells. One might expect that those who move between low-wage work and non-employment statuses would repeat spells more frequently, i.e., they are locked in. In fact, the most common pattern, accounting for over 20 percent of those spellees who repeat spells, was for the first spell to be Type B, Upwardly Mobile, and the second to be Type A, Medium\High Wage Interrupted; next most common (about 15 percent) was to have two Medium\High Wage Interrupted spells (see Table 1.62). Thus those who have less successful spells are not particularly likely to repeat those spells, yet more than a fifth of individuals with two or more spells had a pattern in which both the first and second spell were Types C, D, or E.

Part I.B: Conclusions

Our first conclusion from our examination of the dynamics of low-wage employment is that low-wage employment is not just like medium/high wage employment, except with lower earnings, but is qualitatively different. Basically, low-wage employment is experienced in spells that are short: overall, they average 1.74 years and 80 percent are no more than two years long. They are short compared to medium/high wage employment spells, which average between two and six years long[31], and they are even short compared to spells of poverty or welfare receipt. No matter who experiences them, black or white, men or women, there is no meaningful difference in the length of spell; likewise, spells that lead to better wages and spells that end in a return to welfare or unemployment, and all the other types of spells, are roughly equal in length--short.[32] Such universality and lack of variation suggests that it is not the characteristics of the individuals who experience low-wage employment--which do vary--

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[31] Even with an eighteen year study, a very high proportion of medium/high wage spells are censored; while non-censored spells average 2.6 years, censored medium/high wage spells average 6.25 years, and obviously, many are longer but cannot be measured.

[32] However, of those experiencing low wage spells in any one year, forty percent are in a spell lasting 3 years or longer.

that makes low-wage employment so short-lived, but that it is inherent in the structure of low-wage employment.

Because most spells of low-wage employment are so short-lived, understanding their impact on workers and their families must include an examination of what kinds of work experience and pre-spell statuses low-wage spellees have had, as well as what happens afterwards. Examination of these pre-spell statuses led to the following conclusions:

- Most who enter a low-wage spell of employment have been working, although frequently not full-time and/or full-year; this varies greatly--87 percent of married fathers have been working, mostly at medium/high wages, while over half of married mothers enter their low-wage spells with little or no work experience.
- ~~About~~ one-fifth of those entering a low-wage spell are newly independent young adults.

A similar examination of post-spell statuses found that an even higher percent of low-wage spellees was employed, either part or full-year, after the spell than had been before the spell. At the same time, a substantial number of those who experienced a spell of low-wage employment ended up with lower or no earnings in the post-spell year.

In order to capture these very different experiences, or dynamics, we developed a typology of spells that classifies various pre-spell and post-spell status combinations by how they impact on the spellee's employment status.

Our findings show that a majority of low-wage employment spells are experienced by individuals who are in transition between two better-paying jobs, or are moving into the labor force from a status such as a student or dependent and experience a spell of low-wage employment on their way to better paying jobs. These two types of spells of low-wage employment, which we have labelled as Medium/High Wage Interrupted, and Upwardly Mobile, each account for about 30 percent of all spells of low-wage employment. While those who go through these spells have clearly experienced a spell of low-wage employment, but just as clearly, they are not low-wage workers. One way to understand this phenomenon is to make a distinction between low-wage employment and low-wage workers: not all low-wage employment is experienced by low-wage workers. Indeed, the majority of low-wage spells analyzed here were experienced by people who clearly were not low-wage workers except in the most temporary sense. Yet during any year, a substantial minority (40 percent) of these experiencing a low-wage spell were low-wage workers: they were in a spell lasting three or more years.

The remaining 40 percent of all low-wage spells are divided roughly equally among those who: (1) experience little change in employment status as a result of the low-wage spell (Status Unchanged/Ambiguous spells); (2) are worse off, in terms of wages and/or employment status after compared to before the spell (Downwardly Mobile); and (3) return to the same or similar non-employed status held before the spell (Non-Work Interrupted). Those who experience these types of spells are individuals who are much more clearly classifiable as 'low-wage workers.' But such terminology carries an implicit assumption within it that individuals so described in fact are employed. When we combine the information presented here on the shortness of spells, with the pre- and post-spell statuses that characterize Type C, D, and E spells--unemployment, welfare, out of the labor force for various reasons--it is clear that for substantial numbers of low-wage workers, for substantial portions of their time, the norm is to be out of work. In short, to be a low-wage worker is not to be working a great deal of the time.

The experience of different spell types varies greatly by race and gender. Almost one-half of the spells experienced by men are Type A versus only 21 percent of women's spells. At the other extreme, one out of six spells experienced by women, compared to one out of 20 experienced by men, are Type E, Non-Work Interrupted. It also varies greatly by marital and family status; two-thirds of the spells experienced by married fathers are Type A, compared to one-sixth for married mothers, and one-fifth for single parents. The less positive spell types (C, D, and E,) account for almost one-half of the women's spells, regardless of marital or family status. Blacks tend to have similar patterns as whites, but the differences by gender, and to a lesser extent, by marital and family status, are less pronounced among blacks than whites.

What kind of spell is experienced strongly influences the impact of low-wage employment on family income and poverty status. Not surprisingly, the contribution to family income follows the employment status changes of each spell type very closely, e.g., those who experience an Upwardly Mobile spell (Type B) increase their contribution to family income when they enter the spell, and again when they exit, paralleling their improving employment status through and after the spell. Likewise, the incidence of poverty, and whether it occurs before or after the spell is closely linked to the type of spell, although the majority of spellees never experience poverty. The percent of spellee's families who experience poverty associated with a low-wage spell varies from a low of 2.7 percent of those who experience Type A spells, to a high of 27.5 percent of those who experience Type E spells. Differences by race are most pronounced in this analysis of the incidence of poverty, with blacks experiencing higher incidences of poverty, controlling for spell type and gender.

Much attention has focussed recently, particularly with the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988, on increasing the proportion of welfare recipients who leave welfare for employment. Our analysis of the impact of spells of low-wage employment on those who enter as welfare recipients found that a substantial minority are working in addition to receiving welfare. In fact, some did not leave welfare during the year of their low-wage spell; this suggests that assumptions about the need for work experience on the part of welfare recipients should be revised. The question is thus not how to get more welfare recipients to enter employment, but rather how to make it a viable alternative, and a bridge to better-waged employment (or, how to achieve more Type B spells.) Our findings also show that while the proportion of welfare recipients who are employed does increase subsequent to the spells, a substantial number return, or turn to welfare after the spell. Clearly, low wage employment is not enough of a change economically to substantially improve family status, nor does it generally act as a transition to better jobs and economic self-sufficiency for single parent families.

While low-wage employment is generally experienced in spells of a year or less, its impact on workers and their families varies greatly. Not all spells of low-wage employment are equal, or the same, in how they affect those who experience them. By examining low-wage spells by types, we have begun to sort out the very different dynamics that operate to make low-wage employment a back-up for some, a transition for others, and a dead-end that goes nowhere for too many. The policy challenge is how to make more of low-wage employment into Type A and B spells, and make it better able to increase economic self-sufficiency for the workers and their families who experience low-wage employment.

Part II.A: Terrain of Low-Wage Jobs and Workers
Descriptive Analysis

A great deal of research and even more stereotypes exist about low-wage workers. Low-wage workers are frequently characterized as being casual members of the workforce--as students, post-retirement workers, and as women with family responsibilities choosing temporary jobs to earn extra money rather than as permanent members of the workforce with families to support. They are characterized as having relatively little education and relatively few years of work experience. And they are characterized as working in the low-waged, low-benefit sector of the economy in small, non-unionized firms. These assumptions about the characteristics of low-wage workers and the jobs they hold are empirical questions that need to be tested. Our hypotheses are: first, that low-wage workers are a heterogeneous group, including a substantial portion who are responsible for the economic well-being of children; second, that low-wage jobs are unequally distributed among gender/race-ethnicity groups; third, that those workers with responsibility for children run a higher than average risk of poverty; fourth, that human capital factors are less significant for non-white low-wage workers than are job characteristics; and fifth, that as a result of their heterogenous characteristics, different factors will help different groups of low-wage workers move into higher wage jobs.

To test these assumptions and hypotheses, Part II.A of the report presents findings on the current distribution of low-wage workers, their demographic characteristics and whether their earnings are necessary to keep their families out of poverty. Second, we investigate the human capital of these workers, that is, their work experience, education, and training. Third, we investigate the characteristics of low-wage jobs held by these workers including firm size, occupation, industry, unionization, hours of work, and wage mobility. Fourth, we examine the characteristics of those who are especially at risk of being low-wage workers. Finally, in Part II.B through the use of multiple regression techniques we determine which of these factors are significant in predicting wages and the probability of being a low-wage worker for all groups in the aggregate. We go on to further examine the differential risk of low-wage work for different groups of workers, and the factors that either increase or decrease the risk of low-wage work.

Distribution and Frequency of Low-Wage Workers

The previous section showed that the proportion of medium and high wage workers stayed virtually the same between 1975 and 1985 while the proportion of low-wage workers increased as a result of the entry of the non-employed into the workforce. Even among those who might dispute those findings, there is general agreement about the growing income disparity between families supported by low-wage workers and the remainder of families (Horrigan and Haugen, 1988). Low-wage workers whether defined as earning less than the median wage, or in terms of multiples of the poverty line, represent a substantial portion of the working population. Defining low-wage workers as those earning $5.80 an hour or less in 1987 (at a job that if worked year round, full-time would provide less than the poverty level of income for a family of four), the staff of the U.S. Senate Budget Committee (1988) found that approximately one-third of the U.S. working population was low-wage (32.4 percent in 1979 and 34.3 in 1987).

We have argued the importance of disaggregating low-wage workers both by months of low-wage work and by gender and race-ethnic characteristics of the workers. The first reason to do this is to distinguish between the characteristics of transitional low-wage workers and those working at low-wage jobs most of the year. The second reason is to see if there are inequalities in the distribution of low-wage work--whether low-wage work is evenly distributed or if certain gender/race-ethnic groups in the population are bearing an unequal share of this work.

What do our findings show? Table 2.1 shows that only about half of the 92.3 million workers ages 16-69 with at least 500 hours in the labor force in the calendar year 1984 have no months of low-wage work during the year. The remaining 47.9 million have low-wage jobs for at least two months of the year. These workers are evenly divided between those with two to six months of low-wage work and those with seven or more months of low-wage work. Those workers with fewer months of low-wage work are a more transitional group. They include those who are out of the labor force or unemployed along with those who had higher wage jobs the rest of the year. The 25.6 million workers with seven or more months of low-wage work, are far less likely to spend any time at higher-wage jobs, though they are likely to have substantial months of unemployment and time out of the labor force. It is with this group of low-wage workers that we will be most concerned.

Not surprisingly, as shown in Chart 1, women are twice as likely as men to be low-wage workers most of the year. Approximately four out of ten women workers earn low wages ($5.30 in 1984 dollars) or less for at least seven months of the year compared to approximately two out of ten male workers. When we disaggregate further and rank gender/race-ethnic groups in terms of their likelihood to be low-wage workers for most of the year (see Chart 2), we find the following inequalities:

- Fewer than two out of ten (17.0 percent) white men are low-wage for more than half the year--they are the least likely group to be low-wage workers for most of the year.
- Slightly more than two out of ten Asian men (22.7 percent) are low-wage workers for most of the year.
- Almost three out ten (25.7 percent) Hispanic men are low-wage workers for most of the year.
- Three out of ten (29.7 percent) black men are low-wage workers for most of the year.
- Somewhat more than three out of ten (34.1 percent) Asian women are low-wage workers for most of the year.
- Almost four out of ten (37.1) white women are low-wage workers for most of the year.
- More than four out of ten black women (43.2) and Hispanic women (40.8) are low-wage workers for most of the year. Although the previous section showed that black women decreased their share of low-wage employment from 1975 to 1985, these findings show that they are still most likely to be low-wage workers for most of the year.

Our findings show that (in 1984) there were approximately 25 million workers who held low-wage jobs for seven months or more, who we refer to as year-long low-wage workers.[33] They represent about 27 percent of all workers. The findings also show the importance of examining gender/race-ethnic differences among low-wage workers because low-wage work is unequally distributed across population groups.

Demographic Characteristics: Age, Household Type, and Poverty Status

Low-wage work is often regarded as a choice of young workers who are still in school, women with family responsibilities and older semi-retired workers. Those analysts who make this claim argue that this is because these jobs require relatively little investment in training and education and because it is easy to quit one and find another with little change in pay level (Mincer and Pollachek, 1974). We describe the age and family patterns of gender/race-ethnic groups of year-long low-wage workers in order to examine this claim.

In Part I of the report we show that while younger workers (less than 40 years) have increased their labor force participation as low-wage workers, middle-age workers increased theirs the most. In this section we use finer age breakdowns to illustrate the relation between age and low-wage status. (The data are shown in Table 2.2). Since age is one of the most significant variables in predicting wages for all workers in the aggregate, we examine this factor in considerable depth, describing patterns of prime working years for each gender/race-ethnicity group.

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[33] As we noted in the methodology section, those low-wage workers employed for less than 12 months of the year tend to be unemployed for the rest of the year.

Looking at the graphs of the age curves for all workers who are low-wage for seven months of the year (Graphs 1-3), we see the following: The curve for all workers resembles a U shape. Young workers (16-19) are most likely to be year-long low-wage workers, almost three out of four earn $5.30 (in 1984 dollars) or less. The proportion drops significantly as workers age, so that slightly fewer than half of workers between 20-24 are year-long low-wage workers. The proportion of low-wage workers continues to drop until age 45; at age 45 the proportions begin to increase until the post-65 years, when more than four out of ten workers are year-long low-wage.

The curve in Graph 1, for male workers only, drops more sharply as workers age, with less than ten percent of prime age workers (6.7 percent of 34-44 year olds, 7.9 percent of 45-54 year olds) employed as year-long low-wage workers. The proportion of year-long low-wage workers rises slightly as men experience middle age and move into the older age brackets, until they reach the post-65 years when almost one-half (44.2 percent) are employed as year-long low-wage workers.

Like their male co-workers, the proportion of women workers who are low-wage drops (though not as precipitously as for male workers) until age 35 when about 30 percent are year-long low-wage workers. Then the curve begins to rise with about one-third of female workers remaining year-long low-wage workers throughout the prime working years of 35 through 64; in the post-65 years, their expected year-long low-wage work increases to more than half (53.7 percent).

Our findings show that young workers, especially those under the age of 25, regardless of gender, are more likely to be year-long low-wage workers than not and that a considerable portion of those over age 65 are in this position. These two age groups account for less than half of all year-long low-wage workers, however, leaving 14.1 million year-long low-wage workers in their prime working years. It is in the prime working years that the patterns between men and women diverge, with a significantly larger share of prime age working women as year-long low-wage workers.

What variations do we find when we compare the age graphs of workers by both their race and gender? (See Graphs 2 and 3.)

- White men are least likely to experience low-wage work for most of the year at each age group after 20 and most likely to experience decreases as they move through their prime working years of ages 25-64.
- Black men are much more likely to experience low-wage work at each age group after 20 than are white men. While they, too, generally experience declines as they age, the relation between age and higher wage work is not as strong--with approximately one-third of 25-34

year olds and 55-64 year olds experiencing year-long low-wage work for most of the year.

- The relation between age and low-wage work for Hispanic males more closely resembles that of black male than white male workers. They experience large drops in the younger age categories but by age 25, the proportion experiencing low-wage work most of the year levels off, where it remains throughout the prime working years.

- The pattern for Asian men more closely resembles that of white men, though with a somewhat larger proportion experiencing full-year low-wage work most of the year in every age category.

- Like other groups, the proportion of white women experiencing full-year low-wage work declines dramatically as they move into their middle twenties from their teens (from 80 to 30 percent) but then levels off until their middle forties when the proportion begins to increase again.

- Black women likewise experience significant declines in low-wage work from their teens to their mid twenties, but, with the exception of the 35-44 decade, these declines do not continue. Approximately half of black women experience full-year low-wage work at each age category.

- Although Hispanic women experience declines in the percentage of low-wage workers as they move from their teens to their mid-twenties, after that either a third or a half of these women fall into the low-wage category depending on age. In other words, their likelihood of being low-wage workers does not level off during the prime work years.

- The patterns for Asian women are closest to white and Asian men - with each age group experiencing a decreasing proportion of full-year low-wage work (with the exception of 45-54 year olds). The percentage of Asian women in each category is, however, significantly higher than that for white and Asian male workers and more closely resembles the percentages for white women.

In addition to examining the slope of the age graphs, the identification of the age span in which workers have a relatively smaller percentage of low-wage workers than they do in total reveals some differences between gender/race-ethnic groups. These age spans are referred to as the prime working years. For women and women the prime working years in Chart 3 are these years in which the percentage of year-long low-wage workers are less than 18.9 percent for men and 38.0 percent for women. These findings, as shown in Chart 8, reveal that:

- For white men, the prime working years cover a 40 year span between ages 25-64. All age groups in this period have distinctly lower percentages of year-long low-wage workers than the average.
- Both white women and Asian women have the same prime working years as white men, 25-64; however, the distinction between prime years and other years (based on wages received) is much less clear.
- Asian and Hispanic men both experience a shorter span of prime working years than do white men; younger Asian men appear to do better than younger Hispanic men while older Hispanic men have a lower percentage of year-long low-wage workers than do older Asian men.
- For black men, the prime working years are ages 35-54 --one half the number of years of white men. Also, the distinction between prime working years and other years (based on the proportions receiving low wages) is very small.
- Hispanic women appear to have two separate periods of prime working years--25-34 and 45-54. The years between have considerably more workers at low-wage jobs than in the prime working years.
- Black women's working years are between ages 25-44, a twenty year span compared to the 40 year span for white and Asian women.

Not surprisingly, our findings show that it is the youngest and the oldest workers who are most likely to be low-wage workers for most of the year. But, in addition, we show that for all but white male and Asian male workers, the proportions of low-wage workers do not decrease steadily as workers move through their prime working years. Instead, the proportion of low-wage workers levels off to between approximately one-third and one-half of workers in these age categories. Although age is a significant predictor of wages, in the aggregate, these findings show that increased age does not have a single linear relation with higher wages, and for women and minority men there is a levelling off relatively early in life.

Household Type

The emphasis in much of the literature on the youth or post-retirement status of low-wage workers implies that they are not responsible for the economic well-being of families. Likewise the description of low-wage jobs as meeting the needs of mothers who trade off higher wages for jobs that allow them to meet their family responsibilities implies that these women's wages are not an important, if not the main, source of support for their families. In contrast to this literature, Part I showed that the shift to low-wage employment has been mostly among adults with responsibility for supporting children, especially black single parents. In this section we examine the household types of full-year low-wage workers and the likelihood that their families would be in poverty without their wages.

The SIPP allows researchers to examine monthly changes in household composition over the span of the panel. Researchers have found that many households do experience change in household composition over the year. In gross terms approximately 17 percent experience some change in composition during the year with single parent families likely to experience the most change. (Citro et al., 1986). In examining the effects of changes in household composition on the likelihood of being low-income households, Citro et al. (1986:104) found that those who did experience composition change exhibit higher low-income rates than did full-year households.

These findings should be kept in mind when reviewing those that follow. Unlike the Citro et al. study, we categorized workers on the basis of their initial household type. In addition to using household status to categorize workers, we also use marital status to categorize workers in dual and single earner households. The household type "with children" refers to any adult worker who lives in a household where children are present. We have identified working single teenagers (under age 18) separately so that they are not identified as workers having economic responsibility for children. Because our unit of analysis is workers in different types of households rather than the household itself, our findings do not provide an unduplicated count of households.

Table 2.3 shows the percentage distribution of workers in each household type. It also shows the risk for workers in each type of household to be over or under represented among year-long low-wage workers. A risk factor of 1.0 would mean that workers in a particular household type (say single without children) have an equal chance of being represented among year-long low-wage workers as they do among all workers. A risk factor of greater than 1.0 would mean over representation among low-wage workers and a risk factor of less than 1.0 would mean under representation.

The findings show that almost half of all workers are adults with children in their household. The largest group of adult workers, more than one-fourth (26.3 percent), live in married couple, dual-earner households with children. The next largest group live in single persons households without children (18.5 percent), closely followed by married couple, dual-earner households without children (15.6 percent) and married earner one-earner households with children. Fewer than one out of ten workers live in single parent households with children (7.6 percent).

Adult workers who are year-long low-wage are more likely to be workers living in single parent households with children and less likely to be married couple dual-earners with children than are high-wage workers. The risk factor for single parents with children is 1.38, indicating that these workers are almost one and one-half times more likely to be represented among year-long low-wage workers than their proportion of all workers. These findings support Part I of the report which also showed single parents' higher risk of being low-wage.

When we disaggregate workers by gender we find, not surprisingly, that male workers in general are more likely to be in married households and less likely to be in single households, especially single households with children, than are women workers. When we look at the risk factors we find, surprisingly, that male workers who are in single parent households with children have a higher risk of being low-wage workers (although there are substantially fewer of them in this category--500,000 as compared to over 2.1 million single women-maintained households) than do women workers who are in single parent families with children. This means that although many more women than men are year-long low-wage workers living in single parent households with children, those men living in this type of household have a higher risk of being year-long low-wage workers. It should be noted that these men are not necessarily fathers; some portion of them may be the adult sons or brothers of female heads.

When we disaggregate year-long low-wage workers by race - ethnic group as well as gender, we find the following:

- More than seven out of ten white male, Asian and Hispanic year-long low-wage workers live in married couple households and more than six out of ten have children in their household. The majority of the remaining workers are in single person households without children. Of these three groups, white men are much less likely to be in single households with children than other men. Both white and Hispanic men living in single parent households with children are over represented in the year-long low-wage category.
- Over one-fourth of black male workers live in single households without children (29.4%)--the group most likely to do so. A slightly higher percentage of these men live in single households with or without children than in married, households with children.
- Approximately seven out of ten year-long low-wage white, Asian, and Hispanic female workers live in

married couple households. The remainder of Asian and Hispanic women are more or less evenly divided among single person households with and without children, while white women are somewhat more likely to live in single person households without children. But even among white women, one out of ten live in a single headed household with children.

- Black women who are low-wage workers for most of the year are the least likely (49.9 percent) of all the gender/race-ethnic groups to live in married couple households and the most likely (almost 37.7 percent) to live in single headed households with children. This finding supports the Part I finding that black single parents experienced the greatest movement into low-wage work.

The findings in this section show that more than 40 percent of low-wage workers live in households with children. Workers who are year-long low-wage are more likely than higher wage workers to live in single headed households with children. Black women who are year-long low-wage workers are the most likely gender/race-ethnic group to live in this household type. These findings have important consequences for the likelihood of poverty in their households.

Poverty Status

Part I showed that the increasing labor force participation of single parents has been accompanied by an increase in the poverty of their households. This part shows that a notable minority of the year-long low-wage population appear to be solely responsible for the economic well-being of families and children and that they and their families are at risk of poverty. Black women and men and Hispanic men are especially likely to have these responsibilities.

Table 2.4 presents the proportion of workers' families who fall into one of three categories: (1) those workers whose family income is above the poverty line regardless of the earnings of the worker; (2) those workers whose families' income would be below a poverty standard without their wages and whose wages are therefore responsible for bringing families out of poverty; and (3) those workers whose families are still in poverty despite the economic contribution of the worker. Although it is this latter group who have been referred to as the working poor, both groups 2 and 3 are either in poverty or at risk of poverty if they lose their paycheck.

In 1984 there were approximately 1.8 million full-year low-wage workers (about eight percent of all full-year low-wage workers) whose wages did not lift their families out of poverty. About twice this number (or 17.8 percent of all low-wage workers) of workers have enough earnings to bring their families above the poverty line (although often by not very much). The remaining three-quarters of these year-long low-wage workers lived in households that had living standards above the poverty line without the economic contribution of the worker.

Given the fact that men in every wage category have higher earnings than women it is not surprising that these higher male earnings are more likely to bring families out of poverty. As Table 2.4 shows, the earnings of almost half of those male workers with no (0 or 1) months of low-wage work are responsible for moving family income above the poverty line in sharp contrast to the earnings of only 15 percent of women workers with no (0 or 1) months of low-wage work. This finding indicates that higher male wages are still more focal for family economic well-being, although, as we saw in Part I, households are becoming more dependent on women's wages.

Among full-year low-wage workers, almost one-third of the men need to earn wages to lift their families out of poverty and almost one-quarter (22.6 percent) successfully do so. In contrast, less than one-quarter (21.8 percent) of women's wages are necessary to move their families out of poverty, and only 15 percent successfully do so. These findings show that although a significant minority of both male and female workers who are full-year low-wage workers are responsible for bringing family living standards above the poverty line, higher earning male workers are both more likely to have this responsibility and more likely to be successful at doing so. Even among these male workers, however, ten percent do not earn enough to bring their families out of poverty.

These proportions vary significantly when we disaggregate workers by race-ethnicity as well as gender. Among white men, white women, Asian men, Asian women and Hispanic women who are year-long low-wage workers, more than three quarters of their families have above-poverty living standards without their economic contributions. Among these groups, the wages of white women are least likely to be responsible for pulling families above the poverty line (or leaving families in poverty). The wages of white men who are full-year low-wage workers are most likely to pull their families out of poverty and Asian men are the most likely to fail.

In contrast fewer than half of the families of black women and men and Hispanic men who are full-year low-wage workers would have incomes above the poverty line without the economic contribution of the workers. In other words these workers are likely to have sole responsibility for the economic well-being of their families. The wages of approximately one-third of these workers are responsible for moving their families out of poverty. For about 15 percent of these workers, their families remain poor despite their earnings. Thus almost half of these workers' families either are in poverty or are at risk of poverty should they lose their paycheck.

About half of the families of black and Hispanic men and black women are at risk of poverty without their wages or are poor despite their earnings. The wages of year-long low-wage black and Hispanic males are most likely (37.4 and 36.6 percent, respectively) to keep their families out of poverty. The wages of almost 14 percent of black male year-long low-wage workers and 19 percent of Hispanic men are not high enough to bring their families out of poverty; and their families remain poor despite their earnings. Compared to black men, the wages of Hispanic male longer term low-wage workers are almost equally likely (36.6

percent) to move households out of poverty, but a substantially higher percentage (19.0 percent) cannot do so as a result of their earnings. More than any other group of women workers, black women who are full-year low-wage workers are responsible for moving their families out of poverty. Approximately one million black women (31 percent of year-long low-wage black women workers) earn enough to do so while 19.3 percent (more than for black and Hispanic males) do not; their families remain poor despite their earnings.

These findings show that although three-fourths of all year-long low-wage workers live in families that would be above the poverty line without their earnings, one-quarter do not. These workers' families are either in poverty or at risk of being poor. The wages of half of year-long low-wage black men and women and Hispanic men are responsible for bringing families above the poverty line or are too low to do so. For these latter two groups, earnings alone represent the least viable option for providing for their households' economic well-being.

Human Capital: Work Experience, Education and Training

Most studies of wages, influenced by human capital theory, emphasize the role of work experience, education, and training in explaining why workers receive higher or lower wages. Low-wage workers are expected to have limited work experience, fewer years of education, and limited training. For example, most human capital theorists argue that because of their job interruptions because of family responsibilities, women choose jobs that require less education and on-the-job training (Black and Garen, 1988).

There is, however, a rich literature of counter-studies, that argue that these human capital variables do not, for example, explain the large variance in earnings between race-sex groups (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981; Bluestone, Murphy, Stevenson, 1974). In this section we investigate this debate further by comparing and contrasting differences in life-time work experience, education, and job training in order the examine patterns of relationship between these factors and low-wage work.

Work Experience

The regression analysis discussed late shows years of experience to be one of the most significant factor for predicting wages for all workers in the aggregate. In this section, we examine patterns of work experience and find differences among gender and race-ethnic groups. Work experience was determined by the number of years doing the same type of work as his/her current job for each SIPP respondent. This measure may underestimate work experience because the respondent does not include years of working at other than the current type of job.

Using SIPP data, Lammas et al. (1986) found that holding education, age, occupation, race, and Spanish origin constant, women are more likely than men to have less than 5 years of work experience. They also found that black and Hispanic men have less experience than white men and that Hispanic women have less experience than either white or black women. As Table 2.5 shows, when we disaggregate workers' experience by months of low-wage work as well as gender/race-ethnicity, our findings, in general, replicate Lammas et al. (1986) with some critical differences.

Years of work experience and months of low-wage work are inversely related. Our findings show that those workers with no (0 to 1) months of low-wage work have, on the average, twice (10.8 years) the work experience of those who are low-wage workers (5.1 years). Of the men, white and black males have the most work experience while Hispanic and Asian men have less. (There is some variance, however, in the transitional low-wage category.) Women do, on the average, have less experience than their male counterparts. White and black women (who have more work experience than Asian and Hispanic women) have less experience than white and black males. The male-female differences, however, reverses from two years difference in favor of male workers among higher-wage workers to nine months difference among year-long low-wage workers, in favor of female workers. Year-long women low-wage workers have more work experience than do their male counterparts (5.4 as compared to 4.7 years). Black men and black, white, and Hispanic women all have 5 or more years of work experience in contrast to white, Asian, and Hispanic men. These findings indicate that these latter groups can more easily move into higher-paid jobs.

Although years of work experience is negatively related to months of low-wage work, on the average, at least half of workers who are employed at low-wage jobs for most of the year do have more than five years of work experience. These findings do show a critical mass of relatively experienced workers who have low-wage jobs despite their experience. These findings indicate that although years of work experience is a significant factor in predicting higher wages and a lack of five or more years of work experience increases the risk of low-wage work, lack of experience is not a sufficient reason for having low-wage jobs.

Education

Workers' education, usually measured as highest grade of school completed, is one of the most widely used variables to measure human capital. Along with other researchers, our repression analysis shows that education is one of the most significant predictors of higher wages; in this section, we will describe patterns and differences. Analysts using this measure usually assume that the more years of education a worker has the greater her or his productivity, and the greater the productivity, the higher her or his wages should be. In contrast, researchers who disaggregate education by gender have consistently shown that college-educated women workers earn less than high school educated male workers (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981).

Many researchers argue that it is the lack of a high school diploma that results in a career of low-wage work. For example, Kosters and Ross indicate that "young workers who have not finished high school account for a major share of workers with low-earnings" (1987:53). In contrast, a recent report, The Forgotten Half (1988), which focuses on the status of non-college bound youth, shows that, while earnings are closely tied to years of schooling completed regardless of race or ethnic origin, the earnings (in constant dollars) for non-college male youth have declined since the 1970s. The Forgotten Half concludes that high school diplomas do not necessarily result in starting a productive career.

These latter findings are generally borne out by our own. In Part I of the report, we saw that educational attainment of low-wage workers increased modestly between 1975 and 1985. Table 2.6 shows that, despite some variances in amount of education, non low-wage workers regardless of gender and race, are significantly more likely to be college graduates. The percentage of workers with no months (0 or 1) of low-wage work who have college degrees ranges from a high of 45 percent for Asian males to a low of 14 percent for Hispanic males (it should be noted that Asian year-long low-wage workers are slightly more likely to have college diplomas than are higher-wage Hispanic male workers). Year-long low-wage workers are more likely, on the average, to have less than a high school diploma, although there are significant differences among groups, with almost 50 percent of Hispanic males falling into this category, but only 19 percent of white females.

Although years of schooling is, in general, inversely related to months of low-wage work, the modal educational category for all groups is at least a high school diploma. This is true of low-wage workers as well as those with no (0 or 1) months of low-wage work. Almost eight out of ten women who are year-long low-wage workers and three quarters of men in this category have at least a high school diploma. Among the various gender/race-ethnic groups, white women who are year-long low-wage workers are most likely to have at least a high school diploma (81.5 percent), followed by white men (74.4 percent), Asian women (74.2 percent), black women (66.8 percent), black men (66.3 percent), Asian men (60.9 percent), and Hispanic women (59.8 percent). Hispanic men are least likely to have more than a high school diploma (51.1 percent).

These findings provide additional evidence that although years of education is positively related to higher wages, a high school diploma does not mean a higher wage job for significant segments of all gender/race-ethnic groups.

Training

The results of the previous section indicate that a high school diploma does not guarantee wages that result in higher wages. On the basis of findings like this, authors of The Forgotten Half concluded that "a substantial portion of high school graduates do require extensive [training] in order to perform at expected levels of work readiness" (1988:125).

Training, as separate from years of schooling, is another measure of human capital. Human capital theorists argue that workers who are planning to spend less time in the workforce are less likely to invest in training. Thus, for example, it is expected that women workers would sort themselves into jobs requiring less training (Black and Garen, 1988).

Table 2.7 presents data on the percentage of workers who have had training by their months of low-wage work. Training in this case includes a variety of activities of differing lengths taking place in a wide variety of settings, including: apprenticeships; programs at junior or community colleges, high school vocational education; on-the-job training; training in the military; correspondences courses; vocational rehabilitation; and sheltered workshops. The table shows that year-long low-wage workers are more likely to invest in or receive training than are transitional workers or workers with no months (0 or 1) of low-wage work (24.0, 19.6, and 15.3 percent, respectively). These findings may indicate attempts at upward mobility on the part of low-wage workers, attempts to move from unemployed to work, or attempts to make up for the lack of a diploma or a useful education. The findings may also represent the success of job-training programs (especially federal or state ones) to recruit those workers most in need of training. If this is the case, the findings may also show the failure of training programs to enable workers to move out of low-wage work.[34]

When workers are disaggregated by gender and race-ethnicity, the findings become more difficult to interpret. White male year-long low-wage workers are the most likely of any group (33.2 percent) to have acquired some form of job training. Whether this finding reflects white males' willingness to invest in their human capital because of their long-term commitment to the workforce, or employers' or state program operators' beliefs that providing training to white males has the most pay-off is not clear. In the regression analysis reported below, we will see that training is not a significant predictor of higher wages for white males, although it is significant in decreasing the risk of being a low-wage worker.

Asian men are the next most likely group of low-wage workers to have had job training (24.0 percent), followed by black men and white women (19.5 and 19.0 percent, respectively). As our regression analysis will show, job training appears to be a significant factor in decreasing the risk of low-wage work for white women but not for black men. Less than 15 percent of black, Asian, and Hispanic women and Hispanic men experienced job training. As the regression analysis will show, job training is not significant in decreasing the risk of low-wage work for these groups. These findings show the lack of a single relation between job training and higher wages.

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[34] A recent evaluation of JPTA training programs by The National Commission for Employment Policy (1987) indicates that the 60 percent of JPTA trainees employed after the program earned an average wage in 1987 dollars of $4.65--a below poverty wage for a family of four.

Job Characteristics: Firm Size, Occupations, Industry, Hours and Weeks of Work, and Wage Mobility

In the next section we turn from what have traditionally been viewed as human capital explanations of wage differences to more structural or institutional explanations. These latter explanations emphasize the characteristics of jobs, firms, and industries, and their role in a changing economy, rather than the characteristics of workers. Analysts such as Bluestone, Stevenson, and Murphy (1974) suggest that little of the variance in wages is accounted for by human capital variables and that institutional variables are more important in explaining wage differences between gender and race groups.

Following the pioneering work of Doeringer and Piore (1971), many institutional analysts divide the job market into two major sectors--the primary and the secondary sector. In its simplest version this categorizations posits a primary sector of firms and jobs typified by relatively high pay, stable employment, unionization, the possibility of promotion up administratively defined job ladders, and pay which increases with education and work experience. The secondary sector includes jobs and firms characterized by low pay, lack of unionization, little opportunity for advancement via promotion or investment in human capital, arbitrary personnel practices and intermittent employment (Belman and Voos, 1988:2).

Researchers positing dual labor markers have sorted firms, industries, and occupations into primary and secondary groups and then tested for differences in wages. The results have been mixed, especially for women workers. Although we will not directly test this theory we will use it as a point of departure in analyzing the structural characteristics of jobs. These characteristics are firm size, occupations, industries, union membership, hours and weeks of work, and wage mobility.

Firm Size

Large firms are expected to have the characteristics of the primary labor market (i.e., higher salaries, fringe benefits, and promotions based on work experience), while small firms are expected to have the characteristics of the secondary labor market--low-wages, lack of benefits, and few returns to work experience. Small firms are often portrayed as constituting a harsh world of intense competition in which there is little margin for increased employee wages and benefits. Increases in the minimum wages and federally mandated benefits are seen as threatening the viability of small firms and the jobs they provide (Spalter-Roth and Willoughby, 1988). Thus, we would expect that low-wage workers would be more likely to be working in smaller firms, while the reverse would be true for higher wage workers. Here we test this assumption by examining the distribution of workers in different size firms by worker's months of low-wage work, their gender and race-ethnicity.

The SIPP asks workers, "What was the total number of employees working for this business?" (referring to the business in which the worker is currently or was last employed). This question does not clearly distinguish between the immediate work site (a local McDonald's for example) or the total number of workers employed by the firm regardless of sites (a question the respondent might have difficulty answering). Hence workers may be tempted to answer for only their particular work site or guess as to the number of employees at other sites, and do this in round numbers. We assume that these misunderstandings and guesses balance out and that the distribution of workers among different size firms is reliable.

We found that our hypothesis appeared to be true for workers with no months of low-wage work but not year-long low-wage workers (See Table 2.8). Over half (54 percent) of all workers with no months of low-wage work are employed by firms with 1,000 or more workers. The rest are relatively evenly distributed among firms of under 25, 25-99, and 100-499 workers, with the smallest number employed at firms with 500-999 workers.

In contrast, there is a bi-modal distribution for year-long low-wage workers--with approximately one-third (33.5 percent) in firms with fewer than 25 workers and another third (31.6 percent) in the largest size firms--those with 1,000 or more employees. The remainder are divided among firms with 25 to 999 employees.

This finding, if reliable, indicates that year-long low-wage workers are as likely to be employed in the largest firms--those expected to have higher wages and returns to experience--as they are in the smallest firms--those expected to pay low wages and have few returns to experience. We would suggest that larger firms may have bifurcated internal labor markets, i.e., large firms may contain both primary and secondary labor markets.

The applicability of dual labor market theory to the labor market experience of women workers (rather than to minority males, about whom the theory was first developed) has been questioned (Hartmann, 1987). Women workers are often described as working in the "women's sector", i.e., jobs with relatively low wages, with virtually no returns to work experience, but with the relative job stability often occurring in large primary type firms (Dickens, Friedberg and Lang, 1988; Belman and Voos, 1988). The identification of a women's sector, with aspects of both primary and secondary labor markets suggests that the theory works less well for women.

When we disaggregate the finding by gender, we find some support for the existence of a women's sector. In so far as firm size can be used as a proxy measure for dual labor markets, year-long low-wage male workers are more likely to be found in the smallest firms (four out of ten are in firms with less than 25 workers, with an additional 14 percent in firms with 25 to 99 workers, while approximately one-quarter are found in the largest firms). Compared to men, a higher proportion of women workers

(34.7 percent) are employed by firms with 1,000 or more employees and a smaller proportion (29.5 percent) are employed by the smallest firms.

When we further disaggregate year-long low-wage workers by race-ethnicity as well as gender, we find the following:

- More than four out of ten low-wage white, Hispanic, and Asian males are found in the smallest size firms, while only about one-quarter are found in firms with 1,000 or more employees.
- In contrast, black men are more likely to be employed in the largest firms than the smallest firms.
- About one-third of white and Asian women are employed by the largest firms, while only about one-quarter are employed by the smallest firms.
- Black women are even more likely (44.2 percent) than white and Asian women to be employed in firms with 1,000 or more workers, while Hispanic women are more likely to be employed in the smallest firms.

In so far as firm size is reliably measured and serves as a valid proxy for dual labor markets, we find support for the theory that low-wage male workers are more likely to be found in the secondary sector, consisting of small firms, and low-wage women workers, and especially black women, are more likely to be found in large firms, where they apparently constitute the women's sector of year-long low-wage work. The exception to this rule is black men, a substantial portion of whom are found in large firms, where they apparently constitute a low-paid secondary, "black-male sector," and Hispanic women who are more likely to be employed by the smallest firms. As we will see in the regression analysis presented below, working in a large firm is a significant factor in reducing the risk of low-wage work for only white men and white women.

Occupation

Among the most striking features of the workplace is unequal distribution of gender/race-ethnicity groups across occupations, a phenomenon known as occupational segregation. Although there have been some declines during the 1970s as a result of affirmative action, occupational segregation has been relatively stable (Beller and Han, 1984). Occupational segregation is a relatively crude measure of workplace segregation because segregation also occurs at the job level. Thus, measures of occupational segregation undercount the amount of actual gender and race segregation in the workforce because even workers in integrated occupations and industries often work in different jobs and in different departments (Reskin, 1984).

Researchers have found that the major consequence of occupational segregation is lower wages for women and minorities. The larger the percentage of female workers an occupation has, the less both women and men earn (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981). Dickens, Friedberg, and Lang (1988) find that a large portion of the differential between men and women's wages is almost certainly due to the fact that women work in establishments and occupations that pay relatively low-wages. There is a debate within the literature as to whether women choose low-paying occupations because these jobs do not penalize intermittent employment (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). The weight of evidence, however, provides limited support for this assumption (England, 1984). Instead, evidence suggests that jobs held by women and minorities pay less at least in part because they are held by these groups (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981).

Table 2.9 displays the distribution of all workers across selected occupations, the percentage of low-wage workers in the occupation, and the percentage of women workers in the occupation. Those occupations in which workers have more than one and a half times the risk of being low-wage include: retail sales workers; information clerks; communications equipment operators, miscellaneous administrative support, private household workers; guards; food service workers; health service workers; personal service workers; cleaning and building services; agricultural workers; textile and apparel machine operators; construction helpers; freight, stock, and material handlers; garage and service station workers; car washers; and hand packers.

Given previous studies we would expect to find a positive relationship between the percentage of low-wage workers in an occupation and the percentage of women. This relationship is pictured in Chart 4. The chart shows a generally positive relationship between these two factors (with some variations). In general, the higher the percent of women in an occupation, the higher the percent of year-long low-wage workers in the occupation. Traditional women's service sector occupations including food, health, and personal service workers, are most likely to be occupations with both a high percentage of low-wage workers and a high percentage of women workers. Traditional women's technical and sales occupations including sales workers in retail and personal sales, and information clerks also fall into this category.

The chart also shows a number of higher-wage "male dominated" occupational categories with a relatively small percentage of women workers. These are technical and sales occupations including engineering technicians, commodities sales representatives, and sales supervisors. Finally the chart shows a number of higher-wage "female- dominated" technical and professional occupations including teachers, librarians, and health technicians, and a few male-dominated low-wage occupations such as vehicle workers and equipment cleaners; and freight, stock, and material handlers. These latter occupations are exceptions to the general rule that occupations with few low-wage workers are more likely to be male-dominated while those with a high percentage of low-wage workers are likely to be female-dominated.

The traditional women's sector occupations such as administrative support, along with some of the traditionally low-wage male jobs, such as operatives, fabricators, and laborers, are the occupations for which relatively slow growth is predicted for the year 2000 (Silvestri and Lukasiewicz, 1987). In contrast, the professional, managerial, and administrative occupations along with some technical occupations are expected to grow at a faster than average rate in the next decade or so. Not surprisingly, as Table 2.10 shows, the majority of low-wage workers are in the slower growing occupational categories including sales, service, crafts, operatives, and transport laborers. These projections imply that the job status of women and minority workers may decline over the remainder of the century.

Service work is the occupational category with the highest percentage of year-long low-wage workers, although the percentage of year-long low-wage workers varies by gender/race-ethnicity ranging from a high of 70 percent of all Hispanic women in the category to a low of 33.3 percent for black men. In other words, seven out of ten Hispanic women service workers are year-long low-wage workers while only three out of ten are not. The reverse is true for black men. White men are slightly more likely than black men to be year-long low-wage workers, while half of the Hispanic and Asian men and six out of ten white and black women in the service occupations are year-long low-wage workers.

Although the service occupations contain the highest percentage of year-long low-wage workers regardless of gender/race-ethnicity, when we examine the non-service occupational distributions of year-long low-wage workers, we do see evidence of occupational segregation by gender and race.

White, black, and Hispanic males are most likely to be employed in service or in other transport occupations. White and Asian women are most likely to be employed in the technical, sales, and administrative occupations (most likely as sales and clerical workers) followed by service work. In contrast, black and Hispanic women are most likely to be employed as service workers followed by technical, sales, and administrative work. Asian and Hispanic women are more likely than white and black women to be employed as operators, fabricators, and laborers. Asian men are most likely to be employed as service workers. Although only a crude indicator of occupational segregation is used here, the results show both its salience in dividing gender and race-ethnic groups and its consequences for wages and for future employment. As we will see in the section using regression analysis, service jobs result in a significant risk of low-wages for all workers. Minority women, who are most likely to be in these occupations, are most at risk of low wages.

Industry

The industry in which a worker is employed is also highly consequential for her or his rate of pay. During the last few decades an important industrial shift has occurred in the U.S. economy. The steel, automobile, machine tools, rubber, and consumer appliance industries have experienced decreased employment. Between 1966 and 1986 manufacturing jobs declined from 30 to 19 percent of all employment (Esman, Jackson, and

King, 1988). The other side of this industrial shift has been the growth of the service sector and especially the finance, real estate, insurance, health, business, and professional service industries. Critics contend that as a result of this transformation a large tier of secondary, more marginalized low-paid and low-benefit jobs has emerged (Service Employees International Union, 1987). The workers filling these jobs, they contend, are disproportionately minority and women workers.

Table 2.11, which shows the distribution of gender/race-ethnic categories of workers among industries, does provide some support for claims that there is a large tier of low-paid jobs in the retail and service sector industries and that women and minorities are over represented in this tier. These industries include: retail, finance, insurance, and real estate; business services; personal services; and professional (including health) services. Our findings show that only about four out of ten workers with no months of low-wage work are employed in these service industries compared to more than seven out of ten year-long low-wage workers.

Male workers are less likely to be employed in these service sector industries than are female workers. Among those male workers with no months of low-wage work only three out of ten workers are in these industries compared to six out of ten women workers with no months of low-wage work. Among those full-year workers, six out of ten men and eight out of ten women workers are employed in these industries.

When we disaggregate by race-ethnicity as well as gender we find the following inequalities among longer term low-wage workers:

- Approximately six out of ten white, black, and Hispanic men who are year-long low-wage workers are employed in service sector industries, in contrast to only three out of ten who have no months of low-wage work.
- Almost eight out of ten white women who are year-long low-wage workers are employed in service sector industries in contrast with six out of ten with no months of low-wage work.
- Black and Hispanic women are somewhat less likely than white women to be employed in service sector industries, regardless of months of low-wage work.
- Asian men are more likely than other groups of men, while Asian women are less likely than other groups of women, to be employed in service sector industries.

These findings indicate than a substantial portion of year-long low-wage male workers are employed in what might be described as secondary sector service industry jobs. Women are more likely than men to be in service sector jobs, regardless of their wage status. Those women who are year-long low-wage workers are most over represented in what critics claim is a marginal tier of low-wage, low-benefit jobs. As we will see in the regression analysis, employment in service and retail industries are among the most significant factors increasing the risk of low-wages.

Union Membership

Between 1973 and 1984, the union membership of the male workforce dropped from 32 to 24 percent of all employed male workers. In contrast union membership among women workers remained stable at about 15 percent of employed female workers. During this period, the declines for men were particularly severe in blue collar employment (from 43 to 33 percent); while the percentage of women in white collar jobs actually increased slightly (from ten to 13 percent) (Freeman and Leonard, 1987). These changes reflect the restructuring of the U.S. economy, the increase in anti-union activity, and the increased effort of unions to organize the growing female non-blue collar employment sectors. Unionism (or the lack thereof) is an important structural factor in understanding low-wage work because it has a positive effect on average hourly earnings for both male and female workers, although this positive effect declined slightly between 1973 and 1984 (Freeman and Leonard, 1987:197). As we will see in the regression analysis, union membership is among the most important factors in decreasing the risk of low-wages for almost all gender/race-ethnicity groups.

Our findings, shown in Table 2.12, on the percentage of workers who are union members, using the SIPP, replicate those of Freeman and Leonard, who used the Current Population Survey; one in five workers is a union member, one in four male workers and about 15 percent of women workers belong to unions. Given the positive effect of union membership on wages, it is not surprising that those workers with no months of low-wage work are more than four times as likely to be unionized than full-year low-wage workers (28.6 as compared to 6.5 percent, respectively). Higher wage male workers are more than five times as likely to be union members than are low-wage male workers, and higher wage women workers are more than three times as likely to be union members than are low-wage women workers.

The most meaningful differences emerge, however, when we disaggregate workers by both gender and race-ethnicity. We find that men and women of color who have no months of low-wage work are the workers who are most likely to be union members. Almost half of black men (48.9 percent) with no months of low-wage work are unionized; four out of ten black women, almost four out of ten Hispanic men and more than one-third of Hispanic women with no months of low-wage work are unionized. Indeed, a higher proportion of black and Hispanic women with no months of low-wage work are unionized than are white men in this category. These data indicate that union membership is a route to higher earnings for minority men and women, who are not able to obtain a college education or experience at professional or managerial jobs.

Hours and Weeks of Work

The next institutional factor that we examine is hours and weeks of work. Are low-wage work and part-time work synonymous? In 1984, 22 percent of U.S. workers were working part-time. These workers earned only 58 percent of the pay of full time workers (DuRivage, 1986). Does the growth of part-time work (up from 14 percent in 1954), and the resulting low earnings of part-time workers, represent the growth of a tier of permanent marginalized work in service sector industries as some critics claim? Or does it represent the choices made by a substantial segment of the work force, especially younger and post-retirement workers and women with family responsibilities (Kosters and Ross, 1987)?

Critics of this trend argue that women workers are over-represented in what they characterize as temporary, dead-end jobs without benefits. Two-thirds of part time workers are women. Paradoxically, they argue, this secondary workforce with its marginalized tier of low-wage jobs has been the major source of U.S. economic growth in the last decade (Smith, 1986). These researchers argue that workers do not really choose part-time work, but either do so because the labor market does not provide enough full-time work or because of lack of child care (DuRivage, 1986).

Conversely, those on the other side of the debate argue that the economy has successfully integrated the baby-boom generation by creating an extraordinary number of new jobs without increases in the proportion of workers with low earnings (Kosters and Ross, 1987). These authors claim that low earnings status is predominately a result of low working hours and not of low wages. Low working hours, they assert, are associated with patterns such as school attendance, family responsibilities, and the aging of the workforce. They conclude that "increases in the share of workers with low earnings that are the consequences of worker choices and demographic changes, should, therefore be viewed as making a positive contribution to the overall quality of jobs and not as a diminution in...job quality" (Kosters and Ross, 1987:55).

Although the SIPP provides no information on workers' choices, Table 2.13 does present information on the hours and weeks worked by months of low-wage work during 1984. This information is based on respondents' reports of the hours and weeks they worked in the previous four months. As noted earlier, throughout Part II of this report we have excluded those workers with fewer than 500 hours of employment during the year, in order to concentrate on those with stronger attachment to the workforce. Table 2.13 shows that somewhat more than one-quarter (29.5 percent) of all the remaining workers are employed part-year, if part-year is defined as working fewer than 50 weeks in the year. Wages do appear to be positively related with weeks of work. Only one in ten workers with no months of low-wage work are likely to work part-year (12.5 percent). In contrast, four out of ten of year-long low-wage workers work part-year. All workers, regardless of weeks worked, are working more than 35 hours per week, on the average. This high average number of weekly hours indicates that part-year workers included in this study may experience a reduced number of weeks of work rather than steady, year-round part-time work. Many workers may be employed at more than one job to keep their weekly hours up. This finding corroborates findings also based on SIPP data by Hill and Hartmann (1988) and findings based on PSID data in Part I of this report. It indicates that low-wage workers may have less flexibility in setting their hours and weeks of work and are more likely to work when employment is available.

When we disaggregate by gender we find that male workers are more likely than female workers to be employed 50 weeks or more per year (75 percent as compared to 65 percent respectively). But when we examine the patterns among year-long low-wage workers, we find that women are as likely as men to work 50 weeks or more per year. Of the four out of ten low-wage workers who work more than seven months but fewer than 50 weeks a year, almost half work 40 to 47 weeks, a sizeable portion of the year. Workers in this category include both those who have experienced periods of unemployment as well as those who have full-time jobs that are not year-round. Based on these findings, we would suggest that the distinction between part and full-year workers is problematic. Limiting full-year work to 50 or more weeks a year undercounts the number of workers who are in the workforce permanently but who do not have jobs that last 50 weeks or more.

When we disaggregate by race-ethnicity as well as gender, we find that with the exception of Asian women, women workers who are year-long low-wage workers are as likely as their male counterparts to work at least 50 weeks in the year, although they work somewhat fewer hours on average. There is surprisingly little variance among gender/race-ethnicity categories of low-wage workers in terms of their participation in the workforce, when those with fewer than 500 hours of work are excluded from the analysis. Although these workers are significantly less likely to work 50 or more weeks in the year than are workers with no months of low-wage work (and as we will see in the regression analysis, weeks and hours of work is an important factor in predicting higher wages), the great majority of workers employed at low-wage jobs most of the year (approximately 80 percent) have more than a casual attachment to the workforce.

Wage Mobility

The final factor that we examine is wage mobility. A key debate on the meaning of low-wage work centers around whether, on the one hand, these jobs are dead-end jobs (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988) that will not keep workers and their families off welfare in the long run, or on the other hand, these jobs represent a choice for part-time work or needed opportunities for unskilled and inexperienced workers to allow them to gain a foothold on the job ladder. Thus, one side concludes that low-wage jobs are dead-end while the other concludes they lead to upward mobility.

Since the 1984 SIPP is a panel study it allows us to look at workers and their wages over time. We can therefore do a limited test of the mobility debate by examining the wage increases of low-wage workers and comparing these increases to those of higher-wage workers. Since we chose to use only 12 months of the 1984 SIPP data our analysis is limited to wage mobility over a one-year period. It should be noted that unlike previous tables that included both salaried and hourly wage workers, this section includes only hourly workers. We have seen previously that a plurality of workers who are year-long low-wage had more that five years of work experience regardless of gender or race-ethnicity; we suggested that these findings indicated that a lack of work experience was not a sufficient explanation for employment at low-wage work. As a result of this finding we hypothesize that for many workers, a low-wage job does not represent the first step on the ladder to a job that will ultimately pay a living wage.

Table 2.14 examines the relation between months of low-wage work and the percentage of workers who received the following over a 12 month period: a decrease in wages or no increase; an increase of less than ten percent; an increase of ten to 15 percent; an increase of 15 to 20 percent, or a wage increase of more that 20 percent. The findings show that three-quarters of all hourly workers either received no wage increase or an increase of less than ten percent over the year (with slightly more receiving no increases and slightly fewer receiving less than ten percent increases). The remaining one-quarter of workers did receive more than a ten percent wage increase.

Contrary to our expectations, hourly workers who are year-long low-wage workers were more likely than those hourly workers with no months of low-wage work to receive wage increases of ten percent or more. While the majority of both groups of workers received either no increase in wages or an increase of less than ten percent, three out of ten year-long low-wage workers compared to only two out of ten higher wage workers received wage increases of more than ten percent. Since higher wage workers are more likely to be salaried than are lower wage workers, the lack of increases shown for the former group may not be valid since it excludes approximately half of higher wage workers.

When we dissaggregate by gender, we find that hourly wage male low-wage workers are somewhat more likely to receive increases of ten percent or more than are women workers in this same category (31.9 percent as compared to 25.6 percent, respectively).

When we further disaggregate by race-ethnicity as well as gender we find that:

- Hispanic men and women are the year-long hourly low-wage workers most likely to receive more than a ten percent wage increase in the course of a year, with about four out of ten men and one-third of Hispanic women falling into this category. Indeed, Hispanic low-wage workers are substantially more likely than any other group to experience increases of 20 percent or more.
- Approximately three out of ten black and white year-long hourly low-wage male workers receive wage increases of ten percent or more. Black men are the group of year-long hourly low-wage workers most likely to have received no wage increase or experience an actual decrease, with almost six out of ten workers falling into this category.
- Approximately three out of four black women as well as three out of four white women who are employed as year-long hourly low-wage workers received either no increase in wages or less than a ten percent increase, with black women more

likely to fall into the no increase category than white women (42.1 as compared to 37.0 percent).

- And finally, approximately eight out of ten Asian men and women employed as year-long hourly low-wage workers received either no increases in wages or less than a ten percent increase.

These findings cannot resolve the debate as to whether low-wage jobs are dead-end or lead to upward mobility because the data are limited to a year in the lives of hourly low-wage workers. They do show, however, that one out of three low-wage workers (with the exception of Hispanic men) did not receive wage increases over the year. Black men are particularly likely to be in this situation. For these workers, the low-wage jobs they hold do not appear to lead to increased wages and a path to higher wage jobs, at least in the short-run.

Among those workers who did receive a wage increase there is a great deal of diversity by gender and race-ethnicity as to the amount of the increases. With the exception of black men who were much less likely to receive wage increases, the largest percentage of those workers who did receive wage increases, received increases of less than ten percent. For these workers. low-wage jobs may represent the beginning of upward mobility, although several caveats need to be kept in mind before reaching this conclusion. First, assuming a ten percent increase each year, it would take these workers three years, on the average, to earn above $5.30 an hour given their current average wage of $4.24 per hour. Second, as we have noted, the majority of these workers are not new entrants into the labor force; they already have work experience. The workers clearly have not experienced a great deal of wage mobility thus far. Third, as we have seen in Part I of this report, the average spell of low-wage work is under two years, with about 40 percent "exiting" to unemployment, out-of-the labor force status, or part-year employment; hence, a substantial portion of these workers may not experience year after year upward wage mobility.

Finally, on the average, 15 percent of low-wage hourly workers experience wage increases of 20 percent or more. There is considerable variation by gender and race-ethnicity with Hispanic men most likely and Asian women least likely to receive these increases. Although, it is no more than a guess, it may be these 15 percent of workers who have found, in a low-wage job, the route to upward mobility.

Specially at Risk Groups of Low-Wage Workers

In this section we explore the characteristics of three especially at risk groups for low-wage workers: those receiving welfare payments, the working poor, and displaced homemakers.

Welfare Recipients

The United States has a two-tiered welfare system (Abramovitz, 1988; Ellwood, 1987; Pearce, 1981). The gap in average monthly payments to recipients between the better-funded primary tier social insurance programs and the means-tested secondary tier programs grew throughout the 1970s and has likely continued to do so (Folbre, 1984). The primary tier, comprised of social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance, disability, workers' compensation and social security were designed for a predominately male, full-time, full-year workforce with verifiable work histories and reasons for not being employed. The secondary tier of means-tested programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and Foodstamps were designed for elders who do not receive sufficient social security payments to bring them out of destitution, impoverished mothers and children with little income support from male breadwinners, and non-striking workers and welfare recipients with family incomes below the federal poverty guidelines.

It is largely with impoverished mothers that the most recent attempts at changing AFDC rules to reflect dominant work ethic and family ideals--The Family Support Act of 1988--is aimed. A major feature of the Family Support Act is the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program (which replaces the previous Work Incentive Program). The JOBS Program requires all women with children age three or over (or all women with children over age one at the discretion of states) to participate for at least 20 hours per week in a program that includes either "job search", "community work experience", or job or basic skills training. The major purpose of the program is to move recipients off the welfare rolls and into paid employment. The underlying assumption of this purpose is that AFDC recipients do not work, and that paid work and participating in second tier welfare programs, or in the words of its framers "economic self-sufficiency" and "dependency," are mutually exclusive and not overlapping activities.

The treatment of those who do paid work and those who receive means-tested welfare as two mutually exclusive groups was fostered during the 1980-1984 budget cuts in means-tested welfare expenditures. During this period there was a 7.5 percent cut in expenditures on these programs as a result of tightening eligibility requirements and demanding work from "able-bodied" persons (Heclo, 1986: 338). This tightening of eligibility benefits had especially negative consequences for low-wage workers receiving supplementary welfare payments--for example, the dropping of the "30 and 1/3" rule that ignored the initial $30 and one-third of the remained earned wages of welfare recipients in the calculations of their benefits.

The data available from the 1984 SIPP panel, coming as it does at the end of this period of cutbacks and eligibility tightening, allows us to investigate to what extent paid work and receipt of welfare payments are overlapping or mutually exclusive activities. The data in Table 2.15 shows the relation between months at low-wage work, gender/race-ethnicity and receipt of seven government transfer programs. With the exception of Social Security all the remaining programs included are means-tested welfare programs including Aid to Families with Dependent

Children (AFDC), Medicaid, Women, Infants, and Children, (WIC), General Assistance, Supplemental Social Security (SSI), and Foodstamps.

Not surprisingly the data show that full-year low-wage workers are eight times as likely to receive these benefits as are higher-wage workers (with 0-1 month of low-wage work). Approximately one out of every ten year-long low-wage employees, 1.4 million workers, do receive such benefits. Male low-wage workers are slightly less likely than are female low-wage workers to receive them (10.6 as compared to 11.7 percent, respectively).

When we disaggregate by race-ethnicity as well as gender, we find that Hispanic men and women who are low-wage workers are much less likely than other groups to receive welfare payments (less than four percent of year-long Hispanic low-wage workers receive some form of welfare payments). These are workers who may fall through the cracks of government transfer programs, the "safety net" of programs, because they are workers rather than destitute elders or destitute mothers, or because of their lack of citizen status.

Low-wage workers who are white women are also less likely to receive means-tested welfare supplements (about one out of ten do so) since many are married to higher-income males. White and black men who are low-wage workers are more likely to be single and hence less likely to qualify for family-oriented welfare programs. Black women, who we have seen are most likely to be low-wage workers and most likely to be single parents, are also most likely to receive some form of welfare supplements (about one in four do so), indicating that for this group of low-wage workers, paid work and receipt of welfare are not mutually exclusive activities.

As we will see in the next section, which reviews the characteristics of those low-wage workers whose families are still in poverty despite their earnings, a substantially higher percentage of this group are both workers and secondary-tier welfare recipients.

The Working Poor

There are more than 2.8 million workers in the U.S. that we have labelled the working poor. These are year-long low-wage workers whose earnings do not bring their families out of poverty, and whose families either do not have any additional earners (which is true in nine out of ten cases) or whose additional earners' wages are so low that the combined earnings of both workers do not bring the family out of poverty; these are the workers who belie the popular stereotype that jobs are the path out of poverty. Who are these workers, and what factors appear to explain their inability to earn a standard of living that would bring their households out of poverty?

In Table 2.16 the working poor are contrasted to all workers and to working women and men in general. By definition, the working poor are more likely to be low-wage workers than is the average worker. They are about two and one-half times as likely to work at low-wage jobs seven months or more than are workers in general (66.7 as compared to 27.5 percent, respectively). Fully seven out of ten poor working women were year-long low-wage workers. This relatively long stretch of employment indicates commitment to the labor force despite the apparently meager rewards received from working.

By definition, the working poor are poor because they earn less money; they earn half as much per hour as do all workers ($3.40 as compared to $6.80 per hour in 1984 dollars, respectively). Poor working women earn the lowest wages--$3.28 per hour (in 1984 dollars). Not surprisingly, the wage gap between poor working men and women is narrower than it is between all working men and all working women (90 cents to each dollar as compared to 74 cents to each dollar, respectively). There is what might be termed a "negative equality" between genders among the working poor.

Despite stereotypes that low-wage workers are young, without family responsibilities and just entering the labor market, the median age of the working poor is 30 years as compared to 34 years of age for all workers. Although the working poor are, on the average, four years younger than is the average worker, a substantial portion of the working poor are adults. Even more surprisingly, the working poor are more likely to be responsible for children than are workers in general. Two-thirds of the working poor have children, and fully 7 out 10 working poor women are parents. The implications of these findings have been discussed by others. Smith (1989), for example, shows that the real increases in poverty during the Reagan Administration were among children. Smith found a precipitous decline in the number of children living in middle-income households and a steep increase in the number of children who lived in less well-off circumstances. According to Smith, the rise in the number of poor children had little to do with the increase in childbearing among the poor or among female parent families, but rather was due to the restructuring of the economy including the decline in well-paying, full-time, full-year jobs and the increase in service sector jobs. Like Smith, we do find that the working poor (especially poor working women) are twice as likely to be in part-time, part-year service occupations; but unlike Smith, we also find that additional factors along with economic restructuring contribute to workers' poverty and the poverty of their children.

There are human capital differences between the working poor and all workers. The working poor are less likely to have had the wherewithal to gain more than a high school education; this is especially true for poor working women. Still, almost one out of five of these women do have more than a high school education, and one out of four poor working men have more education than a high school degree. These findings indicate, one again, that a high school degree, by itself, is not a path out of poverty for a substantial minority of the population.

Although the working poor do have substantially fewer average years of work experience on the same job than does the average worker (five as compared to eight years of experience, respectively), many clearly do have substantial work experience. The gap in work experience between poor working women and all working women is less than between poor working men and all working men. Indeed, poor working women have as much work experience as do poor working men, even though their average hourly wage is less. Many of the working poor are not raw beginners or new recruits into the labor market; they do have more experience than their minimum wages appear to reflect.

What other factors then appear to explain their extremely low wages? One factor that does stand out is the lack of job training among the working poor. Previously, we have found that low-wage workers have, on the average, more job training than do higher-wage workers. We suggested that the reason for this finding was either the attempt on the part of low-wage workers to make up educational deficits or the success of job-training programs to find and train their target population. In sharp contrast to other low-wage workers, the working poor have not been successfully found as a target for job training. Only three percent of them have had job training.

The working poor do work fewer weeks and hours per year than do workers in general. On the average they work about six weeks less per year than do all workers (41.5 as compared to 47.2 weeks, respectively). On the average, the working poor are employed for the majority of the year. Even poor working women, who work the least number of weeks (39 weeks) are working about nine months of the year. In contrast to the relatively small gap in weeks worked, the gap in hours is substantial between the working poor and all workers. The working poor are employed about 40 percent fewer hours than is the average worker; the average worker is employed about 38 hours per week, while the working poor are employed only 27 hours per week. (Previously, we found that full-year low-wage workers are employed about 33 hours per week, on the average). This finding of relatively few hours per week might be construed to suggest that if only the working poor worked more hours, they would not be poor. But even if these workers were employed full time, full year (2000 hours), they would still only earn approximately $6,800--below the poverty line for a family of two. Increased hours of work, by itself, is not a path of out poverty for these workers even if they were employed in full-time, full-year jobs. Many of these workers are probably filling the part-time, part-year jobs being generated in large numbers by the current economy.

Table 2.16 provides some evidence that the working poor are less likely to work in jobs and in firms that provide relatively stable, full-time, full-year, well-paying work. The working poor are more than twice as likely as are all workers (50.0 percent as compared to 21.5 percent, respectively) to work in small size firms. Previously, we have seen that there appear to be low wage, women and minority sectors in large firms. Although employment in a large firm does not necessarily result in higher wages for women and minority men, employment in a small firm appears to be at least a partial explanation for the extremely low wages of the working poor.

Likewise, the working poor are almost twice as likely as all workers to be employed in low-wage service occupations. This is especially true for poor working women; almost four out of ten of these women, compared to 17 percent of all working women and only 13 percent of poor working men are so employed. In contrast, poor working men are more likely than other groups of workers to be employed in low-wage blue collar jobs such as laborers. It may also be the case as Smith (1989) suggests that these low-paid workers, are replacing traditionally higher-paid blue collar workers as durable goods manufacturing industries restructure, and minority laborers are used as replacements for more expensive white men.

Finally, Table 2.16 shows that the jobs held, the hours worked, and the extremely low earnings of the working poor require public subsidy by taxpayers. Four out of ten poor working men and fully five out of ten poor working women receive some form of public assistance, compared to only one out of five of all workers and one out of ten of all year-long low-wage workers. This is evidence that employment is not necessarily an alternative to welfare payments. The 1988 Family Support Act, with its mandatory JOBS program, appears to assume that employment results in movement off the welfare rolls. Our findings indicate that for the working poor this is not the case. Earnings are so low that these workers cannot support themselves and their children without taxpayer-funded Government transfer programs, for which, despite the means testing of most these programs, many still qualify. Taxpayer-funded government transfer payments appear to be a supplement for the low wages paid and the part-time jobs offered by the employers of the working poor rather than an alternative.

In sum, these findings show that a substantial segment of the working poor are adult workers with children and while they are less educated, less trained, and less experienced than are workers in general, and even than other low-wage workers, they are not raw recruits into the job market. They are likely to work in the part-time, part-year jobs in firms and occupations that have been referred to as "the secondary labor market." And their wages are so low that they still qualify for public assistance, despite or perhaps as a result of employment in these secondary sector jobs.

Displaced Homemakers

Displaced homemakers are defined here as women between the ages of 30 and 64 who are solely responsible for the economic well-being of their families, as a result of divorce, separation from, or death of a husband. As we have seen, about one-third of all working women do not earn high enough wages to bring a household of four out of poverty. As a result of life-cycle events such as divorce, separation, or death, women and their children face dramatic drops in their economic well-being. As Burkhauser and Duncan (1988) found in their study of the economic risks of gender roles over the life course, divorce remains the single most devastating event for young and middle aged women and death of a spouse is a less devastating but still important economic event for older women. These authors conclude that current social insurance and the social welfare system, formulated during a period when life-long intact marriages to male breadwinners was the norm, do not prevent women from experiencing substantial falls in well-being as a result of family-breakup. In the absence of a responsive social insurance and social welfare system, displaced homemakers must join the labor force in order to support their families, a labor force than many of them are ill-trained to participate in.

According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, there are more than 11 million displaced homemakers in the United States. Our findings from the SIPP show that approximately 8.1 million of these women are in the labor force, and of those in the labor force, about two-thirds have worked as low-wage workers at some time during the year and more than one-third spent most of the year (seven months or more) employed at low-wage jobs. Our findings concentrate on this latter group of full-year displaced homemakers. These women represent a significant group of low-wage workers that defy the stereotype that low-wage workers are casual entrants into the labor force; likely to be students, post-retirement workers, or married women with family responsibilities choosing temporary jobs to earn pin money. They are a group of workers whose families are dependent on their earnings, and whose families face a high risk of being poor despite these women's earnings.

Table 2.17 compares displaced homemakers who are full-year low-wage workers with all women workers ages 30-64 (with more than 500 annual hours in the labor force). It also examines the differences among white women and minority women or women of color (the majority of whom are black but for reasons of sample size could not be further disaggregated). What do these comparisons show? They show that those displaced homemakers who are in the labor force are somewhat more likely to be year-long low-wage workers than are all women workers (36.5 as compared to 32.0 percent, respectively). Displaced homemakers who are women of color are the most likely to be year-long low-wage workers with more than four out of ten in this situation.

Displaced homemakers are both more likely to be year-long low-wage workers and more likely to be solely responsible for their children's economic well-being than are other women workers in their age category. The families of displaced homemakers are likely to include children, with over half of all low-wage displaced homemakers and more than two-thirds of low-wage displaced homemakers who are women of color having minor children in the household. Table 2.17 also shows that compared to all women workers in their age category, the earnings of a substantially higher percentage of low-wage displaced homemakers either are responsible for moving their households out of poverty or are so low that they fail to do so. More than half (56.7 percent) of displaced homemakers' families would be at risk of poverty without their earnings or are poor despite their earnings, compared to 20.0 percent of all women workers and 26.0 percent of low-wage women workers in their age category.

This substantially greater risk of family poverty distinguishes displaced homemakers from other low-wage women workers in their age category. Unlike the majority of low-wage women workers (especially white women), displaced homemakers do not live in dual-earner families. Low-wage white displaced homemakers are more than twice as likely as are all low-wage white women in their age category to be responsible for their families' economic well-being (50.4 as compared to 19.0 percent, respectively). Of all low-wage working women, minority displaced homemakers are the most responsible for the economic well-being of their families. The earnings of more than seven out of ten of these women either are responsible for bringing their families out of poverty or are not high enough to do so.

The result of this economic responsibility is that the families of low-wage displaced homemakers are substantially more likely to be in poverty, despite these women's earnings, than are the families of all other women in their age category. Approximately 3.5 percent of the families of all women workers live in poverty despite their earnings. In contrast, approximately 14 percent of the families of white displaced homemakers who are year-long low-wage workers and double the percentage (28 percent) of the families of women of color who are year-long low-waged workers are poor despite these women's earnings.

Despite their substantially greater responsibility for their families' economic well-being, displaced homemakers employed as year-long low-wage workers are less likely to have gone beyond a high school education than are other women workers including other low-wage workers in their age category. Only 17 percent of all low-wage displaced homemakers, compared to 41.2 percent of all women workers in their age category and 24 percent of all women employed as low-wage workers, have more than a high school education.

Likewise, displaced homemakers are less likely than are all women workers and less likely than other low-wage women workers to have received job training. Fewer than 12 percent of displaced homemakers employed as year-long low-wage workers compared to 17.1 percent of all working women and 17.6 percent of all year-long low-wage women workers in their age category have received such training.

Although low-wage displaced homemakers have less education and training than do other women workers in their age category, they have slightly more years of work experience than do other categories of year-long low-wage working women (8.5 as compared to 8.0, respectively). For displaced homemakers, however, years of work experience do not result in higher wages and lack of work experience is not a sufficient explanation for employment at jobs that pay low wages.

Nor are fewer weeks or hours of work a sufficient explanation for their low wages. Displaced homemakers, regardless of race-ethnicity, work slightly more hours per year than all women employed as year-long low-wage workers. (The average hours of work are 1,760 for all low-wage displaced homemakers, 1,747 for white displaced homemakers, 1,789 for women of color, and 1,636 for all year-long low-wage women workers, respectively). In fact, low-wage displaced homemakers work, on the average, only about 150 fewer hours per year than do male workers. Although they may hold part-time jobs, if they do, they clearly hold more than one in order to try to earn a full-time, full-year salary. Despite this effort, however, these women are still low-wage workers and additional weeks and hours of work is not the solution to moving these women and their children out of poverty.

One factor that might move these women into higher paid work is education, training, and experience in higher-wage occupations and industries. Low-wage displaced homemakers are more than twice as likely as are all working women (38.3 as compared to 16.0 percent, respectively) and somewhat more likely than other low-wage working women to be employed in what we have termed low-wage, highly female service occupations. Low-wage displaced homemakers who are women of color are most likely (46 percent) to be employed in these occupations. Low-wage displaced homemakers are also about twice as likely than are all women workers to be employed in low-paid service and retail industries.

In sum, displaced homemakers are more likely to be responsible for the economic well-being of their families although they are more likely to be low-wage workers in feminized low-wage occupations and industries than are other women in their age category. Although they have more experience and work more hours, they are less likely to have gone beyond a high school education and less likely to have had job training. As a result their families are more than twice as likely as are the families of other women low-wage workers and more than four times as likely as the families of all working women in their age category to be in poverty.

Part II.B: Regression Analysis

In the descriptive analysis, we examined demographic, human capital, and job characteristics of workers to determine how each of these factors separately affected their wages. Now, we use two sorts of regression analyses--ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression analysis--to enable us to look simultaneously at all the characteristics previously studied in Part II.A and to quantify the relative influence of each characteristic on wages and on the risk of being a low-wage worker, when we control for the remaining characteristics. We also test to see if there are different relationships among gender/race-ethnic groups.

Methodology For Regression Analysis

In the first part of our regression analysis, we use an OLS model to isolate and compare the strength and significance of characteristics, previously examined separately, that influence incremental changes in wages. This analysis quantifies the relations between the dependent variable (average annual wage) and the set of independent variables representing demographic, human capital, and job characteristics that appeared to be strongly related to wages in the descriptive section of Part II.A. It also tests hypotheses regarding differences among the gender and race-ethnic groups. First, we estimated a model for the total sample of workers containing the selected set of independent variables including variables for gender/race-ethnicity and their interaction. Not surprisingly, given the previous findings, we found gender and race-ethnicity to be extremely significant (the results are discussed in the next section on Findings). Since we were not only concerned with showing the significance of gender and race-ethnicity, but also in investigating the differential importance of demographic, human capital, and job characteristics among groups, separate regressions were estimated for the eight gender/race-ethnic groups so that the significance levels and parameter estimates (coefficients) could be compared.

Independent Variables

The models created were designed to fully describe, quantify, and compare the independent variables associated with higher or lower annual wages (the dependent variable). The regression technique estimates the average annual wage of a person with given values on the independent variables; it shows the returns, in dollars, to each factor--for example, how much gain in hourly earnings does a worker receive for each additional year of education.[35] This technique does not necessarily imply a causal relationship between the independent variables and wages. For example, a specific individual's job change from service to manufacturing industries may not be the cause of her or his increased wages. However, on the average, persons who work in service industries are identified as a group who are likely to receive lower wages than those who work in manufacturing industries.

The set of independent variables, which capture demographic characteristics and family compositional variables of workers, are:

1) Age
2) Race and ethnicity
3) Gender
4) Women of color
5) Married with spouse present
6) Presence of children.

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[35] Typically, some part of the differences in actual wages cannot be explained by the independent variables in the regression; these unexplained differences are called residuals.

The set of independent variables pertaining to human capital are:

1) Years of schooling completed
2) Years of work experience
3) Whether any formal job training was been received.

The set of structural characteristics of the labor market and the job that are included in the model are:

1) Industry of the current primary job
2) Occupation of the current primary job
3) Indicator for large work site
4) Indicator for a small firm.
5) Annual hours worked
6) Union membership.

In addition, residence in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) was also included as an independent variable.

In regression analysis when a categorical or dichotomous variable such as marital status are used, all cases are compared to a reference group[36]. The reference group is the group to which workers are compared through a set of dummy variables. The reference group for these equations is a professional/managerial single worker, with no children living outside the inner city in a MSA, working in a manufacturing industry in a medium size firm and without formal job training. The estimates for all workers are relative to a white male worker with the same characteristics. Where appropriate, the characteristics of the reference group are indicated in parentheses in the relevant tables.

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[36] We created dichotomous variables (called dummy variables) for each 0 of the categorical variables used in the model. A value of 1 was assigned if the characteristic was present or a value of 0 when it was not.

Logistic Regression

Analysis of the risk associated with experiencing low-wage work, given a person's characteristics, is important since the focus of this study is on low-wage workers and not specifically on changes in actual hourly wages. For the second part of the analysis, a logistic regression is utilized to explain the dichotomous dependent variable identifying the risk of being a full-year low-wage worker or not[37]. The logistic model is very similar to the least-squares model. The difference is in the dependent variable, which here is the risk (or probability) of being a full-year low-wage worker, contrasted to the probability of being a worker with 0-1 months of low-wage work in the year. (The sample for this step contains only workers with either 0-1 months of low-wage work or those with seven-twelve months; the omission of the workers with two-six months eliminates the more transitional workers who may be moving out of or into a period of low-wage work or unemployment.)

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[37] A dichotomous variable is a categorical variable that can only take on only two values (0 or 1). A logistic regression technique is needed where the dependent variable is dichotomous rather than continuous--like wages.

Findings on the Annual Wage (OLS) Regression

Most of the independent variables for the all workers' model were found to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level, meaning that there is only a one percent chance that the association found between the independent variables and the dependent variable could have occurred by chance (see Appendix Regression Table 2.1). Given the large sample available with the SIPP data, and our previous findings that demographic, human capital, and job characteristics do affect wages, the statistical significance of most of the independent variables is not surprising. Two variables were not significant in all the workers' models: working in the wholesale industry or in the finance, insurance, and real estate (F.I.R.E.) industry group model and the presence of children in the household. We made the decision to keep these variables in the gender and race-ethnicity models because variables which do not appear to be significant for all workers considered together may be significant for particular groups of workers.[38] This is indeed what we found for women with children (negatively correlated with higher wages) and men in F.I.R.E. (positively correlated with higher wages).

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[38] This is a way of testing the significance of the interaction terms.

All Workers

Of the demographic characteristics, age[39] is positively correlated with wages but being female or a minority is negatively correlated. Thus, older workers fare better than younger ones (26 cents more per your for each year), among workers in general. Workers who are women earn \$2.62 less per hour than white men; other minorities earn between \$0.66 to \$1.46 less than white men, when we control for other characteristics. The interaction of being female and a minority is significant but has less of a negative effect than the sum of the two variables if examined separately. Marriage does have a positive effect on wages (married workers earn an additional 50 cents per hour, when we control for other characteristics), although residing either in a city or in a rural area are both significant and negatively correlated with wages.

The acquisition of human capital does increase wage for workers in general. Positive coefficients were found for education (\$0.43 per hour for each additional year of schooling), experience (\$0.18 per hour for each additional year), and job training (\$0.26 increase for having had job training), when we control for other characteristics. In the descriptive part of the analysis we found that substantial percentages of low-wage workers have a high school education and more than five years experience and are, on average, more likely than higher wage workers to have had job-training. Here we find that the more education, experience, and job training the average worker has, the better.

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[39] Both EXPERIENCE and AGE exhibit a quadratic relation with wage hence the squared terms are also used as independent variables in the regression.

Workers in construction, transportation, communications, and public utilities earn significantly more than those in the manufacturing industry. Workers in retail, services, and public administrative industries earn less. All occupations relative to professional and managerial are negatively correlated to wages. Workers in small firms (1-24 employees) earn 61 cents per hour less than those in medium size firms (26-499 employees) while workers with jobs at large work sites earn 99 cents per hour more, when we control for other characteristics. Wages do increase with the annual hours worked, implying that full-time workers earn more per hour than part-time workers, controlling for all other characteristics.

The results of the two gender regressions and the eight gender and race-ethnicity regressions are given in Appendix Regression Tables 2.1, 2.2. and 2.3. In these models we see that different variables are significant and have very different coefficients than in the all workers' model.

Findings for Male Workers

For white men, we found that many of the demographic and human capital factors generally associated with higher earnings result in even greater returns in wages than in the all workers' model. White men have the largest returns to education by 16-38 cents per year over the other race-ethnicity and gender groups, the largest returns to years of experience (except for Asian men and women), the largest returns to age (except for Hispanic men). Their wages are very sensitive to firm size; they benefit the most from working in large firms by at least 34 cents per hour compared to other workers and their wages suffer from working in small firms (84 cents per/hour less than workers in medium size firms). White men benefit the most from marriage--married white men earn an additional 79 cents per hour. Inner-city living has less of a negative effect on wages than for Hispanic men and women--the only other groups where it is also significant. However, white men's wages are most sensitive, relative to white women, black men, and black women, to residing in a rural area--a decrease of $1.28 less per hour compared to other white men of the same characteristics. Unionization has the smallest returns to white men (only an additional 41 cents per hour) because they are most likely to be higher-wage professionals and managers. White men are the only group of men for whom hours worked are significant, likely indicating that full-time white men earn higher wages, while the difference in wages between full-time and part-time is not significant for minority men. The industry and occupation in which a white male works generally appear to have approximately the same effect, either positive or negative, on wages than for other groups. They lose $2.86 per hour by working in a service rather than a professional or managerial occupation, and $2.17 per hour by working in agriculture and mining rather than in manufacturing. Working in the F.I.R.E. industry, white men experience the largest significant increase in wages (which accounts for a 85 cent increase in wages over manufacturing).

For black men, unionization is by far one of the most influential variables for increasing wages for workers of the same characteristics, controlling for all other factors (refer to Appendix Regression Table 2.2). A black man covered by a union contract is able to earn $1.32 per hour more on the average than a similar man with the same demographic, human capital, and job characteristics. Work experience for black men is close to being insignificant for increasing wages and the amount of that increase is only eight cents per hour per year of experience (compared to 24 cents for white men). Hours of work is insignificant. Although education has low payoff for black men compared to white men (34 cents compared to 58 cents for each additional year of schooling) they do benefit more from job training (24 cents to 15 cents per hour). Firm size seems to make less of a difference with black men than for white men--84 cents more for working in a large firm and 54 cents less for working in a small firm, partially confirming our previous findings of the existence of a low-wage black men's sector in large firms. Their demographic characteristics have little or almost no effect on their wages. Marriage, having children, or living in a city are all insignificant although rural living does decrease hourly wages by approximately one dollar. For industries and occupations, black men suffer more than white men by not having a professional or managerial occupation ($2.42 less per hour in technical sales and administrative support to $2.98 less per hour in a service occupation). Black men in agricultural or mining, as most minorities in this industry, lose a great deal of earnings per hour compared to manufacturing workers ($3.26 less per hour). They also have large decreases in earnings by working in retail ($1.37 less), services ($1.49 less), and personal services ($2.44) while all other industries are not significant in affecting wages.

As with black men, Hispanic men have low returns to education compared to white men (27 cents per hour compared to 58 cents for each additional year) and very high returns to unionization ($1.79 per hour more than non-union Hispanic men), controlling for all other factors. In contrast to black men, they do reap twice as much for years of experience and significantly more for job training. Hispanic men's wages are even less affected by firm size than black men's--approximately 45 cents less for a worker in a small firm and 45 cents more for a worker in a large firm. Likewise, their wages are not as sensitive to their occupations as that of black men. They experience a loss of $1.80 as a blue collar worker and $2.70 in a service occupation. They suffer similarly in service industries ($1.53 to $2.39 less than manufacturing). Unlike other workers, Hispanic men employed in wholesale and construction earn significantly less than manufacturing workers, $1.67 less in construction and $1.74 less in wholesale, controlling for all other factors.

Asian men's earnings patterns are different than other men in that higher earnings are even more dependent on education (although not as much as white men), experience, and occupation, while most of the other variables, including all demographic characteristics, are particularly insignificant for explaining higher wages. Asian men earn 42 cents more per hour for each additional year of education and 30 cents more per hour for each additional year of experience (white men earn only 24 cents for each additional year of experience). They also reap large returns in wages by receiving job training--$1.72 per hour more. Asian men who are not able to receive higher education or job training which might place them in a managerial or professional job are greatly handicapped in earning higher wages. They earn $3.66 per hour less in technical, sales and administrative support to $5.63 per hour less in a service occupation than those who are professionals or managers. They also suffer in the industries of agricultural and mining ($5.63 less than workers in manufacturing), even more so than Hispanic and black men. In contrast to white men who do well in F.I.R.E. compared to manufacturing, Asian men earn $3.33 less in this industry than in manufacturing.

Findings for Women Workers

White women's wages are less sensitive to job characteristics and human capital factors than are white men's wages; their wages are less sensitive to age (12 cents less per hour for each year), education (27 cents less per hour for each year of schooling) and work experience (12 cents less per hour for each year) than are white men's. Because they tend not to hold higher paying professional and managerial jobs in whichever industry they work, white women's losses that can be attributed to the occupations and the industries in which they work appear to be less than men's, controlling for all other factors. White women who do not work in managerial or professional occupations earn approximately $1.53 per hour less in technical, sales and administrative support occupations and $2.12 less per hour in service occupations than those white women who do (while white men can lose as much as $2.86 per hour by not working as a professional or manager). White women in the lowest paying industries-- agricultural/mining and personal services--have a wage loss relative to manufacturing workers of $1.50 to $2.00 per hour (compared to white men who might lose as much as $3.22 per hour in personal services). In contrast, white women do benefit more from job training, unionization, and hours worked (16 cents more, 28 cents more, and 40 cents more, respectively) than white men. Women who work in the transportation, communication, and public utilities industries, a highly unionized industrial sector where many non-union members do benefit from the unionization, earn approximately one dollar more than white women who are manufacturing workers. Marriage is not significantly related to higher wages for white women, but having children significantly decreases wages, controlling for all other factors. This is the reverse of the situation of white men who benefit from marriage and do not experience significant losses when they have children.

These findings indicate that white men benefit from marriage while white women bear the costs of child care. Black women have a dual disadvantage in that they experience even lower returns to education and experience than do white women along with the higher sensitivity to occupations experienced by white men. Black women are less advantaged by working in a large firm (25 cents more per hour compared to 90 cents more per hour for white women and $1.24 more per hour for white men), controlling for all other factors. They also experience the largest decrease attributable to working in a small firm over all men and other women--96 cents less per hour than black women in medium size firms (white men experience 84 cents less per hour when working in a small firm). Job training does not result in significantly increased wages but hours worked and union status do. (Black women earn an additional 42 cents per hour for each additional 1000 hours worked and $1.01 per hour more than black women who are not union members). They earn a substantially larger wage ($1.87 per hour) in the transportation, communications, and public utilities industries than similar workers in manufacturing. (This increase is 84 cents more than the increase seen by white women and $1.50 more than white men who also work in transportation, communications, and public utilities). For black women (unlike white women) having children does not appear to decrease wages, and marriage is insignificant. A black woman residing in a rural area has a wage of 84 cents less than one who lives in the suburbs and inner city living does not significantly influence wages up or down.

Hispanic women experience much of the dual disadvantage of black women. They have low returns to age (21 cents per hour for each year), education (19 cents per hour for each year), and experience (10 cents per hour for each year). Their wages are also very sensitive to occupation and industry. Those that are not professionals or managers can lose between $2.83 (in technical, sales, and administrative support occupations) to $3.48 (in service occupations). Their wages also drop substantially by working in agricultural/mining ($3.58 per hour), wholesale ($1.88 per hour), or retail ($1.32 per hour) relative to a similar worker in manufacturing. Like black men and women and Hispanic men, they benefit greatly from unionization--with an hourly wage increase of $1.27. They also benefit from working in larger firms (76 cents more per hour). Neither job training nor hours worked are significant. Hispanic women's wages are sensitive to demographic characteristics. Married women do earn more than single women (53 cents more per hour) and the presence of children decreases wages by 71 cents per hour. Residing in either the inner city or a rural area can result in lower wages, 57 cents and $1.19 respectively.

For Asian women, the demographic characteristics of marriage, children, and residence and the structural characteristic of industry have no significant bearing on wages. Unlike other women, Asian women do reap high returns for education (32 cents per hour for each year of schooling) and for experience (also 32 cents per hour). The returns to experience is the highest of all the gender/race-ethnic groups. They are similar to Asian men in that their wages are highly volatile depending on their occupation. They can lose between $2.52 in technical, sales and administrative support occupations to $4.82 in blue collar per hour by not working in a professional or managerial occupation. Asian women are also unique in that they are the only group of women where union members earn less per hour than non-union members ($2.76 per hour less). Age, job training, hours worked, small firm size, and large work site are not significant in influencing wages for Asian women.

Findings for the Logistic Regression

In the OLS regression models, we identified the variables which are positively correlated with wages. But are these increases responsible for pushing low-wage workers into higher paying jobs or do they simply increase the wages of those workers with already high pay? To answer this question, we must examine a model which analyzes the factors contributing to the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker. For example, we found that workers in the Public Administrative industry experience a decrease relative to the manufacturing in all workers' OLS model. When examining the logistic regression, however, this variable is not significant for identifying low-wage workers. We might conclude that public administration employees do earn a lower wage than manufacturing workers, controlling for the other characteristics, but this decrease in wages is not enough to lower wages below the level of $5.30 per hour (in 1984 dollars). We would suggest, therefore, that working in public administration does not increase thee risk of being a year-long low-wage worker, although employment in this sector does not result in higher wages.

When the coefficients in the logistic regression model are positive they indicate a higher risk of being a low-wage worker - hence the signs of the coefficients are usually the opposite sign to those in the OLS model. Models for Asian men and women are not included in this part of the regression analysis because the small sample sizes prohibited a reasonable set of estimates.

All Workers

The 'all workers' model given in Appendix Regression Table 2.4 is accurate[40] in 85 percent of the cases for predicting whether a worker is low wage for most of the year or not. This is a high rate of accuracy, and hence the model has a good fit. What characteristics increase the risk in the all workers model of being a year-long, low-wage worker? In this model women and minority workers, those with children, and those who live in a rural area have an increased risk of being a year-long low-wage worker. Structural variables such as working in a small firm, working in a non-professional or non-manager occupation, and working in the low paying industries of agricultural/mining, retail, and service all increase the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker. The F.I.R.E. industry group is also identified here as increasing the risk of being a low-wage worker although it was not significant in the all workers' OLS regression model, it was positively correlated with annual wage for white men, and it was negatively correlated with Asian men's wages. This industry may be an example of one having a secondary tier of low-wage jobs filled largely by women and minorities although many higher paying jobs for white men do exist in the same industry.

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[40] The accuracy of a logistic regression is the ratio of the correct predicted classification to the total sample size. Each workers' characteristics (the independent variables) were used to estimate his or her probability of being a low-wage worker. If the estimated probability was greater than 0.5, the worker had a predicted classification as a low-wage worker. This classification was then compared to the true classification and the total number of correct classifications were found.

What characteristics decrease the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker for the average worker? Age, education, and experience all decrease the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker, controlling for all other factors (although we saw in the descriptive analysis that many low-wage workers do hold a high school diploma, have at least five years experience, and half are over 30 years old). Job training is another factor that decreases the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker (although in the descriptive analysis we found that low-wage workers are more likely to receive training than higher paid workers). Hours worked also decreases the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker. Not surprisingly then, as workers move into full-time employment their risk of being a low-wage worker decreases, controlling for all factors. Also working in the public sector and working in a large firm are factors which generally decrease the risk. (We saw in the descriptive analysis that there are many low-wage workers who do work in large firms but these regression findings indicate that many of the higher-paid workers in these firms are at risk of being a low-wage worker if their employment was to change to a smaller firm). Labor union membership decreases the risk of year-long low-wage work more than any other categorical variable. Union membership appears to be crucial for obtaining higher paying jobs for many workers who would otherwise be year-long low-wage workers. Finally, we see that marriage also decreases the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker in the all workers' model. These findings for all workers are summarized in the chart below:

Factors which are Significant in Either Increasing or Decreasing the Risk of Low-wage Work for All Workers

Increase Risk	Decrease Risk
Working in a small firm Technical, Sales, Administrative Support Occupation Service Occupation Blue Collar Occupation Agricultural/Mining Industry Retail Industry F.I.R.E. Industry Service Industry Personal Service Industry Non-White Female Rural Residence Having Children in Household	Age Education Experience Job Training Labor Union Hours Large Work Site Public Admin. Married

Gender and Race-Ethnicity

Are the factors that increase the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker the same for all gender/race-ethnic groups? In the previous analyses we have seen that some factors are more likely to be related to higher wages for some groups while other factors appear to be more important for others. We have also seen that year-long low-wage work is unequally distributed among gender/race-ethnic groups. We now use the coefficients of the logistic regression to calculate the probabilities of being a year-long low-wage worker for each gender/race-ethnic group, when we assign all workers, regardless of gender/race-ethnicity, the characteristics of the average worker in the identical labor market structure.[41] When we assume that all workers regardless of gender/race-ethnicity have the same characteristics (including occupational and industrial distribution, human capital, and personal characteristics) except race and gender we find the following probabilities of being a year-long low-wage worker:

Probabilities of Being a Low-Wage Worker
If Each Worker Possessed the Same Average Characteristics
And Faced The Same Job Market

Probability (White Man being a Low-Wage Worker) = 0.07
Probability (Minority Man being a Low-Wage Worker) = 0.11
Probability (White Woman being a Low-Wage Worker) = 0.23
Probability (Minority Woman being a Low-Wage Worker) = 0.28

The results show that even if women of color have the same average age, marital status, education, work experience, work in the same occupations and industries, for the same number of weeks and hours as white men, they would be four times as likely to be year-long low-wage workers. White women would be more than three times as likely and men of color would be 1.63 times as likely to be year-long low-wage workers as would white men.

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[41] The following equation was used to calculate the probabilities:

$$X = \exp\left(\sum_{i \in U} B_i * Y_i \right)$$

where X is the odds of being a low-wage worker, U is the set of independent variables in the regression analysis, Y_i is the mean of the ith variable except for race and gender where either a 1 or a 0 were entered, B_i is the coefficient estimate of the ith variable.

Because the characteristics in the equation used to calculate the probabilities of year-long low-wage work were dominated by the characteristics of the white male workers (the largest gender and race-ethnic grouping in the labor force) they understate the risk to the remaining groups who (in contrast to white men) experience segregation into the lower paying jobs. In what follows we will specify the factors that increase or decrease the risk of year-long low-wage work for each of the gender/race-ethnic groups starting with white men.

In Appendix Regression Table 2.5, many of the same results of all workers are seen for white men. This is not surprising given white men's labor market dominance. The same human capital variables decrease the risk of being a low-wage work for most of the year: age, education, experience, and job training. Several industries, relative to manufacturing, are lower paying industries for white men (as they were for all workers)--agricultural/mining, retail, F.I.R.E., service and personal services industries with the addition of the wholesale industry. In the OLS model, F.I.R.E. industries were positively correlated with higher wages for white men and wholesale was not significant. With both of these factors increasing the risk for white men being year-long low-wage workers in the logistic regression model, no consistent conclusions can be drawn as to these industries' effect on wages. It may be that secondary labor markets exist within these industries and that the models reflect the differential impact of these internal markets.

White men who work either in technical, sales, or administrative support occupations, or blue collar occupations have a higher risk of year-long low-wages than do managerial/professional workers; however, service occupations are not significant in either increasing or decreasing risk. Both membership in a labor union and working at a large work site are structural factors which decrease the probability for white men of being full-year low-wage workers. Working in a small firm increases the risk. For white men, the demographic characteristics which influence the risk of being low wage are a rural residence (increase risk) and being married (decrease risk). The significant factors are summarized in the following chart.

Factors which are Significant in Either Increasing or Decreasing the Risk of Low-wage Work for White Men

Increase Risk	Decrease Risk
Working in a small firm	Age
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support Occupation	Education
Blue Collar Occupation	Experience
Agricultural/Mining Industry	Job Training
Wholesale Industry	Labor Union
Retail Industry	Large Work Site
F.I.R.E. Industry	Married
Service Industry	
Personal Service Industry	
Rural Residence	

In the logistic regression for black men we find fewer significant factors that decrease or increase the risk of year-long low-wage work than with white men. Only age, education, and labor union coverage decrease the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker. Labor union coverage decreases the risk of year-long low-wage work more than any other categorical variable. The factors contributing to a higher risk of low-wage work for black men are all structural except for living in a rural area. Working in a small firm increases the risk although working in a large firm is not significant for either increasing or decreasing the risk, again demonstrating the likelihood of a low-wage black male sector in large firms. Black men who do not hold managerial or professional jobs are, not surprisingly, have a higher risk of year-long low-wages than those who do. Black men in agricultural/mining, retail, and service industries also have a higher risk of year-long low-wages than those workers in the other industries. The following chart summarizes these factors:

Factors which are Significant in Either Increasing or Decreasing the Risk of Low-wage Work for Black Men

Increase Risk	Decrease Risk
Working in a small firm	Age
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support Occupation	Education
Blue Collar Occupation	Labor Union
Service Occupation	
Agricultural/Mining Industry	
Retail Industry	
Service Industry	
Rural Residence	

For Hispanic men, only four factors are significant for increasing the risk of year-long low-wage work and four are significant for decreasing risks. As we have seen, low-wage Hispanic men are concentrated in the service occupations, and in the agricultural/mining, retail, and service industries. These are the four significant factors that increase the risk for Hispanic men of year-long low-wage work. The same three factors are significant for decreasing the risk of being a low-wage worker for Hispanic men as for black men--age, education, and labor union coverage. Labor union coverage has the most impact of all the categorical variables. Experience is significant for decreasing the rise of being a low-wage worker for Hispanic men, although it is not significant for black men. These factors are summarized in the chart below:

Factors which are Significant in Either Increasing or Decreasing the Risk of Low-wage Work for Hispanic Men

Increase Risk	Decrease Risk
Service Occupation	Age
Agricultural/Mining Industry	Education
Retail Industry	Experience
Service Industry	Labor Union

For white women, having children and living in a rural area are both demographic characteristics which are significant in increasing the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker (see Appendix Regression Table 2.6). As with white men, age and marriage both contribute to a decreased risk of being a low-wage worker. As with all other workers, except black men and Hispanic women, education and experience do significantly decrease the risk of year-long low-wages. White women also appear to benefit significantly from job training. White women who do not work as professionals or managers are at a greater risk of being year-long low-wage workers than those who do. Working in the transportation, communications, and public utilities industry group or in the public sector has advantages over other industries in decreasing the risk of low-wage work, while working in the low-paying retail and service industries increases the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker. The number of hours worked is also important in decreasing the risk of low-wage work for white women. As with white men, working in a large firm is also an advantage for white women relative to working in other size firms, but working in a small firm is not a significant disadvantage. The following chart summarizes these findings.

Factors which are Significant in Either Increasing or Decreasing the Risk of Low-wage Work for White Women

Increase Risk	Decrease Risk
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support Occupation	Age
Service Occupation	Education
Blue Collar Occupation	Experience
Retail Industry	Job Training
Service Industry	Labor Union
Personal Service Industry	Public Admin.
Rural Residence	Transportation, Communications, & Public Util.
Having Children	Large Work Site
	Hours Worked
	Married

The same factors contribute to the risk of year-long low-wages for black women as for black men. Black women, however, are faced with the additional factor of children-- who increase the risk of year-long low-wage work. Black women's risk decreases with increased experience, education, and age. Their wages suffer from not working as a manager or a professional. As with all minorities and white men, black women experience a higher risk of being a low-wage worker if employed in agricultural/mining industries. Also employment in retail and service industries increases the risk of year-long low-wages. Black women also have a higher risk of low-wage employment if they work in a small firm. And as with all workers, except Hispanic men, they have a higher risk of low-wages if they reside in a rural area. Again, labor union coverage is the categorical variable with the greatest impact for decreasing the risk of full-year low-wages. These findings are summarized in the chart below:

Factors which are Significant in Either Increasing or Decreasing the Risk of Low-wage Work for Black Women

Increase Risk	Decrease Risk
Working in a small firm	Age
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support Occupation	Education
Blue Collar Occupation	Experience
Service Occupation	Labor Union
Agricultural/Mining Industry	
Retail Industry	
Personal Service Industry	
Rural Residence	
Having Children	

For Hispanic women (like black men) only age, education, and labor union coverage contribute to decreasing the risk of year-long low-wage work. Experience and hours are not significant factors, indicating less likelihood of benefiting from work force participation. Hispanic women who do not work in managerial or professional occupations have a higher risk of being a year-long low-wage worker than those who do. Also working in agricultural/mining, retail, and service industries increases the risk of year-long low-wages. As with Hispanic men, working in the wholesale industry increases the risk of earning low-wages. But, unlike Hispanic men, a rural residence increases the risk of year-long low-wages. These findings are summarized in the chart below:

Factors which are Significant in Either Increasing or Decreasing the Risk of Low-wage Work for Hispanic Women

Increase Risk	Decrease Risk
Working in a small firm	Age
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support Occupation	Education
Blue Collar Occupation	Labor Union
Service Occupation	Married
Agricultural/Mining Industry	
Retail Industry	
Service Industry	
Wholesale Industry	
Rural Residence	

CONCLUSIONS: PART II

In order to shed light on the public stereotypes, scholarly debates, and policy confusion concerning the characteristics of low-wage workers and the meaning of low wage work, Part II of this report provided two kinds of analyses. Part II.A provided a descriptive analysis examining the characteristics of low-wage workers, focussing on the characteristics of year-long low-wage workers, and the differences among them including their demographic, human capital, and job characteristics. We were especially concerned with the inequalities and differences among gender/race-ethnic groups. In addition, we examined the characteristics of three particularly at risk groups of low-wage workers--welfare recipients, the working poor, and displaced homemakers. Part II.B used multiple regression analysis to measure the relative effects of demographic, human capital, and job characteristics on wages in general and on the differential risks of being a year-long low-wage worker. Here again we examined commonalities and differences among gender/race-ethnic groups.

We had five major hypotheses. These were: first, that low-wage workers are a heterogeneous group, including a substantial portion who are responsible for the economic well-being of children; second, that low-wage jobs are unequally distributed among gender/race-ethnicity groups; third, that those workers with responsibility for children run a higher than average risk of poverty; fourth, that human capital factors are less significant for non-white low-wage workers than are job characteristics; and fifth, that as a result of their heterogenous characteristics, different factors will help different groups of low-wage workers move into higher wage jobs. In general, we found the hypotheses to be true.

Hypothesis 1: On the whole we found that low-wage workers are a heterogenous group. This is in contrast to the stereotypical view of low-wage workers as teenagers working part-time or as first entrants or other casual members of the labor force. Although many year-long low-wage workers are relatively young, their median age is 30 years; about half have more than five years of work experience; with year-long low-wage women workers more experienced than their male counterparts. Less than one in five (18.7 percent) are teenagers living at home. Their median hours and weeks of work come close to full-time, full-year. More than four out of ten (44.3 percent) have children and more than one-third (37.3 percent) are single earners solely responsible for their families' economic well-being.

Hypothesis 2: Not surprisingly, we found that year-long low-wage work is unequally distributed among gender/race ethnic groups, with black women (closely followed by Hispanic women) most likely and white men least likely to be year-long low-wage workers. More surprising were the findings from the logistic regression model which showed that if all workers possessed the characteristics of the average worker (whose characteristics are dominated by the average white male worker) and faced the identical labor market structure, only seven percent of white men, compared to 11 percent of minority men, 23 percent of white women and 28 percent of minority women would still be year-long low-wage workers. Thus even if women of color had the same demographic, human capital, and job characteristics as white men, they would be almost four times as likely to be low-wage workers, based on race and gender differences alone. These findings show that when demographic human capital and jobs characteristics are held constant, year-long low-wage work is unequally distributed among gender/race-ethnic groups and can therefore be read as evidence of gender and race discrimination.

Hypothesis 3: Although we found that a somewhat lower percentage of workers employed at year-long low-wage jobs had children than did higher wage workers (44.3 percent compared to 48.5 percent, respectively), we found that a higher percentage of the working poor (those workers whose earnings are not high enough to bring their families out of poverty) are more likely to have children than are all workers (66.6 as compared to 52.6 percent).

Hypothesis 4: In our descriptive analysis we found that about three-quarters of year-long low-wage workers had at least a high school education, half had at least five years of work experience (with women having somewhat more experience than men), and that they were more likely than higher-wage workers to have obtained job training (24.0 percent as compared to 15.8 percent, respectively). Based on these findings we would conclude that for many year-long low-wage workers lack of human capital is not the explanation for employment at low-wage jobs. The regression models did show education to be significant for all groups of workers, though these factors have less payoff for all groups besides white and Asian men and women. Years of work experience was not significant for black men and Hispanic women. Job training decreased the risk of low-wage work for only white men and women. We also found that certain occupations and industries--especially service occupations and industries--are always highly correlated with year-long low-wage work. Firm size is less likely to be significant for men and women of color than white men and women. Union membership is always significant, and has an especially strong effect on wages for black and Hispanic men and women. Based on all these findings, we would conclude that job characteristics, especially union membership, are more significant for men and women of color than are human capital characteristics with the exception of education.

Hypothesis 5: Here again, we found commonalities and differences. Three factors decrease the risk of year-long low-wage work for all workers, regardless of gender/race-ethnicity. These are: age, education and union membership. Other factors such as working in the public sector or in a large firm, for more hours, or more years, being married, or receiving job training had varying significance among gender race-ethnic groups.

In general our findings show both commonalities and differences among gender and race-ethnic groups. Specifically, some of our major findings are:

- Prevalence and Distribution In 1984, 47.9 million workers experienced two or more months of low-wage work during the year. More than half of these experienced more than seven months of low-wage work. Women are twice as likely as men to be year-long low-wage workers (37.9 and 18.8 percent, respectively). Approximately three out of ten black and Hispanic men, four out of ten Hispanic women, and more than four out of ten black women are year-long low-wage workers (that is, they experience at least seven months of low-wage work during the year).

- Age More than half of year-long low-wage workers (14.1 million) are in their prime working years--between the ages of 25 and 65. With the exceptions of white and Asian male workers, the proportion of year-long low-wage workers does not decrease steadily as workers move through their prime working years. Black and Hispanic women have the shortest spans of prime working years--years in which they are a smaller percentage of year-long low-wage workers than their proportion in the population of workers would warrant.

- Household Type There are over three million year-long low-wage workers who live in single-parent households with children. Workers living in this type of household are almost one and one-half times as likely to be year-long low-wage workers than are workers living in other types of households. Black women year-long low-wage workers are most likely to live in single-headed households with children (40 percent do so).

- Poverty Status Approximately 25 percent of all year-long low-wage workers are either responsible for bringing their families out of poverty or are unable to do so despite their earnings. (The remaining three-fourths of low-wage workers live in families that would be above the poverty line even if they had no earnings.) The wages of at least half of year-long low-wage black men and women and Hispanic men either bring their families out of poverty or fail to do so. Of the approximately one million black women who are year-long low-wage workers and who live in families that are dependent on their wages, six out of ten earn enough to bring their families out of poverty, but four out of ten do not.

- Human Capital More than half of all year-long low-wage workers have more than five years of work experience, with low-wage women workers having somewhat more experience than their male counterparts. Three-quarters have at least a high school diploma. Approximately one quarter have additional job training. Year-long low-wage workers are more likely to have invested in or received training than were workers with no months of low-wage work. Year-long low-wage white male workers were most likely to have invested in or to have received training, and women of color (black, Hispanic and Asian) were least likely to have done so.

- Firm Size Year-long low-wage workers are equally likely to have jobs in firms with 1,000 or more employees as they are to be working in firms with 25 or fewer. Women workers (and especially black women) in the year-long low-wage category are more likely than men to work in the firms with 1,000 or more employees, indicating the existence of a low-wage "women's sector" in large firms. Like women workers, black men are also more likely to be working in large firms than are other groups of male workers, likewise indicating the presences of a low-wage "black male sector" in large firms.

- Occupation A majority of year-long low-wage workers are employed in sales, services, crafts, operative and transport occupations. The occupations with a large percentage of low-wage workers are usually occupations with a high percentage of female workers. Although the highest percentage of workers in the year-long low-wage category are employed in service occupations (a relatively gender integrated occupational group), the findings do show segregation within the low-wage job market by gender/race-ethnicity. Male low-wage workers are also likely to be employed in transport occupations as well as in service occupations. White and Asian year-long low-wage women are employed in technical, sales, and administrative occupations as well as service occupations. Hispanic women are also likely to be employed as operatives and black women are most likely to be employed in the service occupations.

- Industry Seven out of ten longer term low-wage workers are employed in service sector industries including retail; finance, insurance, and real estate; business services; personal services; and professional services (including health industries), with women workers more likely than men to be employed in these industries.

- Union Status Union membership or coverage by union contract is strongly related to higher wages, for all gender/race-ethnic groups, except for Asian men and women. A relatively small portion of year-long wage workers (less than ten percent for all gender/race-ethnic groups) are likely to be covered by union contracts. For black and Hispanic men and women, union contracts are especially related to higher wages. Almost half of black men who have no months of low-wage work, almost 40 percent of Hispanic men and black women, and almost 35 percent of Hispanic women with no months of low-wage work are covered by union contracts.

- Weeks and Hours Worked We found surprisingly little variation in attachment to the work force by gender/race-ethnicity among year-long low-wage workers, indicating a strong commitment to the labor force for all groups. More than half of year-long low-wage workers were employed 50 or more weeks in the year. Another two out of ten were employed between 40 and 49 weeks. This holds true for all gender/race-ethnicity groups. The average hours of employment were more than 35 hours per week for all groups of workers.

- Wage Mobility Seven out of ten year-long low-wage workers receive either no wage increase or less than a ten percent increase over a one-year period, although they are somewhat more likely to receive pay increases than are higher wage workers. Hispanic men and women are the most likely and black men are the least likely to do so.

- Welfare Receipt Only about one out of every ten year-long low-wage workers receive some form of welfare benefits. White women (who are most likely to be married to higher wage men) are the least likely to receive these benefits, and black women (who are most likely to be single parents) are most likely to receive some form of welfare benefits.

- The Working Poor The working poor earn approximately the minimum wage. They are more likely than other workers to have children (seven out of ten poor working women are parents). They are less likely to have more than a high school education, five years of work experience and job training than are other low-wage workers. They work fewer weeks and hours but even if they worked full-time, full-year they would not earn enough to support a family of four at the poverty level. They are twice as likely as are all workers to be employed in service occupations and four times as likely as all year-long low-wage workers to receive some form of welfare payment to supplement their below-poverty wages.

- Displaced Homemakers Displaced homemakers who work as year-long low-wage workers are more likely than other low-wage working women to be solely responsible for their families' economic well-being. The families of almost six out of ten of these women workers are either in poverty despite their wages or are at risk of poverty without them. Displaced homemakers work more hours than do other low-wage women workers, are less likely to have more than a high school education or job training, and are more likely to work in low-paid service occupations.

In the ordinary least squares regression analysis with wages as the dependent variable, we examined each of the gender and race-ethnic group separately. Specifically, our major findings are:

- For white men, the returns to education and age are highest of all groups and second highest for work experience. Their wages are very sensitive to firm size--benefitting the most of all workers by employment in large firms. Although union membership is significant, they have the smallest returns of the groups to labor union coverage and their wages are generally less sensitive to occupation and industry than other workers, except when working in the service industries. These findings indicate that white men receive higher pay regardless of occupation and industry.

- Labor union coverage is extremely important for black men in earning higher wages. The returns to human capital are much less than for white men and experience is close to being insignificant. The wages of black men suffer greatly by not working in managerial or professional jobs or by working in the low-paying agricultural/mining, and service industries.

- Hispanic men also have very low returns to education and high returns to unionization. Job training is a significant means of earning higher wages. Not only do they experience lower wages in retail, service, and agricultural/mining industries but also in wholesale and construction.

- Asian men's wages are more dependent on education than other factors. They also have high returns for job training. Those who are not either highly educated or in professional and managerial occupations are greatly handicapped in earning higher wages.

- White women do not experience the magnitude of returns to education, age, and experience as white men, but do benefit from job training, hours worked, and labor union coverage. The wage decrease due to having children is significant. They benefit from working in transportation, communications, and public utilities relative to other industries.

- Black women experience lower returns to education, to experience, and to working in large firms relative to white men. Unionization is highly influential in increasing wages. They are also able to earn substantially more than manufacturing workers in the transportation, communications, and public utilities industries.

- Hispanic women have similar patterns to black women in that they have low returns to age, education, and experience and high returns to union membership. Their wages are significantly lower when employed in retail, agricultural/mining, and wholesale industries. As with white women, having children is correlated with lower wages.

- For Asian women, experience and education result in very high returns to wages. In this way, they are similar to Asian men, although their earnings are not as high. They are the only group of women workers for whom labor union coverage is negatively correlated with higher wages.

In the logistic regression analyses, we examined how the demographic, human capital, and job characteristics differentially influence the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker for all workers and for each of the gender/race-ethnic groups. For all workers, the acquisition of human capital (education, age, and experience) helps decrease the risk of year-long low-wage work, although more so for white men and Asians than for other workers. Work experience does not decrease the risk of low-wages for black men and Hispanic women. We also found that labor union coverage is very significant in decreasing that risk for all groups--especially for minorities and women. Labor union coverage is the only common factor, besides age and education, associated with a decreased risk of being a year-long low-wage worker for all gender/race-ethnic groups. All workers generally face a higher probability of being a year-long low-wage worker when employed in low-paying industries of service, retail, and agricultural/mining or when working in a non-professional or non-managerial occupations. Having children increases the risk of year-long low-wage work for white and black women, but does not do so for men. Also, all workers, except Hispanic men, face a higher risk of being a year-long low-wage worker when living in a rural area. The specific differences we found are:

- For white men, working in a small firm or in a wholesale or F.I.R.E. industry will increase the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker. They experience a decrease in risk by working in large firms, having job training and more education, more work experience and by joining a labor union, and by getting married.
- For black men, working in a small firm is the only additional factor, besides industry and occupation, that is significant in increasing the risk of being a year-long low-wage worker. Hours of work, experience, and job training are not significant. Age, education, and labor union status decrease the risk, but getting married does not.
- For Hispanic men, the service occupations appear to contribute to a higher risk of a being low-wage worker--but blue collar or technical, sales, and administrative support occupations do not. Hours of work and getting married are insignificant. Age, education, work experience, and labor union membership decrease the risk, but getting married does not.
- For white women, having children is a significant factor for increasing the risk of being a low-wage worker, although marriage decreases the risk. Working in a large firm, increasing hours worked, having job training, or working in transportation, communications and public utilities all contribute to a decreased risk of year-long low-wage work, as does union membership.
- Having children is also an additional factor that increases the risk of being a low-wage worker for black women, as does working in a small firm, in service occupations and

industries. Job training and marriage are insignificant, but education and experience do decrease the risk of year-long low-wage work as does membership in a labor union.

- Hispanic Women, like Hispanic men, experience a higher risk of being a year-long low-wage worker when employed in the wholesale industry, as well as the retail and service industries. Job training and experience are not significant factors for decreasing this risk, although education and labor union membership are. Marriage significantly decreases the risk but presence of children is insignificant.

The regression analysis confirms that for white women and minorities of both sexes, the structural factors of working in unionized settings or high-paying industries and occupations especially contributed to higher wages for these groups. Age and education are the two human capital factors that benefit all gender/race-ethnic groups.

Part II of this report shows not only the heterogeneity of year-long low-wage workers, but the unequal distribution of this work among all women and men of color, when all other factors are held constant. It shows that a substantial minority of these workers are responsible for the economic well-being of families and children--in fact, the families of at least half of all year-long, low-wage black men and women and Hispanic men would be poor without their wages. It shows that year-long low-wage workers do have substantial amounts of human capital, and that while all gender/race-ethnic groups benefit from increased education, white men and Asian men and women benefit most. It shows that year-long low-wage women workers have somewhat more years of work experience than do men, and that the risk of low-wage work does not decrease for black men and Hispanic women with additional work experience. Likewise it shows that job training only deceases the risk of low-wage work for white men and women. These findings indicate that moving out of low-wage work is not equally likely for all gender/race-ethnic groups, even when they increase their human capital. Structural factors such as working in service industries and occupations is especially likely to increase the risk of year-long low-wage work. Likewise having children increases the risk of year-long low-wage work for women, but not for men. Labor union membership decreases the risk of year-long low-wage work and is an especially important strategy for men and women of color.

All these findings show the importance of race and gender analysis for understanding the nature and implications of low-wage work and possible strategies for increasing the opportunities for higher-wage work. These findings raise a series of important questions for policymakers in many fields, including education, job training, and welfare as well as employers.

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CHARTS AND GRAPHS


40
CHART 1: NUMBER OF WORKERS BY MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK
30
20
10
0
MILLIONS
30.8
14.5
10.8
11.5
9.7
15.9
MEN
WOMEN
0-1
2-6
7-12
MONTHS OF LOW WAGE WORK

CHART 2: MONTHS OF LOW WAGE WORK

BY RACE AND GENDER



Chart 3: Prime Working Years



CHART 4: % LOW WAGE AND % FEMALE BY OCCUPATION



GRAPH 1: % LOW WAGE WORKERS BY AGE AND GENDER



GRAPH 2: % LOW-WAGE WORKING MEN BY AGE



GRAPH 3: % LOW-WAGE WORKING WOMEN BY AGE



TABLES

TABLE 1.1
Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		ALL	WOMEN	MEN
NOT EMPLOYED	1975	37.1	53.6	17.2
	1980	34.5	47.9	18.1
	1984	32.9	43.7	19.5
Change		-4.2	-9.8	2.3
LOW-WAGE	1975	13.2	15.1	11.0
	1980	16.0	19.5	11.7
	1984	17.5	21.1	13.1
Change		4.3	6.0	2.1
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	49.6	31.3	71.9
	1980	49.5	32.6	70.2
	1984	49.5	35.2	67.4
Change		-0.1	3.8	-4.5
TOTAL	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	9,369	5,208	4,161
	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	10,430	5,759	4,671
	198[illegible]	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	11,023	6,094	4,929

TABLE 1.2
Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Gender and Race: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		BLACK	BLACK WOMEN	BLACK MEN	WHITE	WHITE WOMEN	WHITE MEN	OTHER	OTHER WOMEN	OTHER MEN
	1975	38.6	50.1	22.1	37.1	54.0	16.9	32.2	51.7	10.1
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	39.0	46.1	27.9	34.2	48.4	17.3	27.2	39.5	12.4
	1984	37.0	42.3	27.8	32.6	44.1	18.9	22.9	36.0	9.7
Change		-1.6	-7.7	5.8	-4.5	-10.0	2.0	-9.3	-15.8	-0.3
	1975	20.4	22.9	16.8	12.1	13.9	10.1	22.5	24.2	20.5
LOW-WAGE	1980	21.1	23.7	17.0	15.1	18.6	11.0	23.3	27.7	18.0
	1984	22.8	25.2	18.8	16.8	20.5	12.4	21.2	24.5	17.8
Change		2.4	2.2	2.0	4.7	6.6	2.4	-1.3	0.3	-2.7
	1975	41.0	27.0	61.1	50.7	32.1	73.0	45.3	24.1	69.4
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	40.0	30.2	55.0	50.7	33.0	71.7	49.5	32.9	69.6
	1984	40.2	32.5	53.3	50.5	35.4	68.6	55.9	39.5	72.4
Change		-0.8	5.5	-7.8	-0.2	3.3	-4.4	10.6	15.4	3.0
	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	3,061	1,816	1,245	5,971	3,210	2,761	337	182	155
TOTAL	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	3,516	2,069	1,447	6,550	3,495	3,055	364	195	169
	1984	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	3,672	2,176	1,496	7,128	3,799	3,329	223	119	104

TABLE 1.3
Distribution of Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WOMEN	MEN	TOTAL	Sample N
NOT EMPLOYED	1975	79.1	20.9	100.0	3,319
	1980	76.4	23.6	100.0	3,351
	1984	73.6	26.4	100.0	3,391
Change		-5.6	5.6		
LOW-WAGE	1975	62.6	37.4	100.0	1,630
	1980	67.0	33.0	100.0	2,047
	1984	66.7	33.3	100.0	2,345
Change		4.1	-4.1		
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	34.6	65.4	100.0	4,420
	1980	36.2	63.8	100.0	5,032
	1984	39.3	60.7	100.0	5,287
Change		4.7	-4.7		
ALL	1975	54.9	45.1	100.0	9,369
	1980	55.0	45.0	100.0	10,430
	1984	55.4	44.6	100.0	11,023
Change		0.5	-0.5		

TABLE 1.4

Distribution of Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage)
by Gender and Race: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		BLACK	BLACK WOMEN	BLACK MEN	WHITE	WHITE WOMEN	WHITE MEN	OTHER	OTHER WOMEN	OTHER MEN	TOTAL	Sample N
	1975	10.1	7.8	2.4	87.3	69.2	18.1	2.6	2.2	0.4	100.0	3,319
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	11.5	8.3	3.3	86.0	66.1	19.9	2.5	2.0	0.5	100.0	3,351
	1984	11.8	8.5	3.3	87.0	64.1	22.9	1.3	1.0	0.3	100.0	3,391
Change		1.6	0.7	0.9	-0.4	-5.1	4.8	-1.3	-1.2	-0.1		
	1975	15.0	10.0	5.1	80.0	49.7	30.3	5.0	2.9	2.1	100.0	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	13.4	9.2	4.3	82.0	54.8	27.1	4.6	3.0	1.6	100.0	2,047
	1984	13.6	9.5	4.[illegible]	84.2	55.9	28.3	2.2	1.3	0.9	100.0	2,345
Change		-1.4	-0.5	-0.9	4.2	6.2	-2.0	-2.8	-1.6	-1.2		
	1975	8.0	3.1	4.9	89.3	30.8	58.5	2.7	0.8	1.9	100.0	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	8.2	3.8	4.5	88.6	31.3	57.3	3.2	1.1	2.0	100.0	5,032
	1984	8.5	4.3	4.1	89.4	34.2	55.2	2.1	0.7	1.3	100.0	5,287
Change		0.4	1.2	-0.8	0.2	3.5	-3.3	-0.6	0.0	-0.6		
	1975	9.7	5.8	4.0	87.3	47.5	39.8	2.9	1.6	1.4	100.0	9,369
TOTAL	1980	10.2	6.2	4.0	86.6	47.1	39.6	3.2	1.7	1.4	100.0	10,430
	1984	10.5	6.6	3.8	87.7	47.9	39.8	1.8	0.9	0.9	100.0	11,023
Change		0.7	0.9	-0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	-1.1	-0.6	-0.5		

TABLE 1.5

Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Family Status, Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN				WITHOUT CHILDREN			
		MARRIED		SINGLE		MARRIED		SINGLE	
		WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN
NOT EMPLOYED	1975	57.7	5.2	41.6	24.0	53.7	28.9	50.6	27.2
	1980	47.2	5.2	35.0	11.7	51.9	31.6	49.2	22.8
	1984	37.2	5.8	36.4	14.4	50.0	33.9	47.2	20.5
Change		-20.5	0.7	-5.2	-9.6	-3.7	5.0	-3.4	-6.7
LOW-WAGE	1975	14.9	9.4	16.4	6.1	13.6	11.0	17.0	16.2
	1980	20.7	11.8	30.3	3.5	16.3	9.7	17.3	15.9
	1984	26.3	14.4	26.5	19.2	17.2	9.9	17.2	16.1
Change		11.5	5.0	10.1	13.1	3.6	-1.2	0.2	-0.2
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	27.4	85.4	42.0	69.9	32.7	60.1	32.5	56.5
	1980	32.1	82.9	34.8	84.8	31.8	58.6	33.6	61.3
	1984	36.4	79.7	37.2	66.4	32.8	56.3	35.6	63.4
Change		9.0	-5.7	-4.8	-3.5	0.1	-3.8	3.2	6.9
TOTAL	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	2,267	2,244	747	63	1,272	1,268	922	586
	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	2,430	2,426	829	71	1,397	1,385	1,103	789
	1984	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	2,466	2,461	861	80	1,539	1,530	1,228	858

TABLE 1.6

Distribution of Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Family Status, Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN				WITHOUT CHILDREN					
		MARRIED		SINGLE		MARRIED		SINGLE			
		WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	TOTAL	Sample N
	1975	34.1	3.0	5.3	0.3	23.3	12.5	16.4	5.0	100.0	3,319
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	27.1	3.0	5.4	0.2	24.7	14.9	19.3	5.5	100.0	3,351
	1984	20.5	3.2	6.0	0.3	25.8	17.3	21.3	5.6	100.0	3,391
Change		-13.6	0.2	0.7	-0.1	2.5	4.9	4.8	0.6		
	1975	24.6	15.4	5.9	0.2	16.6	13.4	15.5	8.4	100.0	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	25.6	14.6	10.1	0.1	16.7	9.9	14.6	8.4	100.0	2,047
	1984	27.3	14.9	8.2	0.7	16.7	9.5	14.5	8.2	100.0	2,345
Change		2.6	-0.5	2.3	0.5	0.1	-3.9	-0.9	-0.2		
	1975	12.1	37.4	4.0	0.8	10.6	19.4	7.9	7.8	100.0	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	12.8	33.1	3.7	1.1	10.5	19.2	9.2	10.4	100.0	5,032
	1984	13.3	29.1	4.1	0.9	11.2	19.2	10.7	11.5	100.0	5,287
Change		1.2	-8.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	-0.2	2.8	3.7		
	1975	21.9	21.7	4.8	0.5	16.1	16.0	12.1	6.9	100.0	9,369
ALL	1980	19.8	19.8	5.3	0.7	16.4	16.2	13.5	8.4	100.0	10,430
	1984	18.1	18.1	5.5	0.6	17.0	16.9	14.8	9.0	100.0	11,023
Change		-3.8	-3.6	0.7	0.1	0.9	0.8	2.8	2.1		

TABLE 1.7

Distribution of Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) of Blacks by Family Status, Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN					
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE			
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	TOTAL	Sample N
	1975	23.5	4.7	24.5	12.0	10.3	18.2	6.7	100.0	1111
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	17.3	6.5	21.2	15.2	11.6	18.6	9.7	100.0	1175
	1984	13.1	6.6	24.4	13.7	10.9	21.7	9.5	100.0	1258
Change		-10.4	1.9	-0.1	1.7	0.6	3.5	2.8		
	1975	23.5	14.5	15.6	11.7	6.3	16.3	12.1	100.0	735
LOW-WAGE	1980	20.9	12.3	22.6	12.1	7.0	12.8	12.3	100.0	912
	1984	18.3	11.4	26.9	11.5	5.1	14.1	12.7	100.0	969
Change		-5.3	-3.0	11.4	-0.2	-1.3	-2.2	0.6		
	1975	13.7	35.0	11.3	5.7	10.5	9.4	14.4	100.0	1215
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	14.0	29.0	14.7	5.4	11.4	12.7	12.6	100.0	1429
	1984	13.9	23.1	16.4	6.9	12.7	15.3	11.6	100.0	1445
Change		0.2	-11.8	5.1	1.2	2.2	5.9	-2.7		
	1975	19.5	19.1	17.3	9.4	9.6	14.2	11.0	100.0	3061
ALL	1980	16.7	16.7	18.9	10.6	10.6	15.0	11.4	100.0	3516
	1984	14.6	14.3	21.8	10.5	10.3	17.4	11.1	100.0	3672
Change		-4.9	-4.8	4.5	1.1	0.7	3.2	0.2		

TABLE 1.8

Distribution of Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) of Whites by Family Status, Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN					
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE			
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	TOTAL	Sample N
NOT EMPLOYED	1975	34.7	2.6	3.4	24.8	13.1	16.4	4.9	100.0	2,094
	1980	28.0	2.4	3.5	26.2	15.6	19.4	4.9	100.0	2,071
	1984	21.4	2.8	3.9	27.6	18.3	21.1	5.0	100.0	7,128
Change		-13.4	0.2	0.4	2.7	5.2	4.7	0.1		
LOW-WAGE	1975	24.2	15.1	4.6	17.9	15.1	15.7	7.5	100.0	818
	1980	25.9	14.4	8.2	17.5	10.6	15.4	7.9	100.0	1,050
	1984	28.8	15.3	6.0	17.5	10.0	14.9	7.6	100.0	1,325
Change		4.6	0.3	1.4	-0.4	-5.1	-0.8	0.1		
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	11.9	37.3	4.2	11.2	20.2	7.9	7.3	100.0	3,059
	1980	12.5	33.2	3.8	11.2	20.1	8.8	10.3	100.0	3,429
	1984	13.2	29.7	3.9	11.7	19.9	10.3	11.2	100.0	3,730
Change		1.3	-7.6	-0.3	0.5	-0.3	2.4	3.9		
ALL	1975	21.9	21.7	4.0	17.1	17.0	12.0	6.5	100.0	5,971
	1980	19.8	19.8	4.4	17.3	17.1	13.4	8.1	100.0	6,550
	1984	18.5	18.5	4.3	17.8	17.7	14.6	8.6	100.0	7,128
Change		-3.4	-3.2	0.3	0.8	0.8	2.6	2.1		

TABLE 1.9

Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Presence of Young Children, Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		MARRIED				SINGLE	
		WOMEN		MEN		PARENTS	
		CHILD<6	NONE<6	CHILD<6	NONE<6	CHILD<6	NONE<6
	1975	65.8	51.2	4.5	5.7	53.3	32.1
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	53.6	41.8	4.0	6.3	39.2	28.1
	1984	43.1	31.5	5.8	5.8	37.6	31.2
Change		-22.7	-19.7	1.3	0.2	-15.7	-1.0
	1975	12.5	16.8	12.1	7.2	15.3	15.4
LOW-WAGE	1980	18.9	22.2	13.2	10.6	32.8	23.8
	1984	23.8	28.9	15.5	13.4	30.0	22.2
Change		11.3	12.1	3.4	6.1	14.7	6.8
	1975	21.8	32.0	83.4	87.1	31.4	52.5
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	27.5	36.0	82.7	83.1	27.9	48.1
	1984	33.2	39.6	78.7	80.8	32.4	46.6
Change		11.4	7.6	-4.7	-6.3	0.9	-5.9
	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	1,240	1,027	1,229	1,015	352	458
TOTAL	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	1,407	1,023	1,404	1,022	414	485
	1984	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	1,417	1,049	1,414	1,047	472	469

TABLE 1.10

Mean Education by Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	11.5	10.0	9.4	9.1	3,301
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	11.7	10.3	10.0	9.7	3,313
	1984	11.6	10.6	10.0	9.9	3,360
Change		0.0	0.6	0.6	0.8	
	1975	11.3	10.4	11.2	12.0	1,617
LOW-WAGE	1980	11.7	11.2	11.7	12.1	2,032
	1984	11.8	10.9	11.6	11.3	2,329
Change		0.5	0.5	0.4	-0.7	
	1975	12.9	12.6	12.9	13.4	4,403
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	13.1	12.8	13.1	13.5	5,000
	1984	13.2	12.9	13.4	13.4	5,254
Change		0.3	0.3	0.5	0.0	
	1975	11.9	11.9	10.9	12.0	9,321
ALL	1980	12.1	12.2	11.4	12.4	10,345
	1984	12.2	12.2	11.5	12.3	10,943
Change		0.3	0.3	0.6	0.3	

TABLE 1.11

Percent with Work-Affecting Disability by Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	15.4	39.7	39.5	38.8	3,319
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	18.0	49.1	47.9	54.1	3,351
	1984	21.1	45.9	43.8	41.0	3,391
Change		5.7	6.2	4.3	2.2	
	1975	7.6	10.8	15.6	8.9	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	4.8	11.2	9.1	11.0	2,047
	1984	5.2	8.9	9.0	6.5	2,345
Change		-2.4	-1.9	-6.6	-2.4	
	1975	3.4	6.1	6.1	7.7	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	2.4	4.9	5.6	4.1	5,032
	1984	5.4	5.5	5.0	4.9	5,287
Change		2.0	-0.6	-1.1	-2.8	
	1975	10.7	11.7	23.7	16.3	9,369
ALL	1980	10.5	13.2	25.4	16.1	10,430
	1984	12.2	13.7	23.0	12.4	11,023
Change		1.4	2.0	-0.8	-3.9	

TABLE 1.12

Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) for People without Children by Age, Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		YOUNGER (<40)	MIDDLE (41-60)	OLDER (61+)
NOT EMPLOYED	1975	10.9	31.0	75.8
	1980	8.7	27.5	80.9
	1984	7.7	24.2	81.2
Change		-3.2	-6.7	5.5
LOW-WAGE	1975	20.7	13.6	8.8
	1980	22.2	14.7	7.7
	1984	23.5	16.3	6.3
Change		2.9	2.8	-2.6
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	68.4	55.4	15.4
	1980	69.1	57.7	11.4
	1984	68.8	59.4	12.5
Change		0.4	4.0	-2.9
TOTAL	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	1,641	1,215	1,190
	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	1,893	1,421	1,360
	1984	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	2,033	1,590	1,531

TABLE 1.13

Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Region: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		NEW ENGLAND	MIDDLE ATLANTIC	EAST NORTH CENTRAL	WEST NORTH CENTRAL	SOUTH ATLANTIC	EAST SOUTH CENTRAL	WEST SOUTH CENTRAL	MOUNTAIN	PACIFIC	TOTAL	Sample N
	1975	5.9	18.3	18.2	10.6	14.2	7.7	8.6	3.9	12.6	100.0	3,312
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	4.9	16.6	19.0	10.6	15.8	7.3	8.6	4.0	13.2	100.0	3,339
	1984	5.7	15.4	19.5	9.8	15.6	7.9	8.6	4.5	12.9	100.0	3,379
Change		-0.2	-2.8	1.4	-0.8	1.4	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.3		
	1975	2.8	10.8	14.7	13.4	18.1	8.4	12.5	5.1	14.2	100.0	1,624
LOW-WAGE	1980	2.7	13.0	16.9	12.0	19.1	8.2	11.3	4.7	12.1	100.0	2,035
	1984	3.7	13.5	16.2	11.5	18.8	8.3	11.0	5.2	11.7	100.0	2,337
Change		0.9	2.7	1.4	-1.9	0.7	0.0	-1.5	0.1	-2.5		
	1975	5.9	18.3	20.9	9.1	14.9	6.3	6.7	4.4	13.4	100.0	4,399
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	6.5	18.3	18.8	9.1	13.9	6.1	7.5	5.3	14.5	100.0	5,008
	1984	6.3	17.9	17.6	9.0	14.9	5.7	7.8	5.7	15.2	100.0	5,257
Change		0.4	-0.5	-3.3	-0.2	0.0	-0.5	1.1	1.3	1.7		
	1975	5.5	17.3	19.1	10.3	15.1	7.1	8.2	4.3	13.2	100.0	9,335
ALL	1980	5.3	16.9	18.6	10.0	15.4	6.9	8.5	4.8	13.7	100.0	10,382
	1984	5.7	16.3	18.0	9.7	15.8	6.9	8.6	5.2	13.8	100.0	10,973
Change		0.2	-1.0	-1.1	-0.6	0.8	-0.2	0.4	0.9	0.6		

TABLE 1.14
Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Region: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		NEW ENGLAND	MIDDLE ATLANTIC	EAST NORTH CENTRAL	WEST NORTH CENTRAL	SOUTH ATLANTIC	EAST SOUTH CENTRAL	WEST SOUTH CENTRAL	MOUNTAIN	PACIFIC
NOT EMPLOYED	1975	39.8	39.2	35.4	38.4	35.1	40.5	39.1	33.8	35.5
	1980	31.6	34.0	35.4	36.3	35.5	36.7	35.0	29.1	33.3
	1984	33.0	31.2	35.8	33.3	32.5	37.8	32.9	28.3	30.8
Change		-6.8	-8.0	0.4	-5.1	-2.6	-2.7	-6.2	-5.5	-4.7
LOW-WAGE	1975	6.9	8.2	10.2	17.4	15.9	15.7	20.1	15.6	14.2
	1980	8.0	12.3	14.5	19.0	19.8	19.1	21.2	15.8	14.2
	1984	11.6	14.6	15.8	20.9	20.9	21.2	22.4	17.6	14.9
Change		4.7	6.3	5.6	3.6	5.0	5.5	2.3	2.0	0.7
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	53.4	52.5	54.4	44.2	49.0	43.8	40.8	50.6	50.3
	1980	60.4	53.7	50.1	44.7	44.7	44.2	43.7	55.0	52.5
	1984	55.5	54.2	48.3	45.7	46.6	41.0	44.7	54.1	54.3
Change		2.1	1.7	-6.0	1.5	-2.3	-2.8	3.9	3.5	4.0
TOTAL	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	333	1191	1547	756	2159	780	1069	337	1163
	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	354	1264	1701	824	2469	913	1183	406	1268
	1984	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	403	1303	1740	850	2711	945	1228	455	1338

TABLE 1.15A

Mean Work Hours per Week by Worker Status (Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	36.3	57.7	42.9	35.3	49.3	38.4	47.2	1,551
LOW-WAGE	1980	36.1	54.9	42.7	36.5	46.6	39.7	45.0	1,956
	1984	38.5	53.7	42.8	36.8	50.2	43.9	48.4	2,252
Change		2.2	-4.0	-0.1	1.5	0.9	5.5	1.2	
	1975	36.7	48.1	40.5	38.6	46.1	41.3	45.8	4,219
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	37.1	48.0	42.7	38.1	46.2	41.6	46.4	4,813
	1984	38.0	48.4	41.3	39.6	46.6	43.6	46.0	5,120
Change		1.3	0.3	0.8	1.0	0.5	2.3	0.2	
	1975	36.5	49.1	41.1	37.6	46.5	40.4	46.1	5,770
ALL	1980	36.7	48.9	42.7	37.6	46.2	40.9	46.2	6,769
	1984	38.2	49.2	41.9	38.7	47.1	43.7	46.4	7,372
Change		1.6	0.2	0.7	1.0	0.6	3.3	0.4	

TABLE 1.15B

Mean Weeks Worked per Year by Worker Status (Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	38.6	46.3	39.5	40.6	45.5	40.3	41.2	1,601
LOW-WAGE	1980	42.7	46.5	41.9	43.3	45.1	42.2	44.2	2,026
	1984	41.2	46.1	40.9	43.7	43.8	43.9	43.0	2,295
Change		2.6	-0.3	1.4	3.1	-1.7	3.6	1.8	
	1975	41.6	46.3	43.9	42.5	45.1	43.8	43.4	4,401
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	42.6	46.7	44.9	44.8	45.9	44.8	45.3	4,996
	1984	43.9	47.1	45.6	44.9	46.0	45.0	45.8	5,257
Change		2.3	0.8	1.6	2.5	0.8	1.2	2.4	
	1975	40.6	46.3	42.8	41.9	45.2	42.6	43.0	6,002
ALL	1980	42.6	46.6	43.7	44.3	45.8	43.9	45.0	7,022
	1984	42.8	47.0	43.8	44.5	45.6	44.6	45.3	7,552
Change		2.2	0.7	1.0	2.6	0.4	2.0	2.3	

TABLE 1.16

Mean Hourly Wage by Worker Status (Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984
(Current Dollars)

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	ALL
	1975	1.97	2.08	1.81	2.10	1.97	1.82	1.88	1.97
LOW-WAGE	1980	2.90	3.04	3.05	3.02	2.81	3.00	2.97	2.97
	1984	3.30	3.68	3.38	3.51	3.51	3.49	3.48	3.46
Change		1.34	1.59	1.57	1.42	1.54	1.67	1.61	1.49
	1975	4.69	7.16	5.01	4.93	7.02	5.14	5.93	6.24
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	7.72	10.69	7.01	7.66	11.58	7.31	9.05	9.50
	1984	9.65	14.09	9.56	10.19	14.69	10.01	11.80	12.25
Change		4.95	6.93	4.55	5.26	7.68	4.88	5.87	6.01
	1975	3.73	6.66	4.19	4.10	6.23	4.00	5.03	5.34
ALL	1980	5.83	9.73	5.41	6.09	10.33	5.84	7.80	-7.91
	1984	6.98	12.49	7.15	7.89	13.03	7.89	10.12	9.95
Change		3.25	5.83	2.96	3.79	6.79	3.89	5.09	4.61

TABLE 1.17

Ratio of Mean Hourly Wage to Low-Wage Threshold by Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	ALL
	1975	0.72	0.76	0.66	0.76	0.72	0.66	0.68	0.72
LOW-WAGE	1980	0.69	0.72	0.73	0.72	0.67	0.71	0.71	0.71
	1984	0.62	0.69	0.64	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.65
Change		-0.09	-0.06	-0.02	-0.10	-0.05	0.00	-0.03	-0.06
	1975	1.71	2.60	1.82	1.79	2.55	1.87	2.16	2.27
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	1.84	2.54	1.67	1.82	2.76	1.74	2.16	2.26
	1984	1.82	2.66	1.80	1.92	2.77	1.89	2.23	2.31
Change		0.11	0.05	-0.02	0.13	0.22	0.02	0.07	0.04
	1975	1.36	2.42	1.53	1.49	2.27	1.45	1.83	1.94
ALL	1980	1.39	2.32	1.29	1.45	2.46	1.39	1.86	1.88
	1984	1.32	2.36	1.35	1.49	2.46	1.49	1.91	1.88
Change		-0.04	-0.06	-0.18	0.00	0.19	0.03	0.08	-0.06

TABLE 1.18

Mean Proportion of Family Income from Earnings by Worker Status (Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	0.04	0.71	0.55	0.09	0.48	0.62	0.81	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	0.04	0.56	0.60	0.08	0.38	0.64	0.84	2,047
	1984	0.06	0.50	0.64	0.08	0.30	0.67	0.76	2,345
Change		0.02	-0.21	0.09	-0.01	-0.18	0.05	-0.05	
	1975	0.11	0.89	0.84	0.19	0.79	0.89	0.96	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	0.12	0.87	0.86	0.17	0.76	0.90	0.95	5,032
	1984	0.18	0.85	0.88	0.23	0.73	0.87	0.95	5,287
Change		0.07	-0.03	0.05	0.04	-0.06	-0.01	0.00	
	1975	0.09	0.87	0.76	0.16	0.74	0.79	0.92	6,050
ALL	1980	0.09	0.83	0.76	0.14	0.71	0.81	0.93	7,079
	1984	0.13	0.80	0.79	0.18	0.67	0.81	0.91	7,632
Change		0.04	-0.07	0.03	0.01	-0.07	0.01	-0.01	

TABLE 1.19

Percent in Poverty by Worker Status (Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	3.2	15.6	27.2	2.0	10.1	20.4	26.5	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	2.6	14.6	22.9	1.1	3.8	15.6	21.6	2,047
	1984	3.6	14.0	37.1	4.4	7.1	12.9	30.6	2,345
Change		0.4	-1.6	9.9	2.4	-3.0	-7.5	4.1	
	1975	0.0	1.6	4.4	0.0	0.4	1.4	2.7	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	0.2	0.3	1.5	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.4	5,032
	1984	0.6	0.6	3.9	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.5	5,287
Change		0.6	-1.0	-0.5	0.8	-0.4	-1.2	-2.2	
	1975	1.1	3.0	10.2	0.6	1.9	7.9	8.0	6,050
ALL	1980	1.1	2.1	10.2	0.6	0.5	5.8	4.8	7,079
	1984	1.9	2.7	16.8	2.0	1.1	4.3	6.6	7,632
Change		0.7	-0.3	6.6	1.5	-0.8	-3.6	-1.4	

TABLE 1.20

Percent Not in Poverty Due to Worker's Wages by Worker Status (Low-Wage and Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	7.5	52.4	49.0	9.4	31.2	49.5	59.5	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	5.0	43.9	48.0	8.0	25.4	55.2	65.1	2,047
	1984	9.1	43.2	44.5	5.8	17.3	56.9	41.8	2,345
Change		1.6	-9.2	-4.5	-3.6	-13.9	7.4	-17.7	
	1975	5.2	61.4	68.0	4.5	34.0	73.5	81.8	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	3.8	56.5	75.7	3.6	26.4	75.5	78.5	5,032
	1984	6.4	51.3	68.9	4.0	22.9	69.2	78.6	5,287
Change		1.2	-10.1	0.9	-0.5	-11.1	-4.3	-3.2	
	1975	6.0	60.5	63.2	5.9	33.6	65.3	76.8	6,050
ALL	1980	4.3	54.9	64.5	5.1	26.3	68.6	75.7	7,079
	1984	7.5	50.1	59.4	4.6	22.1	65.2	71.2	7,632
Change		1.5	-10.4	-3.7	-1.3	-11.5	-0.1	-5.7	

TABLE 1.21

Percent of Workers' Families Receiving AFDC by Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	TOTAL
NOT EMPLOYED	1975	3.0	16.1	45.3	0.0	0.1	0.8	0.1	3,319
	1980	3.5	16.1	51.7	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	3,351
	1984	4.8	15.7	53.2	0.5	0.4	1.1	1.1	3,391
Change		1.8	-0.4	7.9	0.5	0.3	0.3	1.0	
LOW-WAGE	1975	0.8	4.5	18.8	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	1,630
	1980	1.5	4.1	17.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	2,047
	1984	1.9	5.0	25.5	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	2,345
Change		1.1	0.5	6.7	0.2	0.3	-0.1	0.0	
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	0.3	0.6	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4,420
	1980	0.6	1.0	7.8	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	5,032
	1984	0.1	0.9	5.8	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	5,287
Change		-0.2	0.3	-3.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	
ALL	1975	1.9	1.8	24.9	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	9,369
	1980	2.2	2.2	24.6	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	10,430
	1984	2.3	2.4	27.0	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.2	11,023
Change		0.4	0.6	2.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	

TABLE 1.22

Percent of Workers' Families Receiving Food Stamps by Worker Status (Low-Wage and Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	9.8	37.8	50.6	4.0	5.5	13.8	3.9	3,319
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	11.1	36.8	67.5	3.1	3.7	16.0	11.2	3,351
	1984	10.5	34.9	60.5	3.6	4.7	15.5	9.5	3,391
Change		0.7	-2.9	9.9	-0.4	-0.8	1.7	5.6	
	1975	10.0	19.8	26.0	1.6	2.7	9.4	7.0	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	8.0	20.2	30.6	2.4	3.6	6.3	5.4	2,047
	1984	8.1	14.7	44.0	1.2	4.3	6.3	3.6	2,345
Change		-1.9	-5.1	18.0	-0.4	1.6	-3.1	-3.4	
	1975	2.0	4.4	16.9	0.8	1.0	2.3	4.0	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	1.4	3.6	13.1	0.5	1.0	1.8	2.4	5,032
	1984	1.2	2.9	6.0	0.4	0.3	0.1	1.2	5,287
Change		-0.8	-1.5	-10.8	-0.4	-0.7	-2.2	-2.8	
	1975	7.7	7.6	31.7	2.6	2.5	9.3	4.5	9,369
ALL	1980	7.3	7.3	35.5	2.2	2.1	9.6	4.9	10,430
	1984	6.5	6.5	34.3	2.1	2.2	8.4	3.3	11,023
Change		-1.2	-1.1	2.6	-0.5	-0.3	-0.9	-1.2	

TABLE 1.23

Percent of Workers' Families Receiving Unemployment and/or Workers Compensation by Worker Status (Low-Wage and Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	11.1	24.8	4.9	5.4	5.7	2.4	6.9	3,319
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	11.6	9.5	2.7	4.2	2.6	2.7	8.2	3,351
	1984	8.3	15.4	2.4	4.4	2.9	1.1	3.7	3,391
Change		-2.8	-9.4	-2.5	-1.0	-2.8	-1.3	-3.2	
	1975	16.6	14.2	9.3	14.1	9.4	11.8	21.3	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	16.2	8.7	11.4	8.9	2.4	5.6	20.7	2,047
	1984	13.8	9.9	11.0	5.3	6.9	8.3	10.0	2,345
Change		-2.8	-4.3	1.7	-8.8	-2.5	-3.5	-11.3	
	1975	10.0	10.7	9.4	10.6	9.4	4.9	11.8	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	8.8	12.3	13.3	7.1	8.4	10.2	12.8	5,032
	1984	8.0	9.2	6.7	8.0	7.3	5.9	9.9	5,287
Change		-2.0	-1.5	-2.6	-2.6	-2.1	1.0	-1.9	
	1975	11.6	11.8	7.6	8.3	8.3	4.8	12.0	9,369
ALL	1980	11.7	11.7	9.4	5.9	6.0	5.7	13.0	10,430
	1984	9.6	9.7	6.4	5.7	5.8	4.0	8.6	11,023
Change		-2.0	-2.1	-1.2	-2.6	-2.6	-0.8	-3.4	

TABLE 1.24

Percent of Workers' Families Receiving Child Support and/or Alimony by Worker Status (Low-Wage and Medium/High-Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	TOTAL
	1975	1.0	0.8	16.2	0.0	0.4	1.1	0.0	3,319
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	0.5	1.7	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	3,351
	1984	1.0	0.0	10.7	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	3,391
Change		0.0	-0.8	-5.5	0.0	-0.4	0.5	0.0	
	1975	1.5	1.2	28.3	0.9	0.0	0.9	0.0	1,630
LOW-WAGE	1980	1.0	0.0	36.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	2,047
	1984	0.2	0.7	33.8	0.5	0.9	1.9	0.0	2,345
Change		-1.3	-0.5	5.5	-0.4	0.9	1.0	0.0	
	1975	1.9	1.4	37.9	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	4,420
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	0.9	0.8	31.7	0.0	0.0	3.9	0.0	5,032
	1984	0.3	0.5	31.1	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.0	5,287
Change		-1.6	-0.9	-6.8	0.0	0.0	-0.9	0.0	
	1975	1.3	1.4	27.8	0.1	0.1	1.7	0.0	9,369
ALL	1980	0.7	0.8	26.7	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	10,430
	1984	0.5	0.5	24.8	0.1	0.1	1.9	0.0	11,023
Change		-0.8	-0.9	-3.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	

Table 1.25
Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) of Blacks by Family Status, Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN			
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE	
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN
	1975	46.6	9.6	54.9	49.5	41.5	49.4	23.7
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	40.2	15.1	43.7	55.6	42.7	48.2	33.0
	1984	33.3	17.0	41.5	48.4	39.3	46.1	31.8
Change		-13.4	7.5	-13.4	-1.1	-2.2	-3.2	8.1
	1975	24.6	15.5	18.4	25.5	13.5	23.4	22.5
LOW-WAGE	1980	26.3	15.5	25.2	24.0	14.0	17.9	22.7
	1984	28.5	18.2	28.2	25.2	11.2	18.5	26.1
Change		3.9	2.7	9.9	-0.4	-2.3	-4.9	3.6
	1975	28.7	75.0	26.8	25.0	44.9	27.2	53.8
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	33.5	69.4	31.1	20.4	43.3	33.9	44.3
	1984	38.2	64.8	30.3	26.5	49.5	35.3	42.1
Change		9.5	-10.2	3.5	1.5	4.5	8.2	-11.7
	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	[illegible]	100.0
	Sample N	741	731	581	213	216	[illegible]	261
TOTAL	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	794	791	639	264	263	407	358
	1984	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	769	765	685	308	304	457	384

Table 1.26

Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) of Whites by Family Status, Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN			
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE	
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN
	1975	58.9	4.4	32.3	54.1	28.6	50.9	28.2
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	48.3	4.2	27.1	51.9	31.2	49.5	20.6
	1984	37.7	4.9	29.8	50.5	33.7	47.2	19.1
Change		-21.2	0.5	-2.5	-3.6	5.1	-3.7	-9.1
	1975	13.4	8.4	14.0	12.7	10.8	15.8	14.1
LOW WAGE	1980	19.7	11.0	28.4	15.3	9.3	17.3	14.8
	1984	26.2	14.0	23.7	16.5	9.5	17.2	14.9
Change		12.8	5.5	9.7	3.8	-1.3	1.3	0.7
	1975	27.7	87.2	53.7	33.2	60.6	33.3	57.7
MEDIUM/HI	1980	32.0	84.8	44.5	32.9	59.5	33.2	64.6
	1984	36.2	81.1	46.6	33.0	56.8	35.7	66.1
Change		8.5	-6.0	-7.2	-0.2	-3.8	2.4	8.4
	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	1,141	1,400	208	1,028	1,024	586	314
TOTAL	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	1,529	1,528	235	1,094	1,085	671	408
	1984	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	1,641	1,640	243	1,205	1,200	746	453

Table 1.27

Percent of Workers' Families Receiving Other Welfare by Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage), Marital Status, and Gender: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				
		MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
		WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	Sample N
	1975	1.9	5.9	12.9	0.6	1.0	4.0	4.0	3,319
NEITHER	1980	2.2	7.6	10.7	0.3	0.2	2.1	5.1	3,351
	1984	2.3	7.6	8.6	0.6	0.9	2.7	4.8	3,391
Change		0.4	1.7	-4.3	0.0	-0.1	-1.3	0.8	
	1975	0.7	2.3	3.8	0.1	0.1	2.5	1.2	1,630
LOW WAGE	1980	1.3	2.3	4.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	1.2	2,047
	1984	0.5	1.4	2.1	0.0	0.1	1.2	0.2	2,345
Change		-0.2	-0.9	-1.7	-0.1	0.0	-1.3	-1.0	
	1975	0.0	0.7	1.1	0.0	0.1	0.7	1.0	4,420
MEDIUM/HI	1980	0.1	0.8	3.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	5,032
	1984	0.4	0.6	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	5,297
Change		0.4	-0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.7	-0.7	
	1975	1.2	1.1	6.2	0.3	0.4	2.7	1.8	9,369
ALL	1980	1.3	1.3	5.9	0.2	0.2	1.9	1.5	10,430
	1984	1.1	1.1	3.9	0.3	0.3	1.5	1.2	11,023
Change		-0.1	0.0	-2.3	0.0	0.0	-1.2	-0.6	

Table 1.28
Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by County Unemployment Level: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		UNEMPLOYMENT RATE				
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	TOTAL	Sample N
	1975	30.3	34.6	35.1	100.0	3,306
NOT EMPLOYED	1980	23.6	41.1	35.3	100.0	2,968
	1984	38.6	31.6	29.8	100.0	3,013
Change		8.3	-3.0	-5.3		
	1975	38.6	34.9	26.5	100.0	1,618
LOW-WAGE	1980	27.3	41.4	31.3	100.0	1,751
	1984	39.2	37.7	23.1	100.0	2,117
Change		0.7	2.7	-3.4		
	1975	31.7	36.9	31.4	100.0	4,385
MEDIUM/HIGH	1980	27.3	43.9	28.8	100.0	4,394
	1984	46.3	32.9	20.8	100.0	4,563
Change		14.7	-4.1	-10.6		
	1975	32.1	35.8	32.1	100.0	9,309
ALL	1980	26.0	42.5	31.5	100.0	9,113
	1984	42.5	33.3	24.2	100.0	9,693
Change		10.4	-2.5	-7.9		

Table 1.29
Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by County Unemployment Level: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		UNEMPLOYMENT RATE		
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
	1975	35.2	35.9	40.6
NEITHER	1980	31.6	33.8	39.2
	1984	30.5	31.8	41.2
Change		-4.7	-4.1	0.6
	1975	15.9	12.9	10.9
LOW WAGE	1980	16.6	15.4	15.7
	1984	16.5	20.3	17.1
Change		0.6	7.4	6.2
	1975	48.9	51.1	48.4
MEDIUM/HI	1980	51.8	50.9	45.1
	1984	52.9	47.9	41.7
Change		4.0	-3.3	-6.8
	1975	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	2730	3784	2795
TOTAL	1980	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	2025	4297	2791
	1984	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Sample N	3842	3583	2268

Table 1.30

Distribution of Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Gender, Race, Family Status, and Marital Status: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WOMEN BLACK KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN BLACK KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN BLACK NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN BLACK NO KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN WHITE KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN WHITE KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN WHITE NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN WHITE NO KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN OTHER KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN OTHER KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN OTHER NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN OTHER NO KIDS SINGLE
NOT EMPLOYED	1975	0.89	0.86	0.45	0.68	11.25	1.05	8.05	5.33	0.52	0.07	0.14	0.09
	1980	0.69	0.82	0.60	0.74	8.29	0.97	7.77	5.76	0.36	0.06	0.13	0.14
	1984	0.51	0.92	0.53	0.84	6.12	1.04	7.89	6.04	0.13	0.02	0.06	0.12
LOW-WAGE	1975	0.47	0.29	0.23	0.32	2.56	0.47	1.90	1.66	0.23	0.02	0.06	0.06
	1980	0.45	0.48	0.26	0.27	3.39	1.06	2.29	2.02	0.25	0.07	0.13	0.04
	1984	0.44	0.62	0.28	0.34	4.25	0.79	2.58	2.20	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.02
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	0.55	0.40	0.23	0.38	5.29	1.55	4.94	3.49	0.18	0.05	0.10	0.05
	1980	0.57	0.55	0.22	0.52	5.50	1.21	4.93	3.87	0.27	0.08	0.07	0.15
	1984	0.58	0.63	0.29	0.64	5.87	1.37	5.16	4.57	0.16	0.03	0.11	0.07
TOTAL	1975	1.90	1.56	0.91	1.38	19.10	3.07	14.89	10.48	0.94	0.13	0.29	0.20
	1980	1.71	1.85	1.08	1.53	17.18	3.25	14.99	11.65	0.87	0.21	0.32	0.33
	1984	1.53	2.17	1.10	1.82	16.23	3.19	15.63	12.81	0.38	0.09	0.24	0.20

Table 1.30 continued)

MEN BLACK KIDS MARRIED	MEN BLACK KIDS SINGLE	MEN BLACK NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN BLACK NO KIDS SINGLE	MEN WHITE KIDS MARRIED	MEN WHITE KIDS SINGLE	MEN WHITE NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN WHITE NO KIDS SINGLE	MEN OTHER KIDS MARRIED	MEN OTHER KIDS SINGLE	MEN OTHER NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN OTHER NO KIDS SINGLE	TOTAL
0.18	0.06	0.39	0.25	0.83	0.07	4.24	1.59	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.03	37.13
0.26	0.02	0.46	0.38	0.72	0.05	4.63	1.45	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.08	34.49
0.26	0.02	0.42	0.37	0.80	0.07	5.24	1.44	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.04	32.92
0.29	0.02	0.13	0.24	1.60	0.02	1.60	0.80	0.16	0.00	0.05	0.08	13.24
0.26	0.01	0.15	0.26	1.89	0.02	1.39	1.04	0.18	0.00	0.04	0.04	15.98
0.27	0.03	0.12	0.30	2.26	0.10	1.48	1.12	0.08	0.00	0.07	0.02	17.54
1.40	0.05	0.42	0.57	16.52	0.31	8.97	3.25	0.65	0.02	0.24	0.05	49.63
1.18	0.05	0.47	0.51	14.56	0.47	8.82	4.53	0.64	0.03	0.22	0.10	49.54
0.97	0.06	0.53	0.49	13.16	0.37	8.83	4.98	0.30	0.00	0.13	0.23	49.54
1.86	0.12	0.93	1.07	18.94	0.40	14.81	5.63	0.92	0.02	0.29	0.15	100.00
1.71	0.08	1.08	1.16	17.18	0.54	14.83	7.01	0.87	0.03	0.31	0.22	100.00
1.50	0.11	1.08	1.16	16.22	0.54	15.55	7.54	0.38	0.00	0.24	0.29	100.00

Table 1.31

Sample N by Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage) by Gender, Race, Family Status, and Marital Status: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WOMEN BLACK KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN BLACK KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN BLACK NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN BLACK NO KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN WHITE KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN WHITE KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN WHITE NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN WHITE NO KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN OTHER KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN OTHER KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN OTHER NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN OTHER NO KIDS SINGLE
NEITHER	1975	370	276	100	162	826	66	493	301	65	12	14	6
	1980	276	242	110	147	707	61	460	257	28	10	8	9
	1984	280	297	132	218	625	69	522	347	20	4	9	16
LOW WAGE	1975	194	128	56	73	198	32	161	100	28	3	8	6
	1980	207	141	74	86	295	63	184	112	10	4	6	4
	1984	227	169	105	111	432	55	242	138	17	4	7	1
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	177	138	57	85	387	87	374	185	22	5	9	4
	1980	198	153	50	106	456	69	365	215	14	2	2	6
	1984	262	176	71	128	584	83	441	261	19	4	10	8
TOTAL	1975	741	542	213	320	1411	185	1028	586	115	20	31	16
	1980	681	536	234	339	1458	193	1009	584	52	16	16	19
	1984	769	642	308	457	1641	207	1205	746	56	12	26	25

Table 1.31 (continued)

MEN BLACK KIDS MARRIED	MEN BLACK KIDS SINGLE	MEN BLACK NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN BLACK NO KIDS SINGLE	MEN WHITE KIDS MARRIED	MEN WHITE KIDS SINGLE	MEN WHITE NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN WHITE NO KIDS SINGLE	MEN OTHER KIDS MARRIED	MEN OTHER KIDS SINGLE	MEN OTHER NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN OTHER NO KIDS SINGLE	TOTAL
81	11	62	49	66	4	250	88	13	0	1	3	3319
96	11	81	82	60	3	291	80	8	0	4	7	3038
108	12	99	112	78	6	345	81	2	0	5	4	3391
154	4	45	81	151	1	128	47	20	0	8	4	1630
168	4	52	115	183	1	117	66	23	0	6	4	1925
169	13	56	119	240	6	140	72	13	0	6	3	2345
496	24	107	131	1183	18	646	179	80	1	21	4	4420
527	20	130	161	1285	30	677	262	76	2	27	12	4845
488	18	149	153	1322	24	715	300	41	1	15	14	5287
731	39	214	261	1400	23	1024	314	113	1	30	11	9369
791	35	263	358	1528	34	1085	408	107	2	37	23	9808
765	43	304	384	1640	36	1200	453	56	1	26	21	11023

Table 1.32

Average Weight by Worker Status (Not Employed, Low-Wage, Medium/High-Wage)
by Gender, Race, Family Status, and Marital Status: 1975, 1980, and 1984

		WOMEN BLACK KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN BLACK KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN BLACK NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN BLACK NO KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN WHITE KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN WHITE KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN WHITE NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN WHITE NO KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN OTHER KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN OTHER KIDS SINGLE	WOMEN OTHER NO KIDS MARRIED	WOMEN OTHER NO KIDS SINGLE
NEITHER	1975	3.8	5.0	7.2	6.8	21.8	25.5	26.2	28.4	12.8	9.0	15.5	23.0
	1980	4.5	6.1	9.8	9.0	21.0	28.6	30.3	40.2	22.8	11.1	28.5	27.7
	1984	3.6	6.1	7.9	7.6	19.2	29.6	29.7	34.2	12.8	11.0	13.9	14.3
LOW WAGE	1975	3.9	3.7	6.7	7.1	20.7	23.4	18.9	26.6	13.4	10.3	12.4	16.8
	1980	3.9	6.1	6.3	5.7	20.6	30.2	22.3	32.3	44.0	29.8	37.7	18.5
	1984	3.8	7.2	5.2	6.0	19.3	28.1	20.9	31.3	11.3	20.8	19.9	30.0
MEDIUM/HIGH	1975	4.9	4.7	6.4	7.1	21.9	28.6	21.2	30.2	13.3	15.0	17.0	21.0
	1980	5.2	6.5	7.9	8.8	21.6	31.6	24.2	32.3	34.9	73.5	61.5	43.5
	1984	4.4	7.1	8.0	9.9	19.7	32.3	23.0	34.3	16.1	14.8	21.2	17.5
TOTAL	1975	4.1	4.6	6.9	6.9	21.7	26.6	23.2	28.7	13.1	10.7	15.1	20.2
	1980	4.5	6.2	8.3	8.1	21.1	30.2	26.6	35.8	30.1	23.6	36.1	30.7
	1984	3.9	6.6	7.0	7.8	19.4	30.3	25.5	33.7	13.4	15.5	18.3	15.9

Table 1.32 (continued)

MEN BLACK KIDS MARRIED	MEN BLACK KIDS SINGLE	MEN BLACK NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN BLACK NO KIDS SINGLE	MEN WHITE KIDS MARRIED	MEN WHITE KIDS SINGLE	MEN WHITE NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN WHITE NO KIDS SINGLE	MEN OTHER KIDS MARRIED	MEN OTHER KIDS SINGLE	MEN OTHER NO KIDS MARRIED	MEN OTHER NO KIDS SINGLE	TOTAL
3.5	8.9	10.0	8.3	20.2	27.3	27.2	28.9	13.8	NONE	1.0	14.0	17.9
4.8	3.5	10.2	8.4	21.6	32.3	28.5	32.4	11.8	NONE	19.3	21.1	20.4
4.6	3.7	8.4	6.5	20.0	23.0	29.8	34.8	3.5	NONE	18.8	18.5	19.1
3.0	6.3	4.5	4.8	16.9	28.0	20.0	27.2	12.7	NONE	9.9	30.3	13.0
2.8	2.5	5.2	4.1	18.5	31.0	21.2	28.2	14.0	NONE	12.8	15.8	14.9
3.2	4.2	4.2	5.0	18.5	31.7	20.7	30.5	11.5	NONE	21.5	13.7	14.7
4.5	3.1	6.3	7.0	22.4	27.7	22.3	29.1	13.0	30.0	18.2	20.5	18.0
4.0	4.3	6.4	5.7	20.3	28.3	23.4	31.0	15.1	27.5	14.8	15.1	18.3
3.9	6.3	7.0	6.3	19.5	30.3	24.2	32.6	14.5	3.0	16.9	32.0	18.4
4.1	5.1	7.0	6.6	21.7	27.6	23.2	28.8	13.0	30.0	15.4	22.3	17.1
3.9	3.9	7.3	5.8	20.2	28.7	24.5	30.8	14.6	27.5	14.9	17.0	18.3
3.9	4.9	7.0	5.9	19.4	29.3	25.4	32.7	13.4	3.0	18.3	26.8	17.8

"Spells" see p. 51

TABLE 1.33 ALL LOW-WAGE SPELLS, CENSORED AND NON-CENSORED, BY LENGTH OF SPELL AND REASON FOR CENSORING

	N	PERCENT	AVERAGE LENGTH	STANDARD DEVIATION	PERCENTAGE OF SPELLS BY LENGTH: 1 YEAR	2 YEARS	3 YEARS	4 YEARS	5 YEARS	6 YEARS+	TOTAL	AVERAGE YEARS IN STUDY
ALL SPELLS	10,957	100.0%	1.88	1.66	61.0%	19.4%	8.6%	4.2%	2.7%	4.2%	100.0%	15.83
ALL NON-CENSORED	7,599	72.1%	1.74	1.39	63.5%	19.6%	8.1%	3.9%	2.0%	2.8%	100.0%	16.52
ALL CENSORED:**	3,358	27.9%	2.26	2.17	54.3%	18.8%	10.0%	4.8%	4.4%	7.7%	100.0%	14.01
LEFT CENSORED, 1967	735	6.1%	2.66	2.57	47.5%	19.4%	10.8%	4.9%	5.8%	11.7%	100.0%	15.69
ESTIMATED TRUE* LENGTH					30.2%	3.8%	0.9%	0.2%	0.1%	0.3%	35.5%	--
LEFT CENSORED, POST-1967 STUDY ENTRY	581	4.3%	1.54	1.22	69.2%	20.4%	5.3%	2.5%	0.9%	1.7%	100.0%	8.23
ESTIMATED TRUE* LENGTH					43.9%	4.0%	0.4%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	48.4%	--
RIGHT CENSORED, 1984	1,517	13.4%	2.31	2.08	52.9%	18.1%	9.9%	5.8%	4.9%	8.4%	100.0%	16.44
ESTIMATED TRUE* LENGTH					33.6%	3.5%	0.8%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	38.4%	---
RIGHT CENSORED, PRE-1984 STUDY KIT	440	3.6%	1.80	1.28	58.7%	20.9%	11.6%	2.8%	3.5%	2.4%	100.0%	10.11
ESTIMATED TRUE* LENGTH					37.3%	4.1%	0.9%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	42.6%	---
LEFT CENSORED, 1967 AND RIGHT CENSORED, 1984	6	0.0%	18.00	0.00	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	18.00
LEFT CENSORED, 1967, AND PRE-1984 STUDY EXIT	12	0.1%	6.28	4.32	0.0%	6.0%	22.9%	0.0%	33.5%	37.6%	100.0%	6.82
RIGHT CENSORED, 1984, AND POST 1967 STUDY ENTRY	36	0.2%	4.13	3.54	17.9%	5.5%	45.7%	8.0%	0.2%	23.1%	100.0%	7.68
POST-1967 STUDY ENTRY AND PRE 1984 STUDY EXIT	31	0.2%	2.91	1.81	37.4%	5.9%	12.6%	26.2%	14.1%	3.8%	100.0%	6.14

N.B. N's are raw sample numbers, percentages are weighted.

* See text for explanation

** In all censored spells, the individual either began a spell of low-wage employment the same year as his/her entry into the study or the same year the study began, or the individual was still in a spell in the last year of the study (1984), or his/her last year before exit, or both. See text for further explanation.

TABLE 1.34 ALL SPELLS, CENSORED AND NON-CENSORED, BY RACE AND GENDER

	BLACK WOMEN			BLACK MEN			WHITE WOMEN			WHITE MEN			TOTAL		
	N	PERCENT	AVERAGE SPELL LENGTH	N	PERCENT	AVERAGE SPELL LENGTH	N	PERCENT	AVERAGE SPELL LENGTH	N	PERCENT	AVERAGE SPELL LENGTH	N	PERCENT	AVERAGE SPELL LENGTH
ALL SPELLS	2,754	9.5%	1.94	2,164	5.8%	1.85	3,314	48.1%	1.86	2,568	34.8%	1.89	10,957	100.0%	1.88
ALL NON-CENSORED	1,988	10.2%	1.77	1,368	5.3%	1.63	2,417	50.1%	1.78	1,726	32.8%	1.67	7,599	100.0%	1.74
ALL CENSORED:	766	7.8%	2.52	796	7.3%	2.26	897	43.0%	2.13	842	39.8%	2.37	3,358	100.0%	2.26

*Includes other Races, not shown separately.

N. B. N's are raw sample numbers, percentages are weighted.

Table 1.35 DISTRIBUTION OF SPELLS

	Percent of all spells of this length	Percent of spells in average year which are of this length
1 year	63.5%	36.5%
2 year	19.6	22.5
3 years	8.1	14.0
4 years	3.9	9.0
5 years	2.0	5.7
6+ years	2.8	12.3

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TABLE 1.36 ALL MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE SPELLS, CENSORED AND NON-CENSORED, BY LENGTH OF SPELL, AND REASON FOR CENSORING

					PERCENTAGE OF SPELLS BY LENGTH						
	N	WEIGHTED %	AVERAGE SPELL LENGTH	STANDARD DEVIATION	1 YEAR	2 YEARS	3 YEARS	4 YEARS	5 YEARS+	TOTAL	AVERAGE YEARS IN STUDY
ALL SPELLS	16,078	100.0%	4.43	4.30	34.1%	16.3%	10.3%	7.2%	32.1%	100.0%	14.96
ALL NON-CENSORED	8,180	49.5%	2.57	2.43	48.6%	19.3%	10.2%	6.6%	15.3%	100.0%	16.46
ALL CENSORED:	7,898	50.5%	6.25	4.91	19.9%	13.4%	10.4%	7.8%	48.5%	100.0%	14.50
LEFT CENSORED, 1967	1,388	11.8%	6.48	4.62	15.1%	9.3%	10.1%	9.6%	55.9%	100.0%	16.02
LEFT CENSORED, POST 1967 STUDY ENTRY	890	4.3%	2.91	2.50	38.3%	21.9%	12.8%	7.2%	19.8%	100.0%	9.03
RIGHT CENSORED, 1984	3,463	21.2%	5.32	4.54	23.1%	17.1%	9.7%	7.1%	43.1%	100.0%	16.78
RIGHT CENSORED, PRE-1984 STUDY EXIT	974	5.0%	3.52	3.06	32.1%	20.6%	12.3%	7.8%	27.3%	100.0%	9.88
LEFT CENSORED, 1967 AND RIGHT CENSORED, 1984	361	3.6%	18.00	0.00	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	100.0%	100.0%	18.00
LEFT CENSORED, 1967, AND PRE-1984 STUDY EXIT	193	1.4%	7.47	3.97	1.5%	1.5%	16.8%	6.7%	73.5%	100.0%	7.77
RIGHT CENSORED, 1984, AND POST-1967 STUDY EXIT	429	2.0%	7.52	4.20	2.1%	0.9%	16.4%	13.5%	67.2%	100.0%	8.10
POST-1967 STUDY ENTRY AND PRE 1984 STUDY EXIT	200	1.2%	5.23	2.68	5.5%	2.1%	24.4%	20.1%	48.0%	100.0%	6.00

N. B. N's are raw sample numbers, percentages are weighted.

TABLE 1.37 DISTRIBUTION OF SPELLS OF POVERTY

	PERCENT OF ALL SPELLS OF THIS LENGTH	PERCENT OF SPELLS IN AVERAGE YEAR WHICH ARE OF THIS LENGTH
1 YEAR	44.5	10.6
2 YEAR	15.8	7.6
3 YEAR	9.8	7.0
4 YEAR	6.2	5.9
5 YEAR	4.7	5.6
6 YEAR	2.8	4.0
7 YEAR	2.1	3.5
8 YEAR	1.0	2.0
9 YEAR	1.1	2.3
OVER 9	12.0	51.5

Source: Bane and Ellwood (1986)

TABLE 1.38 ALL LOW-WAGE SPELLS, USING "LIBERAL" DEFINITION, CENSORED AND NON-CENSORED, BY LENGTH OF SPELLS AND REASON FOR CENSORING

					PERCENTAGE OF SPELLS BY LENGTH						
	N	WEIGHTED	AVERAGE SPELL LENGTH	STANDARD DEVIATION	1 YEAR	2 YEARS	3 YEARS	4 YEARS	5 YEARS+	TOTAL	AVERAGE YEARS IN STUDY
ALL SPELLS	13,763	100.0%	2.04	1.86	57.7%	19.1%	9.6%	4.9%	8.7%	100.0%	15.71
ALL NON-CENSORED	9,205	69.6%	1.83	1.49	61.2%	19.3%	9.2%	4.4%	5.9%	100.0%	16.52
ALL CENSORED	4,558	30.4%	2.54	2.40	49.5%	18.5%	10.6%	6.1%	15.3%	100.0%	13.82
LEFT, CENSORED, 1967	891	5.9%	3.09	2.96	43.5%	17.8%	9.7%	5.5%	23.5%	100.0%	15.48
LEFT CENSORED, POST-1967 STUDY ENTRY	796	5.0%	1.60	1.19	67.2%	18.6%	8.1%	3.5%	2.5%	100.0%	8.41
RIGHT CENSORED, 1984	2,062	14.4%	2.72	2.49	45.6%	18.2%	11.1%	7.2%	17.9%	100.0%	16.58
RIGHT CENSORED, PRE-1984 STUDY EXIT	639	4.2%	1.87	1.49	57.5%	22.9%	9.5%	4.2%	6.0%	100.0%	9.91
LEFT CENSORED, 1967 AND RIGHT CENSORED, 1984	8	0.0%	18.00	0.00	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	18.00
LEFT CENSORED, 1967, AND PRE-1984 STUDY EXIT	25	0.2%	5.92	3.78	0.0%	4.7%	24.5%	5.8%	65.0%	100.0%	6.40
RIGHT CENSORED, 1984, AND, POST-1967 STUDY ENTRY	80	0.4%	4.34	2.95	9.4%	2.6%	46.0%	9.9%	32.1%	100.0%	6.14
POST-1967 STUDY ENTRY AND PRE 1984 STUDY EXIT	57	0.3%	3.01	1.71	31.6%	8.0%	15.0%	26.7%	18.7%	100.0%	6.38

N. B. N's are raw sample numbers, percentages are weighted.

TABLE 1.39 PRE-SPELL STATUS, YEARS BEFORE ENTERING SPELL OF LOW-WAGE EMPLOYMENT (ALL)

PRE-SPELL STATUS	N	%	MEAN	STAN DEV
CHILD	632	6.8%	1.58	1.01
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	201	2.9%	1.56	1.07
RETIRED/DISABLED	119	2.3%	1.42	0.95
WELFARE	184	1.6%	1.74	1.38
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKING	439	5.9%	1.72	1.31
LONG TERM, WORK HISTORY	666	10.6%	2.00	1.68
LONG TERM, MIN WORK HISTORY	485	6.4%	1.64	1.21
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	1,396	17.0%	1.87	1.50
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-WAGE	746	10.3%	1.65	1.33
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	2,731	36.3%	1.69	1.34
TOTAL	7,599	100.0%	1.73	1.37

TABLE 1.40 PRE-SPELL STATUS, YEAR BEFORE ENTERING SPELL OF LOW-WAGE EMPLOYMENT, BY FAMILY, AND MARITAL STATUS, AND GENDER

	WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				ALL
	MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE		
PRE-SPELL STATUS	WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	
CHILD	1.3%	2.5%	6.9%	7.0%	6.6%	14.0%	20.7%	6.8%
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.5%	2.7%	1.3%	1.0%	5.2%	3.1%	11.0%	2.9%
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	1.1%	0.6%	1.0%	9.6%	4.2%	1.8%	2.3%
WELFARE	0.9%	1.4%	11.4%	0.3%	0.1%	1.2%	1.3%	1.6%
LONG TERM, MIN WORK HISTORY	13.0%	0.6%	8.6%	7.6%	1.6%	5.4%	2.2%	5.9%
LONG TERM, WORK HISTORY	23.2%	0.7%	9.1%	19.9%	0.2%	4.2%	1.0%	10.6%
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKING	9.4%	1.8%	4.7%	6.7%	3.4%	6.6%	5.9%	6.4%
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	21.0%	10.2%	23.3%	14.6%	13.7%	20.5%	17.0%	17.0%
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-WAGE	9.7%	11.8%	11.4%	10.4%	10.3%	7.7%	12.2%	10.3%
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	21.0%	67.2%	22.6%	31.5%	49.3%	33.1%	26.8%	36.3%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	1907	1535	883	953	823	774	724	7,599

TABLE 1.41 P ELL STATUS, YEAR BEFORE ENTERING SPELL OF LOW-WAGE EMPLOY BY FAMILY AND MARITAL STATUS, GENDER, AND RACE

A. WHITES

	WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				ALL			
	MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE					
PRE-SPELL STATUS	WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	N		MEAN	STAN DEV
CHILD	1.2%	2.2%	4.3%	7.1%	6.5%	13.4%	22.2%	335	6.5%	1.59	1.01
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.5%	2.8%	1.3%	1.1%	5.3%	3.6%	12.7%	143	3.1%	1.59	1.10
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	1.0%	0.6%	1.0%	9.7%	4.3%	2.1%	81	2.4%	1.44	0.98
WELFARE	0.8%	1.5%	8.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.5%	41	1.0%	1.75	1.56
LONG TERM, MIN WORK HIST	13.7%	0.5%	9.4%	7.8%	1.7%	5.4%	1.5%	287	6.5%	1.67	1.22
LONG TERM, WORK HISTO	23.9%	0.8%	11.8%	19.8%	0.2%	4.2%	0.5%	404	10.9%	1.95	1.65
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKI	8.9%	1.8%	3.9%	6.3%	3.5%	6.6%	5.2%	236	5.6%	1.70	1.36
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	21.1%	8.9%	23.9%	15.1%	13.7%	21.0%	14.9%	693	16.6%	1.83	1.39
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-W	9.2%	12.5%	13.8%	10.6%	10.7%	8.3%	12.9%	438	10.7%	1.67	1.33
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	20.6%	68.0%	22.8%	31.0%	48.6%	33.0%	27.6%	1,485	36.6%	1.69	1.36
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	4,143	100.0%	1.72	1.36
	1072	775	219	698	601	442	336		4143		

B. BLACKS

	WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				ALL			
	MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE					
PRE-SPELL STATUS	WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	N		MEAN	STAN DEV
CHILD	1.0%	4.6%	10.2%	5.7%	7.5%	16.4%	16.1%	290	8.1%	1.43	0.92
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.4%	2.5%	1.4%	0.3%	4.0%	1.1%	4.9%	57	1.7%	1.38	0.67
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	2.1%	0.5%	0.9%	8.8%	3.8%	0.8%	37	1.8%	1.29	0.71
WELFARE	0.7%	1.4%	16.2%	0.4%	0.4%	4.5%	4.7%	139	4.6%	1.66	1.20
LONG TERM, MIN WORK H	9.6%	1.1%	7.2%	6.8%	0.9%	5.6%	2.0%	188	5.5%	1.59	1.22
LONG TERM, WORK HISTO	21.7%	0.5%	5.2%	22.4%	0.0%	4.5%	3.1%	256	9.4%	2.21	1.75
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKI	9.5%	2.4%	6.2%	9.9%	2.7%	6.1%	6.0%	190	6.5%	1.71	0.97
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	21.5%	12.9%	23.2%	7.2%	13.1%	17.6%	27.0%	685	18.3%	1.81	1.42
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-W	12.2%	9.5%	6.9%	9.6%	5.2%	5.5%	9.8%	297	8.8%	1.62	1.38
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	23.5%	63.1%	23.0%	36.7%	57.6%	35.0%	25.5%	1,217	35.3%	1.70	1.19
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	3,356	100.0%	1.72	1.29
N	798	733	655	243	216	327	384		3356		

TABLE 1.42 PRE-SPELL STATUS, YEAR BEFORE ENTERING SPELL OF LOW-WAGE EMPLOYMENT, USING "LIBERAL" DEFINITION OF SPELL (ALL)

PRE-SPELL STATUS	N	%	MEAN	STAN DEV
CHILD	956	8.5%	1.80	1.29
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	318	3.8%	1.61	1.00
RETIRED/DISABLED	212	3.3%	1.62	1.21
WELFARE	346	2.3%	1.85	1.61
LONG TERM, MIN WORK HISTORY	1,038	10.9%	1.78	1.41
LONG TERM, WORK HISTORY	1,142	14.8%	2.08	1.82
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKING	802	8.7%	1.86	1.40
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	4,391	47.8%	1.76	1.42
TOTAL	9,205	100.0%	1.81	1.57

TABLE 1.43 POST-SPELL STATUS, YEAR AFTER SPELL ENDED (ALL)

POST-SPELL STATUS	N	%	MEAN	STAN DEV
DEAD	40	0.6%	1.48	0.82
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	31	0.4%	1.48	0.58
RETIRED/DISABLED	164	3.1%	1.88	1.67
WELFARE	151	1.4%	1.42	0.92
NOT WORKING	1,231	16.6%	1.77	1.53
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	1,432	17.1%	1.86	1.50
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-WAGE	809	10.8%	1.62	1.24
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	3,741	50.0%	1.70	1.28
TOTAL	7599	100.0%	1.73	1.31

TABLE 1.44 POST-SPELL STATUS, YEAR AFTER SPELL ENDED, BY MARITAL AND FAMILY STATUS, AND GENDER

	WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN			
	MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE	
POST-SPELL STATUS	WOMEN	MEN	PARENTS	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN
DEAD	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	3.9%
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.1%	0.1%	0.5%	0.1%	1.2%	0.4%	1.1%
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	0.8%	1.1%	1.9%	10.6%	6.0%	4.8%
WELFARE	0.3%	1.1%	12.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	0.9%
NOT WORKING	29.3%	3.3%	12.8%	26.3%	7.0%	13.3%	10.6%
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	20.2%	9.5%	18.0%	18.7%	15.7%	22.9%	12.9%
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-WAGE	11.2%	10.4%	12.3%	10.4%	9.0%	9.6%	14.4%
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	38.9%	74.8%	41.2%	42.7%	56.5%	46.2%	51.3%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	1953	1579	887	920	779	770	702

TABLE 1.45 POST-SPELL STATUS, YEAR AFTER SPELL ENDED, USING "LIBERAL" DEFINITION OF SPELL (ALL)

POST-SPELL STATUS	N	%	MEAN	STAN DEV
DEAD	50	0.6%	1.89	1.56
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	90	1.2%	1.75	1.26
RETIRED/DISABLED	396	5.9%	2.28	2.04
WELFARE	315	2.1%	1.56	1.06
NOT WORKING	2,573	27.2%	1.84	1.56
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	5,781	63.1%	1.77	1.36
TOTAL	9,205	100.0%	1.81	1.42

TABLE 1.46 PRE-SPELL STATUS BY POST-SPELL STATUS (ALL)

EXIT STATUS

ENTRIES BY EXITS

	POST-SPELL STATUS							
PRE-SPELL STATUS	WELFARE	DEAD	INST/ STUDENT	RETIRED/ DISABLED	NOT WORKING	PART-YR LOW-WAGE	PART-YR M/H-WAGE	M/H-WAGE
WELFARE	0.52% E	0.00%	0.00% E	0.02% E	0.28% E	0.28% C	0.13% B	0.40% B
CHILD	0.10% E	0.00%	0.01% E	0.02% E	0.80% E	1.27% C	1.02% B	3.57% B
INST/STUDENT	0.00% E	0.00%	0.15% E	0.00% E	0.16% E	0.37% C	0.33% B	1.84% B
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.00% E	0.05%	0.00% E	0.96% E	0.60% E	0.38% C	0.04% B	0.27% B
SHORT TERM	0.07% E	0.08%	0.00% E	0.40% E	1.81% E	1.19% C	0.44% B	1.91% B
LT, WORK HIST	0.15% E	0.03%	0.02% E	0.11% E	3.73% E	1.98% C	1.05% B	3.47% B
LT, MIN WORK HIST	0.17% E	0.07%	0.09% E	0.54% E	3.01% E	1.00% C	0.57% B	1.93% B
PART-YR LOW-WAGE	0.21% D	0.05%	0.09% D	0.54% D	3.01% D	5.18% C	1.59% B	6.28% B
PART-YR M/H-WAGE	0.06% D	0.00%	0.03% D	0.20% D	1.08% D	1.77% D	1.97% A	5.21% B
MED/HIGH-WAGE	0.14% D	0.29%	0.07% D	0.84% D	2.59% D	3.64% D	3.66% A	25.12% A

TABLE 1.47 SPELL TYPES, BY GENDER AND RACE (ALL)

	ALL WOMEN		BLACK WOMEN		WHITE WOMEN		OTHER WOMEN		ALL MEN		BLACK MEN		WHITE MEN		OTHER MEN		ALL			
SPELL TYPE:	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	N	%	MEAN	S.D.
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	21.1%	1.59	23.7%	1.70	20.7%	1.55	16.7%	2.73	46.6%	1.59	41.3%	1.60	47.5%	1.60	39.0%	1.20	2278	30.9%	1.59	1.18
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	31.4%	1.89	27.5%	1.99	32.1%	1.84	37.1%	3.02	28.2%	1.62	27.1%	1.51	28.4%	1.60	39.0%	2.77	2272	30.2%	1.79	1.35
C: STATUS UNCHANGED/ AMBIGUOUS	14.6%	1.86	16.7%	1.71	14.1%	1.89	16.3%	1.81	7.3%	1.80	8.8%	1.67	7.0%	1.84	1.3%	1.00	1006	11.7%	1.85	1.51
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	15.4%	1.92	13.0%	1.78	15.9%	1.94	15.2%	2.53	12.8%	1.92	15.8%	1.90	12.3%	1.92	12.2%	2.03	1100	14.4%	1.92	1.63
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	17.5%	1.67	19.2%	1.57	17.2%	1.68	14.7%	2.54	5.2%	1.41	7.1%	1.58	4.8%	1.38	8.6%	1.00	903	12.8%	1.63	1.33
TOTAL	100.0% 4453	1.79	100.0% 1981	1.77	100.0% 2411	1.77	100.0% 61	2.63	100.0% 3106	1.65	100.0% 1359	1.63	100.0% 1710	1.65	100.0% 37	1.89	7559	100.0% 7559	1.73	2.03

TABLE 1.48 SPELL TYPES, BY FAMILY AND MARITAL STATUS (STATUS UNCHANGED)

	WITH CHILDREN			WITHOUT CHILDREN				ALL			
	MARRIED		SINGLE	MARRIED		SINGLE					
	WOMEN	MEN	BOTH	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN				
SPELL TYPE:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	n	%	MEAN	S.D.
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	16.4%	63.7%	20.6%	25.8%	44.1%	28.2%	23.7%	1,983	32.2%	1.55	1.13
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	34.9%	21.0%	34.1%	28.0%	21.4%	28.0%	43.8%	1,826	29.5%	1.66	1.18
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	15.3%	4.4%	13.3%	11.7%	9.7%	14.5%	10.0%	792	11.4%	1.76	1.35
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	13.6%	9.4%	12.3%	16.6%	16.3%	17.4%	13.9%	893	14.1%	1.81	1.55
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	19.8%	1.5%	19.7%	17.9%	8.4%	11.9%	8.6%	762	12.8%	1.56	1.25
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	6,256	100.0%	1.64	1.88
N	1673	1371	682	721	618	627	564		6256		

TABLE 1.49 SPELL TYPES, BY GENDER AND TYPE OF CHANGE IN MARITAL OR FAMILY STATUS (FOR SPELLS IN WHICH STATUS CHANGED)

A. WOMEN

	WOMAN GETS MARRIED		WOMAN GETS SEPARATED		EITHER		WOMAN GAINS CHILDREN		WOMAN LOSES CHILDREN		EITHER	
SPELL TYPE:	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	16.1%	1.68	18.7%	1.94	17.5%	1.83	17.0%	1.64	19.9%	2.50	18.5%	2.12
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	7.1%	1.43	14.1%	1.75	10.9%	1.65	21.7%	1.57	19.4%	2.90	20.5%	2.22
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	41.8%	2.24	34.9%	2.51	38.1%	2.37	19.6%	1.86	29.5%	3.22	24.7%	2.70
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	21.9%	2.12	19.0%	2.72	20.3%	2.42	20.2%	1.48	14.0%	3.72	17.0%	2.44
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	13.2%	1.74	13.4%	2.44	13.3%	2.12	21.6%	2.05	17.2%	2.94	19.3%	2.46
TOTAL	100.0%	2.00	100.0%	2.33	100.0%	2.18	100.0%	1.72	100.0%	3.04	100.0%	2.41
	196		173		369		240		204		444	

B. MEN

	MAN GETS MARRIED		MAN GETS SEPARATED		EITHER		MAN GAINS CHILDREN		MAN LOSES CHILDREN		EITHER	
SPELL TYPE:	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	25.9%	1.39	38.3%	2.04	31.9%	1.77	32.9%	1.55	45.8%	2.05	38.6%	1.81
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	5.8%	1.41	5.5%	1.57	5.7%	1.49	0.6%	1.24	4.3%	1.79	2.3%	1.70
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	48.4%	1.81	35.4%	2.08	42.1%	1.92	55.7%	1.96	19.5%	3.11	39.8%	2.20
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	6.3%	1.21	10.1%	1.97	8.1%	1.66	3.5%	1.39	11.2%	2.32	6.8%	2.06
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	13.6%	1.55	10.6%	2.53	12.2%	1.96	7.3%	2.37	19.2%	3.83	12.5%	3.35
TOTAL	100.0%	1.60	100.0%	2.07	100.0%	1.83	100.0%	1.83	100.0%	2.62	100.0%	2.17
N	148		120		268		217		156		373	

TABLE 1.50 PERCENT OF FAMILY INCOME CONTRIBUTED FROM SPELLER'S EARNINGS, BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE LOW-WAGE SPELL, BY SPELL TYPE (ALL)

	% OF FAMILY INCOME		
	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	62	53	59
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	27	45	52
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	19	30	26
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	37	34	15
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	03	13	04
N	5,752	6,256	6,256

TABLE 1.51 PERCENT OF FAMILY INCOME CONTRIBUTED FROM SPELLER'S EARNINGS, BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE LOW-WAGE SPELL, BY SPELL TYPE, GENDER, AND RACE

A. WOMEN

	BLACK			WHITE			ALL		
	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	0.48	0.44	0.54	0.34	0.33	0.38	0.37	0.35	0.41
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	0.22	0.44	0.51	0.15	0.26	0.32	0.16	0.28	0.35
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	0.22	0.36	0.35	0.10	0.19	0.16	0.12	0.21	0.19
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	0.45	0.41	0.16	0.23	0.22	0.08	0.26	0.25	0.09
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	0.03	0.26	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.09	0.02
N	1,541	1,648	1,648	1,884	1,986	1,986	3,472	3,682	3,682

B. MEN

	BLACK			WHITE			ALL		
	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	0.85	0.74	0.78	0.79	0.65	0.72	0.79	0.66	0.73
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	0.64	0.83	0.87	0.55	0.75	0.84	0.57	0.77	0.85
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	0.58	0.78	0.75	0.37	0.52	0.42	0.40	0.56	0.48
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	0.68	0.72	0.31	0.55	0.44	0.24	0.58	0.50	0.26
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	0.27	0.66	0.35	0.06	0.20	0.11	0.10	0.31	0.15
N	997	1,125	1,125	1,253	1,418	1,418	2,280	2,574	2,574

TABLE 1.52 PERCENT POOR AND NOT POOR, BEFORE, AFTER, OR BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER LOW-SPELL OF EMPLOYMENT, BY SPELL TYPE (ALL)

	NEVER-POOR		EVER-POOR					TOTAL	
SPELL TYPE:	%	N	NOT POOR BEFORE, POOR AFTER SPELL	POOR BEFORE SPELL NOT POOR AFTERWARDS	POOR BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER SPELLS	TOTAL	N	%	N
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	97.3%	1,871	0.8%	1.3%	0.6%	2.7%	112	100.0%	1,983
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	87.3%	1,452	0.8%	10.9%	0.9%	12.7%	374	100.0%	1,826
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	73.6%	471	8.2%	9.6%	8.5%	26.4%	321	100.0%	792
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	80.5%	632	12.6%	2.5%	4.4%	19.5%	261	100.0%	893
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	72.5%	447	8.8%	6.0%	12.6%	27.5%	315	100.0%	762

TABLE 1.53 RACE AND GENDER, BY SPELL TYPE, FOR EVER POOR (POOR BEFORE, AFTER, OR BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE SPELL OF LOW-WAGE EMPLOYMENT)

	BLACK WOMEN	BLACK MEN	WHITE WOMEN	WHITE MEN	ALL	
					%	N
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	5.3%	6.2%	0.9%	2.7%	2.7%	112
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	16.6%	38.0%	5.8%	19.7%	12.7%	374
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	49.0%	67.7%	12.3%	45.5%	26.4%	321
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	36.6%	41.8%	11.9%	21.5%	19.5%	261
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	67.5%	80.1%	14.9%	31.8%	27.5%	315
N	584	400	169	208		1,383

TABLE 1.54 DISTRIBUTION OF EVER POOR, BY WHEN POOR (POOR BEFORE, AFTER, OR BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE SPELL OF LOW-WAGE EMPLOYMENT) BY SPELL TYPE

	EVER-POOR			TOTAL	
SPELL TYPE:	NOT POOR BEFORE, POOR AFTER SPELL	POOR BEFORE SPELL NOT POOR AFTERWARDS	POOR BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER SPELLS	%	N
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	47.1%	30.8%	22.1%	112	2.7%
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	86.0%	6.7%	7.3%	374	12.7%
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	36.5%	31.2%	32.3%	321	26.4%
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	12.6%	65.0%	22.4%	261	19.5%
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	21.8%	32.1%	46.1%	315	27.5%
N	565	393	425	1,383	

TABLE 1.55 DISTRIBUTION OF EVER POOR, BY WHEN POOR (BEFORE, AFTER, OR BEFORE AND AFTER SPELL OF LOW-WAGE EMPLOYMENT), BY GENDER AND RACE

A. WOMEN

	BLACK			WHITE			ALL			
	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	36.9%	20.8%	42.3%	29.7%	47.5%	22.8%	33.8%	32.5%	33.8%	34
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	84.6%	4.4%	11.0%	78.9%	13.8%	7.3%	81.2%	10.6%	8.1%	161
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	25.2%	32.2%	42.5%	48.0%	33.4%	18.5%	37.2%	32.8%	30.0%	192
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	26.4%	39.4%	34.2%	10.5%	78.4%	11.1%	15.5%	62.9%	21.6%	131
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	23.8%	25.7%	50.5%	23.6%	42.9%	33.5%	24.1%	34.9%	40.9%	245
N	215	152	217	69	69	31	288	226	249	763

B. MEN

	BLACK			WHITE			ALL			
	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	32.9%	26.0%	41.1%	51.5%	35.5%	12.9%	51.8%	30.2%	18.0%	78
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	93.7%	0.8%	5.5%	87.1%	5.3%	7.6%	89.1%	4.1%	6.8%	213
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	21.1%	18.3%	60.6%	40.0%	32.6%	27.4%	35.7%	29.3%	35.0%	129
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	5.8%	73.4%	20.8%	11.7%	69.9%	18.4%	9.4%	67.3%	23.3%	130
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	9.5%	[illegible].6%	74.8%	19.[illegible]	19.4%	61.1%	14.7%	23.5%	61.8%	70
N	164	110	126	106	56	46	277	167	176	620

TABLE 1.56 PRE SPELL AND POST-SPELL STATUS BY RACE, FOR THOSE ALSO RECEIVING WELFARE CONCURRENTLY
(WOMEN-MAINTAINED HOUSEHOLDS ONLY)

A. PRE-SPELL STATUS

	BLACKS			WHITES			ALL		
WELFARE RECIPIENTS*	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN
CHILD	17	7.4%	1.27	1	0.2%	3.00	18	3.4%	1.31
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	4	2.3%	1.33	1	2.0%	1.00	7	2.0%	1.17
RETIRED/DISABLED	4	5.6%	1.24	0	0.0%	0.00	5	2.7%	1.22
SHORT TERM	17	12.5%	1.44	2	5.3%	1.00	22	11.6%	1.92
LONG TERM, HISTORY	33	19.0%	1.35	10	24.3%	1.76	44	21.1%	1.61
LONG TERM, MIN HIST	33	26.4%	1.98	11	24.2%	1.79	47	26.4%	1.86
PART-YEAR, LOW-WAGE	29	12.7%	1.52	15	26.9%	2.46	46	18.5%	2.15
PART-YEAR, M/H-WAGE	11	4.8%	1.16	1	3.7%	4.00	12	3.9%	2.42
MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE	19	9.3%	1.50	7	13.3%	1.59	26	10.4%	1.55
TOTAL	169	100.0%	1.54	48	100.0%	1.96	227	100.0%	1.81

B. POST-SPELL STATUS

	BLACKS			WHITES			ALL		
WELFARE RECIPIENTS*	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN
DEAD	0	0.0%	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	5	0.8%	1.13	0	0.0%	0.00	5	0.4%	1.13
RETIRED/DISABLED	0	0.0%	0.00	2	2.7%	2.00	2	1.4%	2.00
NOT WORKING	92	61.6%	1.51	22	47.0%	1.89	115	53.0%	1.70
PART-YEAR, LOW-WAGE	32	17.7%	1.38	12	29.8%	1.33	45	24.4%	1.33
PART-YEAR, M/H-WAGE	7	6.4%	1.76	4	11.0%	2.20	11	8.5%	2.05
MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE	21	13.5%	1.59	5	9.4%	1.99	28	12.3%	1.70
TOTAL	157	100.0%	1.51	45	100.0%	1.77	206	100.0%	1.64

* Spellee received 25% or more of family income from welfare in year previous to beginning spell of low-wage employment.

TABLE 1.57 PRE SPELL AND POST-SPELL STATUS BY RACE, FOR SPELLEE ALSO RECEIVING WELFARE CONCURRENTLY AND DURING THE SPELL
(WOMEN-MAINTAINED HOUSEHOLDS ONLY)

A. PRE-SPELL STATUS

	BLACKS			WHITES			ALL		
	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN
CHILD	1	0.4%	1.00	0	0.0%	0.00	1	0.2%	1.00
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	3	3.5%	1.24	0	0.0%	0.00	3	1.7%	1.24
RETIRED/DISABLED	1	4.1%	1.00	0	0.0%	0.00	1	2.0%	1.00
SHORT TERM	7	11.8%	1.79	1	4.8%	1.00	9	10.8%	1.42
LONG TERM, HISTORY	14	27.3%	1.27	4	32.7%	1.17	18	28.3%	1.22
LONG TERM, MIN HIST	14	36.6%	1.58	4	27.3%	1.77	19	32.7%	1.61
PART-YEAR, LOW-WAGE	11	9.7%	1.49	5	24.2%	1.00	17	16.1%	1.16
PART-YEAR, M/H-WAGE	3	2.1%	1.10	0	0.0%	0.00	3	1.0%	1.10
MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE	6	4.3%	1.00	3	11.0%	1.00	9	7.2%	1.00
TOTAL	60	100.0%	1.44	17	100.0%	1.27	80	100.0%	1.34

B. POST-SPELL STATUS

	BLACKS			WHITES			ALL		
	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN
DEAD	0	0.0%	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	1	1.8%	1.13	0	0.0%	0.00	1	0.1%	1.00
RETIRED/DISABLED	0	0.0%	0.00	1	6.5%	2.00	1	2.4%	2.00
NOT WORKING	32	52.2%	1.07	5	44.0%	1.00	37	45.4%	1.04
PART-YEAR, LOW-WAGE	16	25.6%	1.46	3	30.2%	1.32	20	28.6%	1.35
PART-YEAR, M/H-WAGE	4	3.0%	1.00	1	11.3%	1.00	5	5.9%	1.00
MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE	8	18.9%	1.71	1	7.9%	5.00	11	17.5%	2.13
TOTAL	61	100.0%	1.29	11	100.0%	1.48	75	100.0%	1.34

TABLE 1.5B SPELL TYPE FOR THOSE WHO EVER RECEIVED WELFARE
(WOMEN-MAINTAINED HOUSEHOLDS ONLY)

	ALL		
	n	%	MEAN
A: MED/HIGH WAGE INTERRUPTED	27	7.2%	1.50
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	81	22.5%	2.05
C: STATUS UNCHANGED AMBIGUOUS	74	23.8%	1.79
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	61	16.0%	2.28
E: NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	108	30.5%	1.47
TOTAL	351	100.0%	1.81

TABLE 1.59 PRE-SPELL AND POST-SPELL STATUS BY RACE, SPELLEES RECEIVING WELFARE CONCURRENTLY, BY RACE USING "LIBERAL" DEFINITION OF LOW-WAGE SPELL (WOMEN-MAINTAINED HOUSEHOLDS ONLY)

A. PRE-SPELL STATUS

PRE-SPELL STATUS	BLACKS			WHITES			ALL		
	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN
CHILD	35	8.2%	1.57	7	5.1%	1.29	44	6.9%	1.57
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	12	3.0%	1.59	2	2.4%	1.51	15	2.6%	1.57
RETIRED/DISABLED	9	6.5%	1.60	0	12.8%	0.00	10	3.1%	1.58
SHORT TERM	57	18.9%	1.96	10	38.2%	1.44	68	15.7%	1.80
LONG TERM, HISTORY	80	22.3%	1.43	26	33.3%	2.05	108	29.5%	1.83
LONG TERM, MIN HIST	79	28.9%	1.72	25	8.3%	1.85	109	32.5%	1.77
MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE	32	12.2%	1.08	7	0.0%	2.75	39	9.7%	1.77
TOTAL	304	100.0%	1.60	77	100.0%	1.91	393	100.0%	1.77

B. POST-SPELL STATUS

POST-SPELL STATUS	BLACKS			WHITES			ALL		
	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN
DEAD	0	0.0%	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	14	3.3%	1.28	1	1.2%	3.00	15	2.3%	1.68
RETIRED/DISABLED	8	3.5%	1.29	1	1.1%	2.00	9	2.4%	1.44
NOT WORKING	240	81.3%	1.54	57	84.5%	1.59	301	83.0%	1.57
MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE	42	11.9%	1.60	9	13.3%	2.72	51	12.3%	2.14
TOTAL	304	100.0%	1.53	68	100.0%	1.76	376	100.0%	1.64

TABLE 1.60 PRE-SPELL AND POST SPELL STATUSES BY RACE FOR SPELLEES RECEIVING WELFARE CONCURRENTLY AND RECEIVING WELFARE DURING THE SPELL USING THE "LIBERAL" DEFINITION OF SPELL (WOMEN-MAINTAINED HOUSEHOLDS ONLY)

PRE-SPELL STATUS

	BLACKS			WHITES			ALL		
	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN
CHILD	4	1.3%	1.18	0	0.0%	0.00	4	0.7%	1.18
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	5	2.8%	1.17	0	0.0%	0.00	5	1.5%	1.17
RETIRED/DISABLED	4	3.3%	1.07	0	0.0%	0.00	4	1.7%	1.07
SHORT TERM	22	23.8%	1.23	4	11.4%	1.94	26	17.6%	1.44
LONG TERM, HISTORY	35	22.6%	1.47	12	50.1%	1.08	47	34.5%	1.21
LONG TERM, MIN HIST	37	38.5%	1.47	9	32.4%	1.64	48	37.1%	1.55
MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE	16	7.7%	1.02	3	6.2%	1.00	19	6.8%	1.01
TOTAL	123	100.0%	1.35	28	100.0%	1.36	153	100.0%	1.36

POST-SPELL STATUS

WELFARE EXITS, LIBERAL
CONCURRENT

	BLACKS			WHITES			ALL		
	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN
DEAD	0	0.0%	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	2	1.5%	1.00	0	0.0%	0.00	2	0.8%	1.00
RETIRED/DISABLED	2	3.6%	1.15	1	3.1%	2.00	3	3.4%	1.50
NOT WORKING	96	81.6%	1.21	17	77.8%	1.11	113	79.9%	1.16
MEDIUM/HIGH-WAGE	22	13.2%	1.91	5	19.1%	2.13	27	15.9%	2.03
TOTAL	122	100.0%	1.30	23	100.0%	1.33	145	100.0%	1.31

TABLE 1.61 SPELL TYPE FOR THOSE WHO EVER RECEIVE WELFARE
(WOMEN-MAINTAINED HOUSEHOLDS ONLY)

	ALL		
ALL	n	%	MEAN
MED/HIGH INTERRUPTED	29	5.4%	1.88
UPWARDLY MOBILE	140	22.6%	2.05
DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	55	6.8%	1.75
NON-WORK INTERRUPTED	385	65.2%	1.72
TOTAL	609	100.0%	1.79

TABLE 1.62 SPELL TYPES; FIRST SPELL BY SECOND SPELL FOR THOSE WITH TWO (OR MORE SPELLS) ONLY

	SECOND SPELL					
	A	B	C	D	E	
	MED/HIGH WAGE INT.	UPWARDLY MOBILE	STATUS UNCHANGED	DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	NON-WORK INT.	TOTALS
FIRST SPELL						
A: MED/HIGH/WAGE INT.	4,348	566	216	1373	176	6,679
Grnd %	15.1	2.0	0.7	4.9	0.6	23.2
B.UPAWARDLY MOBILE	6,174	1,632	280	2,768	262	11,116
Grnd %	21.4	5.7	1.0	9.6	0.9	38.6
C. STATUS UNCHANGED	193	1,432	1,151	960	499	4,235
Grnd %	0.7	5.0	4.0	3.3	1.7	14.7
D. DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	354	1,064	659	403	877	3,357
Grnd %	1.2	3.7	2.3	1.4	3.0	11.6
E. NON-WORK INT.	219	1,323	878	726	294	3,440
Grnd %	0.8	4.6	3.0	2.5	1.0	11.9
TOTALS	11,288	5,572	3,032	5,798	3,137	28,827
Grnd %	39.2	19.3	10.5	20.1	10.9	100.0

INT. = INTERRUPTED

TABLE 2.1: Months of Low-Wage Work by Gender and Race-ethnicity

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW WAGE					
	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-10 MONTHS	11-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)
ALL WORKERS	48.6	23.9	15.1	12.4	93,225
MALES	60.1	21.0	11.0	7.8	51,338
WHITE	63.2	19.9	10.1	6.9	42,039
BLACK	43.1	27.2	17.4	12.3	4,587
HISPANIC	46.5	27.9	14.9	10.8	3,541
ASIAN	59.2	18.1	9.4	13.3	1,172
FEMALES	34.6	27.5	20.0	17.9	41,887
WHITE	35.8	27.1	19.8	17.3	33,517
BLACK	29.0	27.8	20.5	22.7	4,964
HISPANIC	28.1	31.1	23.0	17.8	2,454
ASIAN	37.3	28.6	19.9	14.2	952

TABLE 2.2: Age and Months of Low-Wage Work by Gender

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW WAGE WORK					
	% OF LABOR FORCE	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)
ALL WORKERS	100.0	48.6	23.9	27.5	93,225
16-19	7.9	3.3	28.9	67.7	7,346
20-24	15.6	26.2	31.9	41.9	14,527
25-34	29.9	54.3	25.3	20.4	27,870
35-44	21.4	63.6	19.5	16.9	19,916
45-54	14.4	60.7	19.2	20.1	13,456
55-64	9.9	54.7	20.1	25.2	9,206
65-69	1.0	31.0	18.9	50.0	904
Median Age	34	36	31	30	
ALL MALES	100.0	60.1	21.0	18.9	51,338
16-19	7.6	5.4	31.2	63.4	3,896
20-24	14.9	32.6	31.1	36.3	7,666
25-34	30.5	64.2	22.0	13.9	15,638
35-44	21.7	78.7	14.5	6.7	11,162
45-54	14.3	76.6	15.5	7.9	7,339
55-64	10.0	68.5	17.5	14.0	5,137
65-69	1.0	35.6	20.2	44.2	500
Median Age	33	37	29	23	
ALL FEMALES	100.0	34.6	27.5	38.0	41,887
16-19	8.2	1.0	26.4	72.6	3,449
20-24	16.4	19.0	32.9	48.1	6,861
25-34	29.2	41.7	29.6	28.7	12,232
35-44	20.9	44.2	25.8	29.9	8,754
45-54	14.6	41.6	23.6	34.9	6,118
55-64	9.7	37.3	23.4	39.3	4,069
65-69	1.0	25.3	17.4	57.3	403
Median Age	34	37	32	31	

TABLE 2.2: Age and Months Of Low-Wage Work By Race for Men

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW WAGE WORK

	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)
WHITE MALES	100.0	63.1	19.8	17.0	42,039
16-19	7.4	5.4	30.1	64.5	3,116
20-24	14.8	34.4	31.3	34.2	6,219
25-34	29.8	67.9	20.6	11.6	12,545
35-44	22.0	81.3	13.4	5.3	9,236
45-54	14.5	79.4	14.0	6.5	6,114
55-64	10.5	72.9	15.9	11.2	4,396
65-69	1.0	38.5	18.5	43.0	411
Median Age	34	38	29	22	
BLACK MALES	100.0	43.1	27.2	29.7	4,587
16-19	8.6	4.2	39.6	56.2	393
20-24	14.6	21.5	31.3	47.2	670
25-34	32.0	45.8	24.6	29.6	1,468
35-44	21.0	61.5	23.2	15.3	965
45-54	13.7	56.3	26.5	17.2	630
55-64	9.1	42.6	28.2	29.2	417
65-69	0.9	34.8	32.2	33.0	43
Median Age	33	37	31	28	
HISPANIC MALES	100.0	46.5	27.9	25.7	3,541
16-19	8.8	7.2	33.7	59.1	311
20-24	17.5	26.9	31.4	41.7	620
25-34	33.7	49.4	31.5	19.1	1,194
35-44	20.8	69.1	17.4	13.5	737
45-54	11.7	64.2	25.9	9.9	414
55-64	6.4	38.5	31.3	30.2	226
65-69	1.1	11.7	12.9	75.4	39
Median Age	32	36	30	24	
ASIAN MALES	100.0	59.2	18.1	22.7	1,172
16-19	6.5	7.1	21.8	71.2	76
20-24	13.4	31.2	17.8	51.0	157
25-34	36.8	60.5	26.6	12.9	431
35-44	19.0	80.7	13.8	5.5	223
45-54	15.3	80.4	3.2	16.4	180
55-64	8.4	54.8	10.6	34.7	99
65-69	0.5	-	-	-	6
Median Age	33	37	30	24	

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

TABLE 2.2: Age and Months Of Low-Wage Work By Race for Women

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW WAGE WORK

	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)
WHITE FEMALES	100.0	35.8	27.1	37.1	33,517
16-19	8.7	0.6	26.4	72.9	2,930
20-24	16.3	19.7	31.5	48.8	5,472
25-34	28.1	44.0	29.3	26.7	9,431
35-44	20.9	45.7	25.9	28.5	7,009
45-54	14.5	42.8	23.7	33.5	4,859
55-64	10.3	39.6	23.4	36.9	3,464
65-69	1.0	25.3	16.3	58.4	351
Median Age	34	37	32	30	
BLACK FEMALES	100.0	29.0	27.7	43.2	4,964
16-19	5.9	0.0	25.9	74.1	292
20-24	15.7	14.9	39.5	45.6	782
25-34	32.5	33.6	27.5	38.9	1,615
35-44	22.2	38.3	27.2	34.5	1,104
45-54	16.0	33.3	21.7	45.0	793
55-64	6.8	25.9	18.8	55.3	336
65-69	0.8	21.7	31.2	47.1	42
Median Age	33	36	32	32	
HISPANIC FEMALE	100.0	28.1	31.1	40.8	2,454
16-19	6.3	5.6	29.0	65.4	156
20-24	20.7	17.0	40.5	42.6	509
25-34	35.7	33.2	36.3	30.5	875
35-44	17.9	33.8	20.0	46.2	438
45-54	11.4	43.2	22.4	34.3	281
55-64	8.0	17.3	22.8	59.9	196
65-69	-	-	-	-	-
Median Age	32	34	29	32	
ASIAN FEMALES	100.0	37.3	28.6	34.1	952
16-19	7.5	8.7	22.7	68.6	72
20-24	10.4	20.7	20.9	58.4	99
25-34	32.7	39.8	28.5	31.7	311
35-44	21.3	48.9	29.5	21.6	203
45-54	19.4	41.7	30.2	28.1	184
55-64	7.6	33.8	42.7	23.5	72
65-69	1.1	-	-	-	11
Median Age	35	36	35	30	

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

TABLE 2.3: Household Type and Months of Low-Wage Work by Gender

Percentage for Months of Low-Wage Work

	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	Number (000'S)	Risk Factor
ALL WORKERS	100.0	48.7	24.0	27.3	91,730	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	48.5	50.1	49.9	44.3	44,468	0.91
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	51.5	49.9	50.1	55.8	47,262	1.08
Married with children						
Dual Earners	26.3	29.1	27.4	20.4	24,118	0.77
One Earner	14.5	16.0	12.9	13.4	13,339	0.92
Married without children						
Dual Earners	15.6	19.0	14.0	11.2	14,333	0.71
One Earner	12.5	11.6	12.8	14.1	11,493	1.12
Single with children	7.6	5.1	9.6	10.5	7,012	1.38
Single without children	18.5	19.1	17.9	18.1	17,000	0.98
Single Teenage Workers	4.8	0.2	5.5	12.5	4,435	2.57
TOTAL MEN	100.0	60.3	21.1	18.7	50,189	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	48.6	53.3	46.6	35.8	24,388	0.74
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	51.4	46.8	53.4	64.2	25,802	1.25
Married with children						
Dual Earners	23.9	28.3	22.0	11.7	11,971	0.49
One Earner	20.9	22.1	19.4	18.7	10,480	0.89
Married without children						
Dual Earners	13.9	16.8	11.2	7.5	6,972	0.54
One Earner	15.2	13.6	16.3	19.2	7,621	1.27
Single with children	3.9	2.9	5.3	5.4	1,937	1.40
Single without children	17.4	16.1	18.8	20.4	8,754	1.17
Single Teenage Workers	4.9	0.3	7.2	17.1	2,454	3.49
TOTAL WOMEN	100.0	34.7	27.5	37.8	41,540	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	48.3	43.6	53.0	49.3	20,081	1.02
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	51.7	56.4	47.0	50.7	21,460	0.98
Married with children						
Dual Earners	29.2	30.8	32.4	25.5	12,146	0.87
One Earner	6.9	3.2	7.0	10.2	2,859	1.49
Married without children						
Dual Earners	17.7	23.4	16.5	13.4	7,361	0.75
One Earner	9.3	7.3	9.5	11.0	3,872	1.18
Single with children	12.2	9.6	13.7	13.6	5,075	1.11
Single without children	19.9	25.6	17.0	16.7	8,246	0.84
Single Teenage Workers	4.8	0.0	4.0	9.7	1,982	2.03

Note: The risk factor is the ratio of the percent of total low-wage workers, 7-12 months, in a category to the percent of the total workers in that category, i.e., the percent of low-wage single black men without children (29.4 percent) divided by the percent of single black men without children in the population of working black men (26.1 percent).

TABLE 2.3: Household Type and Months of Low-Wage Work by Race for Men

Percentage for Months of Low-Wage Work						
WHITE MEN	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	Number (000's)	Risk Factor
TOTAL	100.0	63.4	19.9	16.8	41,229	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	47.1	52.1	43.9	32.1	19,430	0.68
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	52.9	47.9	56.1	67.9	21,799	1.28
Married with children						
Dual Earners	23.4	27.6	21.2	9.8	9,633	0.42
One Earner	20.8	22.2	19.1	17.8	8,585	0.86
Married without children						
Dual Earners	15.1	17.8	12.2	8.3	6,219	0.55
One Earner	16.1	14.1	18.0	21.2	6,619	1.32
Single with children	2.9	2.3	3.6	4.5	1,211	1.53
Single without children	17.0	15.7	18.8	19.7	7,002	1.16
Single Teenage Workers	4.8	0.3	7.2	18.6	1,960	3.92
BLACK MEN						
TOTAL	100.0	42.2	27.7	30.1	4,404	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	48.4	52.7	49.7	41.3	2,132	0.85
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	51.6	47.3	50.3	58.7	2,272	1.14
Married with children						
Dual Earners	25.3	31.6	24.5	17.0	1,112	0.67
One Earner	14.2	14.6	11.9	15.8	626	1.11
Married without children						
Dual Earners	9.3	11.7	9.9	5.3	407	0.57
One Earner	9.9	10.1	6.7	12.5	434	1.26
Single with children	8.9	6.5	13.2	8.5	394	0.95
Single without children	26.1	25.0	24.2	29.4	1,149	1.13
Single Teenage Workers	6.4	0.6	9.6	11.6	281	1.82
HISPANIC MEN						
TOTAL	100.0	47.0	27.5	25.5	3,443	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	62.5	68.1	61.9	52.8	2,152	0.85
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	37.5	31.9	38.1	47.2	1,291	1.26
Married with children						
Dual Earners	27.3	34.5	26.0	15.6	941	0.57
One Earner	28.1	27.6	28.6	28.5	968	1.01
Married without children						
Dual Earners	7.8	10.0	5.8	5.7	267	0.74
One Earner	11.9	9.7	13.6	14.3	411	1.20
Single with children	7.1	6.0	7.3	8.7	243	1.24
Single without children	13.0	11.8	13.9	14.3	448	1.10
Single Teenage Workers	4.8	0.4	4.9	12.9	165	2.68
ASIAN MEN						
TOTAL	100.0	58.9	19.0	22.1	1,114	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	60.6	63.5	64.7	49.1	674	0.81
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	39.5	36.5	35.3	50.9	439	1.29
Married with children						
Dual Earners	25.6	28.7	18.6	23.5	285	0.92
One Earner	27.0	26.8	32.6	22.5	300	0.83
Married without children						
Dual Earners	7.1	9.3	6.2	2.3	80	0.32
One Earner	14.1	12.0	17.0	17.3	157	1.23
Single with children	8.0	8.0	13.6	3.2	89	0.40
Single without children	13.9	15.3	9.5	14.0	155	1.01
Single Teenage Workers	4.3	0.0	2.6	17.3	48	4.01

TABLE 2.3: Household Type and Months of Low-Wage Work by Race for Women

Percentage for Months of Low-Wage Work

WHITE WOMEN	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	Number (000's)	Risk Factor
TOTAL	100.0	35.9	27.2	36.9	33,221	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	44.6	40.9	48.7	45.2	14,820	1.01
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	55.4	59.1	51.3	54.8	18,401	0.99
Married with children						
Dual Earners	29.3	29.8	32.5	26.5	9,735	0.90
One Earner	6.2	3.1	6.1	9.3	2,046	1.50
Married without children						
Dual Earners	19.7	25.4	19.0	14.6	6,539	0.74
One Earner	10.1	7.8	10.2	12.3	3,355	1.21
Single with children	9.2	8.0	10.1	9.5	3,039	1.04
Single without children	20.6	25.9	17.9	17.5	6,845	0.85
Single Teenage Workers	5.0	0.1	4.2	10.4	1,662	2.08
BLACK WOMEN						
TOTAL	100.0	29.1	27.8	43.1	4,948	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	62.6	55.5	65.3	65.7	3,099	1.05
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	37.4	44.5	34.7	34.3	1,849	0.92
Married with children						
Dual Earners	22.7	26.8	26.1	17.7	1,122	0.78
One Earner	8.8	3.6	8.5	12.4	433	1.41
Married without children						
Dual Earners	8.7	10.5	7.5	8.2	430	0.94
One Earner	5.7	6.0	6.1	5.2	281	0.91
Single with children	31.2	25.1	30.7	35.7	1,544	1.14
Single without children	19.3	28.0	18.2	14.2	956	0.73
Single Teenage Workers	3.7	0.0	2.9	6.7	182	1.82
HISPANIC WOMEN						
TOTAL	100.0	28.2	30.8	41.0	2,441	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	67.0	60.7	77.6	63.4	1,636	0.95
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	33.0	39.3	22.4	36.7	806	1.11
Married with children						
Dual Earners	37.9	49.3	38.9	29.2	925	0.77
One Earner	11.8	2.4	12.6	17.7	289	1.50
Married without children						
Dual Earners	11.0	18.6	5.9	9.7	269	0.88
One Earner	5.8	2.4	6.8	7.4	142	1.27
Single with children	17.3	9.0	26.2	16.4	423	0.95
Single without children	12.5	18.3	6.2	13.3	306	1.06
Single Teenage Workers	3.6	0.0	3.5	6.3	89	1.73
ASIAN WOMEN						
TOTAL	100.0	38.3	28.4	33.4	929	-
TOTAL WITH CHILDREN	56.6	55.5	63.3	52.3	526	0.92
TOTAL WITHOUT CHILDREN	43.4	44.5	36.7	47.7	403	1.10
Married with children						
Dual Earners	39.3	45.8	40.7	30.7	365	0.78
One Earner	9.8	6.6	13.4	10.4	91	1.07
Married without children						
Dual Earners	13.3	18.3	10.6	9.9	124	0.75
One Earner	10.0	5.7	13.3	12.0	93	1.20
Single with children	7.5	3.1	9.2	11.1	70	1.48
Single without children	14.9	20.5	9.4	13.2	139	0.89
Single Teenage Workers	5.2	0.0	3.5	12.6	48	2.43

TABLE 2.4: Family Poverty Without Worker's Income and Months of Low-Wage Work by Family Poverty by Gender

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK					
WITHOUT WORKER'S EARNINGS	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)
ALL WORKERS	100.0	47.7	24.2	28.1	80,419
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	68.6	63.9	71.6	74.2	55,196
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	27.9	35.9	23.8	17.8	22,425
STILL IN POVERTY	3.5	0.2	4.6	8.0	2,799
ALL MALES	100.0	60.0	21.1	18.9	44,574
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	58.3	54.8	60.5	67.3	26,000
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	38.6	45.0	34.6	22.6	17,186
STILL IN POVERTY	3.1	0.3	4.9	10.1	1,388
ALL FEMALES	100.0	32.4	28.0	39.6	35,845
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	81.5	84.9	82.1	78.2	29,195
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	14.6	15.0	13.6	15.0	5,239
STILL IN POVERTY	3.9	0.1	4.3	6.8	1,411

Note: This table only includes workers with families. Single workers living in single headed households have been excluded.

TABLE 2.4: Family Poverty Without Worker's Income and Months of Low-Wage Work by Family Poverty by Race for Men

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK					
	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)
WHITE MALES	100.0	63.2	19.9	16.9	36,571
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	59.3	54.6	62.5	73.3	21,699
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	38.5	45.3	34.1	18.5	14,091
STILL IN POVERTY	2.1	0.1	3.4	8.2	782
BLACK MALES	100.0	41.5	27.6	31.0	3,739
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	56.7	59.8	60.7	48.8	2,118
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	37.1	39.6	33.1	37.4	1,389
STILL IN POVERTY	6.2	0.6	6.2	13.8	232
HISPANIC MALES	100.0	45.8	28.0	26.1	3,210
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	46.1	47.5	45.3	44.4	1,480
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	43.6	50.4	39.0	36.6	1,399
STILL IN POVERTY	10.3	2.1	15.7	19.0	331
ASIAN MALES	100.0	56.3	19.5	24.2	1,054
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	66.8	65.8	53.3	79.9	704
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	29.1	33.1	40.7	10.4	307
STILL IN POVERTY	4.1	1.1	5.9	9.6	43

Note: This table only includes workers with families. Single workers living in single headed households have been excluded.

TABLE 2.4: Family Poverty Without Worker's Income and Months of Low-Wage Work by Family Poverty by Race for Women

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK					
	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)
WHITE FEMALES	100.0	33.6	27.7	38.8	28,281
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	86.1	87.7	87.1	83.8	24,335
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	11.6	12.3	10.2	12.1	3,288
STILL IN POVERTY	2.3	0.0	2.6	4.1	658
BLACK FEMALES	100.0	27.0	28.0	45.0	4,413
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	54.5	62.1	54.7	49.8	2,405
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	32.5	36.7	31.2	30.8	1,435
STILL IN POVERTY	13.0	1.2	14.1	19.3	573
HISPANIC FEMALES	100.0	27.3	31.9	40.8	2,252
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	76.2	82.7	74.7	73.1	1,717
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	17.4	17.3	20.0	15.4	391
STILL IN POVERTY	6.4	0.0	5.4	11.5	144
ASIAN FEMALES	100.0	36.6	28.7	34.8	900
STILL ABOVE POVERTY	82.1	88.4	79.9	77.3	739
GETS FAMILY ABOVE POVERTY	13.9	11.6	13.9	16.5	125
STILL IN POVERTY	4.0	0.0	6.2	6.2	36

Note: This table only includes workers with families. Single workers living in single headed households have been excluded.

TABLE 2.5: Experience and Months of Low-Wage Work By Gender

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK						
	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER	RISK FACTOR
ALL WORKERS	100.0	57.8	21.8	20.4	71,399	
LESS THAN 5	31.9	23.6	39.8	47.2	22,807	1.48
5-9 YEARS	23.7	24.2	23.7	22.4	16,912	0.94
10-19 YEARS	29.2	33.6	24.9	21.2	20,847	0.73
20 OR MORE	15.2	18.6	11.7	9.2	10,833	0.61
MEAN	8.7	10.8	6.7	5.1		
ALL MALES	100.0	70.7	18.1	11.2	39,816	
LESS THAN 5	27.6	21.9	38.6	46.4	11,005	1.68
5-9 YEARS	22.1	22.7	20.2	21.3	8,809	0.96
10-19 YEARS	31.2	34.4	25.9	19.4	12,412	0.62
20 OR MORE	19.1	21.0	15.3	12.8	7,589	0.67
MEAN	9.9	11.5	7.1	4.7		
ALL FEMALES	100.0	41.6	26.4	32.0	31,583	
LESS THAN 5	37.4	27.4	40.8	47.5	11,802	1.27
5-9 YEARS	25.7	27.2	26.6	22.8	8,103	0.89
10-19 YEARS	26.7	32.0	23.9	22.1	8,435	0.83
20 OR MORE	10.3	13.4	8.6	7.6	3,244	0.74
MEAN	7.3	9.4	6.3	5.4		

TABLE 2.5: Experience and Months of Low-Wage Work by Race for Men

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK						
	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER	RISK FACTOR
WHITE MALES	100.0	74.1	16.7	9.2	32,736	
LESS THAN 5	26.5	21.3	38.7	46.3	8,670	1.75
5-9 YEARS	22.0	22.8	19.2	21.3	7,215	0.97
10-19 YEARS	31.0	33.7	26.3	17.8	10,140	0.58
20 OR MORE	20.5	22.3	15.8	14.5	6,712	0.71
MEAN	10.9	11.8	7.2	4.7		
BLACK MALES	100.0	51.4	25.2	23.4	3,531	
LESS THAN 5	32.4	26.5	34.1	43.7	1,146	1.35
5-9 YEARS	17.6	15.7	21.0	18.0	621	1.03
10-19 YEARS	34.9	41.4	27.3	28.9	1,233	0.83
20 OR MORE	15.1	16.4	17.7	9.4	532	0.62
MEAN	10.5	10.5	7.4	5.4		
HISPANIC MALES	100.0	55.8	26.3	17.9	2,611	
LESS THAN 5	33.2	22.9	41.9	52.7	867	1.59
5-9	26.4	28.5	24.1	23.2	688	0.88
10-19	31.5	39.8	24.7	15.5	823	0.49
20 OR MORE	8.9	8.8	9.4	8.6	233	0.96
MEAN	8.1	9.2	6.8	4.3		
ASIAN MALES	100.0	68.1	17.9	14.0	938	
LESS THAN 5	34.4	29.3	46.0	44.3	323	1.29
5-9	30.5	28.6	32.9	36.4	286	1.19
10-19	23.2	29.3	11.3	8.2	217	0.35
20 OR MORE	12.0	12.8	9.8	11.2	113	0.93
MEDIAN	7.4	9.4	5.9	3.9		

TABLE 2.5 Experience and Months of Low-Wage Work By Race for Women

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK

	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
WHITE FEMALES	100.0	43.4	26.3	30.4	25,114	
LESS THAN 5	36.6	27.2	39.1	47.8	9,186	1.31
5-9 YEARS	25.8	27.0	27.6	22.5	6,474	0.87
10-19 YEARS	26.8	32.2	23.4	22.0	6,735	0.82
20 OR MORE	10.8	13.6	9.9	7.7	2,720	0.71
MEAN	7.0	9.5	6.5	5.2		
BLACK FEMALES	100.0	34.0	25.7	40.3	3,897	
LESS THAN 5	37.8	27.6	41.6	44.0	1,474	1.16
5-9 YEARS	25.5	30.1	22.3	23.8	996	0.93
10-19 YEARS	27.0	28.1	30.7	23.7	1,051	0.88
20 OR MORE	9.6	14.2	5.4	8.5	376	0.88
MEAN	6.6	9.1	6.2	6.2		
HISPANIC FEMALES	100.0	33.2	28.7	38.2	1,790	
LESS THAN 5	44.4	34.1	48.5	50.2	794	1.13
5-9	24.3	21.1	28.7	23.8	435	0.98
10-19	24.5	34.0	20.2	19.6	439	0.80
20 OR MORE	6.8	10.8	2.6	6.5	122	0.95
MEAN	4.6	8.3	4.7	5.0		
ASIAN FEMALES	100.0	42.0	30.1	27.9	782	
LESS THAN 5	44.4	21.3	68.8	53.0	347	1.19
5-9	25.5	34.9	13.1	24.7	199	0.97
10-19	26.8	37.8	18.2	19.4	209	0.73
20 OR MORE	3.3	6.0	0.0	2.9	26	0.87
MEAN	5.9	8.9	4.5	4.0		

TABLE 2.6: Educational Level and Months of Low-Wage Work By Gender

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE

ALL WORKERS	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
TOTAL	100.0	49.3	23.8	26.8	89,542	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	5.5	3.4	6.9	8.3	4,938	1.500
9-12TH GRADE	11.0	6.8	13.3	16.6	9,862	1.510
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	37.6	34.3	38.9	42.4	33,622	1.128
SOME COLLEGE	25.0	25.4	24.5	24.8	22,385	0.993
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	20.9	30.1	16.5	7.9	18,735	0.377
ALL MALES	100.0	60.9	20.9	18.2	49,219	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	6.4	4.1	9.0	10.8	3,127	1.704
9-12TH GRADE	11.7	8.0	16.2	18.5	5,738	1.588
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	35.0	34.1	37.9	34.9	17,242	0.995
SOME COLLEGE	24.5	24.5	22.3	26.8	12,049	1.096
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	22.5	29.2	14.6	8.9	11,063	0.397
ALL FEMALES	100.0	35.2	27.5	37.3	40,323	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	4.5	1.8	4.9	6.7	1,811	1.502
9-12TH GRADE	10.2	4.3	10.7	15.5	4,124	1.516
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	40.6	34.7	39.7	46.8	16,380	1.152
SOME COLLEGE	25.6	27.1	26.4	23.6	10,337	0.922
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	19.0	32.1	18.2	7.3	7,671	0.382

TABLE 2.6: Educational Level and Months of Low-Wage Work By Race for Men

Percentage for Months of Low Wage Work

	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
WHITE MALES	100.0	63.9	19.7	16.4	40,414	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	4.4	3.1	6.5	7.2	1,795	1.630
9-12TH GRADE	10.9	7.6	15.5	18.4	4,421	1.684
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	35.1	34.1	38.8	34.9	14,202	0.994
SOME COLLEGE	25.3	24.9	23.4	28.9	10,205	1.145
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	24.2	30.4	15.8	10.5	9,791	0.432
BLACK MALES	100.0	44.0	27.2	28.8	4,282	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	11.5	8.5	13.0	14.5	491	1.266
9-12TH GRADE	15.1	9.2	20.0	19.2	644	1.278
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	39.4	37.1	39.6	42.6	1,686	1.081
SOME COLLEGE	21.7	24.7	17.6	20.9	928	0.964
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	12.4	20.4	9.8	2.8	533	0.223
HISPANIC MALES	100.0	46.7	28.3	25.0	3,380	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	21.6	16.5	24.4	28.1	731	1.297
9-12TH GRADE	18.0	16.0	19.1	20.7	610	1.150
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	32.1	35.0	30.4	28.5	1,085	0.889
SOME COLLEGE	18.7	18.4	18.7	19.3	633	1.033
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	9.5	14.1	7.3	3.3	321	0.346
ASIAN MALES	100.0	60.1	17.1	22.8	1,142	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	9.5	2.5	8.7	28.8	109	3.015
9-12TH GRADE	5.5	2.6	9.3	10.3	63	1.861
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	23.5	24.7	28.0	17.3	269	0.734
SOME COLLEGE	24.7	24.9	22.0	26.3	282	1.063
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	36.7	45.3	32.0	17.4	419	0.473

TABLE 2.6: Educational Level and Months of Low-wage Work By Race for Women

Percentage for Months of Low Wage Work						
	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
WHITE FEMALES	100.0	36.4	27.3	36.4	32,400	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	3.2	1.5	2.9	5.2	1,034	1.620
9-12TH GRADE	9.2	3.8	10.4	13.7	2,981	1.486
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	41.3	34.9	40.2	48.6	13,392	1.174
SOME COLLEGE	26.0	27.2	26.1	24.7	8,425	0.949
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	20.3	32.6	20.4	7.9	6,568	0.389
BLACK FEMALES	100.0	29.7	27.5	42.9	4,691	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	5.6	2.9	5.7	7.3	261	1.311
9-12TH GRADE	16.6	6.0	13.7	25.9	780	1.558
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	40.3	35.7	41.4	42.7	1,888	1.060
SOME COLLEGE	24.2	25.4	29.4	20.1	1,137	0.828
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	13.3	30.0	9.9	4.0	625	0.301
HISPANIC FEMALES	100.0	29.1	29.6	41.3	2,312	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	17.7	5.3	20.5	24.4	409	1.378
9-12TH GRADE	12.5	8.9	11.7	15.7	290	1.252
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	35.8	34.8	37.5	35.2	827	0.985
SOME COLLEGE	26.5	32.3	28.1	21.3	612	0.803
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	7.5	18.6	2.2	3.3	172	0.448
ASIAN FEMALES	100.0	38.6	28.8	32.6	922	
8TH GRADE OR LESS	11.7	2.2	27.8	8.8	108	0.752
9-12TH GRADE	7.9	3.6	3.4	17.0	73	2.142
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	29.7	24.1	21.6	43.4	274	1.462
SOME COLLEGE	17.5	20.5	18.2	13.2	161	0.756
COLLEGE GRAD OR MORE	33.2	49.6	29.0	17.5	306	0.528

TABLE 2.7: Job Training and Months of Low-wage Work by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS WHO HAD JOB TRAINING

	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS
ALL WORKERS	18.7	15.3	19.6	24.0
MEN	18.9	14.9	21.5	29.3
WOMEN	17.1	15.8	18.0	17.6
MEN				
WHITE	20.1	15.5	23.4	33.2
BLACK	14.5	11.7	13.6	19.5
HISPANIC	11.7	11.1	13.4	13.8
ASIAN	15.4	9.2	25.0	24.0
WOMEN				
WHITE	17.8	16.6	17.9	19.0
BLACK	16.0	13.7	23.1	13.1
HISPANIC	11.5	9.6	13.9	10.9
ASIAN	10.7	10.9	10.0	11.1

Table 2.8: Firm Size and Months of Low-wage Work by Gender

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE						
ALL WORKERS	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
TOTAL	100.0	48.7	24.0	27.5	93,225	
NO RESPONSE	3.3	1.8	6.8	3.1	3,103	0.92
UNDER 25	21.5	13.5	24.0	33.5	20,066	1.56
25-99 EMPLOYEES	12.5	11.4	13.1	13.9	11,620	1.12
100-499 EMPLOYEES	14.6	14.9	15.1	13.6	13,603	0.93
500-999 EMPLOYEES	4.4	4.5	4.2	4.4	4,083	1.00
1000 OR MORE	43.7	54.0	36.8	31.6	40,749	0.72
ALL MALES	100.0	60.1	21.1	18.9	51,338	
NO RESPONSE	3.2	1.9	6.5	3.6	1,634	1.13
UNDER 25	21.2	13.3	27.0	40.2	10,899	1.90
25-99 EMPLOYEES	13.4	12.6	14.7	14.3	6,869	1.07
100-499 EMPLOYEES	13.0	13.6	12.8	11.4	6,690	0.88
500-999 EMPLOYEES	4.2	4.4	3.5	4.1	2,136	0.98
1000 OR MORE	45.0	54.2	35.5	26.4	23,110	0.59
ALL FEMALES	100.0	34.6	27.5	38.0	41,887	
NO RESPONSE	3.5	1.5	7.1	2.7	1,469	0.77
UNDER 25	21.9	14.1	21.2	29.5	9,167	1.35
25-99 EMPLOYEES	11.3	8.7	11.5	13.7	4,751	1.21
100-499 EMPLOYEES	16.5	17.7	17.3	14.9	6,913	0.90
500-999 EMPLOYEES	4.6	4.6	4.9	4.6	1,947	1.00
1000 OR MORE	42.1	53.5	38.1	34.7	17,640	0.82

Table 2.8: Firm Size and Months of Low-wage Work by Race for Men

Percentage for Months of Low Wage Work						
	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
WHITE MALES	100.0	63.1	19.9	17.0	42,039	
NO RESPONSE	3.1	2.0	6.3	3.7	1,313	1.20
UNDER 25	20.8	13.5	26.9	40.5	8,721	1.95
25-99 EMPLOYEES	13.4	12.6	14.9	14.7	5,634	1.10
100-499 EMPLOYEES	12.9	13.5	12.6	11.2	5,426	0.87
500-999 EMPLOYEES	4.2	4.5	3.6	3.8	1,760	0.91
1000 OR MORE	45.6	54.1	35.7	26.0	19,184	0.57
BLACK MALES	100.0	43.1	27.2	29.7	4,587	
NO RESPONSE	4.7	1.7	10.0	4.0	213	0.85
UNDER 25	20.2	7.2	24.0	35.5	925	1.76
25-99 EMPLOYEES	10.2	10.1	8.6	11.8	468	1.16
100-499 EMPLOYEES	13.6	14.2	13.9	12.4	623	0.91
500-999 EMPLOYEES	4.1	3.2	5.1	4.4	187	1.07
1000 OR MORE	47.3	63.9	38.5	31.8	2,170	0.67
HISPANIC MALES	100.0	46.5	27.9	25.7	3,541	
NO RESPONSE	2.5	1.3	4.3	2.8	90	1.12
UNDER 25	26.9	16.3	28.6	44.0	951	1.64
25-99 EMPLOYEES	16.3	15.8	19.8	13.6	579	0.83
100-499 EMPLOYEES	12.5	13.6	13.1	9.8	442	0.78
500-999 EMPLOYEES	4.4	4.7	1.4	7.0	156	1.59
1000 OR MORE	37.4	48.3	32.8	22.8	1,325	0.61
ASIAN MALES	100.0	59.2	18.1	22.7	1,172	
NO RESPONSE	1.5	-	-	-	17	-
UNDER 25	25.8	15.1	40.5	42.2	303	1.64
25-99 EMPLOYEES	16.1	14.5	19.7	17.2	188	1.07
100-499 EMPLOYEES	17.0	18.4	10.7	18.6	199	1.09
500-999 EMPLOYEES	2.9	-	-	-	34	-
1000 OR MORE	36.7	46.4	23.4	22.1	430	0.60

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.8: Firm Size and Months of Low-wage Work by Race for Women

Percentage for Months of Low Wage Work

	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
WHITE FEMALES	100.0	35.8	27.1	37.1	33,517	
NO RESPONSE	3.2	1.6	6.4	2.6	1,087	0.81
UNDER 25	22.5	15.2	22.6	29.6	7,557	1.31
25-99 EMPLOYEES	11.7	9.0	11.9	14.2	3,917	1.12
100-499 EMPLOYEES	16.9	18.4	17.6	14.9	5,668	0.88
500-999 EMPLOYEES	5.0	4.8	5.2	5.0	1,667	1.00
1000 OR MORE	40.6	51.1	36.3	33.8	13,620	0.83
BLACK FEMALES	100.0	29.0	27.8	43.2	4,964	
NO RESPONSE	4.3	1.6	9.7	2.5	211	0.58
UNDER 25	16.7	4.3	13.0	27.5	830	1.65
25-99 EMPLOYEES	7.6	4.7	7.3	9.6	375	1.26
100-499 EMPLOYEES	13.7	14.1	14.3	13.0	680	0.95
500-999 EMPLOYEES	3.7	3.2	5.2	3.1	185	0.84
1000 OR MORE	54.1	72.3	50.4	44.2	2,683	0.82
HISPANIC FEMALES	100.0	28.1	31.1	40.8	2,454	
NO RESPONSE	5.4	1.7	8.7	5.4	132	1.00
UNDER 25	23.2	11.0	22.0	32.5	570	1.40
25-99 EMPLOYEES	13.5	10.5	12.7	16.3	332	1.20
100-499 EMPLOYEES	14.6	8.2	15.7	18.0	357	1.24
500-999 EMPLOYEES	2.2	4.7	0.8	1.5	53	0.68
1000 OR MORE	41.2	64.0	40.2	26.2	1,010	0.64
ASIAN FEMALES	100.0	37.3	28.6	34.1	952	
NO RESPONSE	4.1	-	12.3	1.8	39	0.44
UNDER 25	22.0	22.7	15.8	26.4	209	1.20
25-99 EMPLOYEES	13.3	11.7	15.4	13.3	127	1.00
100-499 EMPLOYEES	22.0	25.6	23.8	16.5	209	0.75
500-999 EMPLOYEES	4.4	1.3	3.7	8.3	42	1.89
1000 OR MORE	34.3	38.7	29.1	33.8	327	0.99

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.9: Occupational Details with Percent of Labor Force, Percent Low-wage, Percent Female, Wage Ratio of Women to Men

OCCUPATIONS - SUMMARIZED DETAILS
SELECTION IS BASED ON WORKER BEING IN THE OCCUPATION FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS

	TOTAL WORKERS (000's)	% LABOR FORCE	% LOW WAGE 7-12 MONTHS	% OF TOTAL LOW WAGE WORKERS	% FEMALE	WAGE RATIO FEMALE/ MALE	RISK FACTOR
TOTAL	38,449	100.0	24.4	100.0	45.6		
Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations							
Executive, Admin., & Managerial	3,732	9.7	6.5	2.6	36.2	0.67	0.26
Engineers, Architects, Surveyors	537	1.4	3.3	0.2	3.1	0.91	0.13
Math & Computer Scientists	113	0.3	-	-	31.6	0.59	-
Natural Scientists	135	0.4	-	-	13.0	0.92	-
Health Diagnosing Occupations	166	0.4	8.5	0.2	24.1	0.65	0.35
Health Assessment & Treating	1,169	3.0	1.4	0.2	87.8	0.91	0.06
Teachers, Post-Secondary	248	0.6	2.9	0.1	28.3	0.72	0.12
Teachers, exc. Post-Secondary	1,798	4.7	8.2	1.6	67.5	0.86	0.34
Counselors, Educ. & Vocational	104	0.3	-	-	61.1	0.91	-
Librarians, Archivists, & Curators	105	0.3	9.3	0.1	84.2	0.96	0.38
Social Scientists & Urban Planners	51	0.1	-	-	44.4	0.60	-
Social, Recreat., & Religious Workers	473	1.2	23.2	1.2	37.3	1.03	0.95
Lawyers & Judges	317	0.8	1.7	0.1	29.1	0.64	0.07
Writers, Artists, Entertainers, & Athletes	395	1.0	20.2	0.9	43.8	0.90	0.83
Technical, Sales, And Administrative Support							
Health Technicians	566	1.5	11.8	0.7	86.6	1.04	0.48
Engineering Technicians	263	0.7	14.0	0.4	15.2	0.59	0.57
Science & Other Technicians	415	1.1	5.5	0.2	35.7	0.74	0.23
Sales Supervisors & Proprietors	1,180	3.1	13.2	1.7	24.1	0.59	0.54
Sales Rep, Fin. & Bus. Services	493	1.3	14.6	0.8	28.2	0.64	0.60
Sales Rep, Commodities exc. Retail	609	1.6	7.1	0.5	12.5	0.77	0.29
Sales Workers, Retail & Personal	1,693	4.4	63.9	11.5	71.4	0.65	2.62
Admin. Support, Supervisors	179	0.5	7.4	0.1	64.5	0.78	0.30
Computer Equipment Operators	143	0.4	25.4	0.4	54.2	0.69	1.04
Secretaries & Typists	2,415	6.3	23.0	5.9	98.6	0.70	0.94
Information Clerks	299	0.8	42.0	1.3	88.9	0.54	1.72
Records Processing, Exc. Financial	148	0.4	24.3	0.4	84.0	1.02	1.00
Financial Records Processing	754	2.0	27.4	2.2	95.1	0.94	1.12
Communications Equipment Operators	97	0.3	37.2	0.4	94.1	1.07	1.53
Mail & Message Distribution	462	1.2	8.0	0.4	21.2	0.89	0.33
Material Recording, Scheduling, & Distributing Clerks	551	1.4	19.9	1.2	38.0	0.79	0.82
Adjustors & Investigators	221	0.6	16.4	0.4	80.6	0.61	0.67
Misc. Administrative Support	949	2.5	42.9	4.3	93.5	0.78	1.76
Service Occupations							
Private Household Occupations	236	0.6	89.2	2.2	-	-	-
Firefighting Prevention	124	0.3	21.4	0.3	-	-	-
Police & Detectives	306	0.8	2.1	0.1	10.2	0.75	0.09
Guards	381	1.0	42.4	1.7	11.5	0.88	1.74
Food Prep & Services	1,600	4.2	70.0	12.0	67.3	0.78	2.87
Health Services	983	2.6	59.5	6.2	89.2	0.84	2.44
Cleaning & Building Services	1,102	2.9	54.1	6.4	50.3	0.74	2.22
Personal Services	983	1.0	69.7	3.0	84.8	0.81	2.86

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.9: Occupational Details with Percent of Labor Force, Percent Low-wage, Percent Female, Wage Ratio of Women to Men (cont'd)

OCCUPATIONS - SUMMARIZED DETAILS
SELECTION IS BASED ON WORKER BEING IN THE OCCUPATION FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS

	TOTAL WORKERS (000's)	% LABOR FORCE	% LOW WAGE 7-12 MONTHS	% OF TOTAL LOW WAGE WORKERS	FEMALE	WAGE RATIO FEMALE/ MALE	RISK FACTOR
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing Occupations							
Farm Occupations exc. Managerial	333	0.9	83.6	3.0	12.1	1.00	3.43
Related Agricultural Occupations	231	0.6	41.5	1.0	-	-	1.70
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair Occupations							
Supervisors, Mechanics & Repairers	94	0.2	10.9	0.1	6.3	1.51	0.45
Mechanics - Vehicles	601	1.6	15.5	1.0	-	-	0.64
Mechanics - Industrial	252	0.7	5.2	0.1	2.3	0.79	0.21
Mechanics - Electronics & Electrical	238	0.6	-	-	5.4	0.57	-
Mechanics - Heating & A/C	119	0.3	9.7	0.1	-	-	0.40
Mechanics - Others	268	0.7	10.2	0.3	4.5	0.75	0.42
Supervisors - Construction	61	0.2	6.6	-	-	-	0.27
Construction Trades - Carpenters, Brickmasons, Plumbers, etc.	1,272	3.3	9.3	1.3	0.5	0.53	0.38
Extraction Occupations	60	0.2	16.9	0.1	-	-	0.48
Precision Production	643	1.7	1.1	0.1	10.9	0.74	0.14
Precision Metal	472	1.2	4.7	0.2	1.2	0.80	0.19
Precision Textile	67	0.2	48.8	0.3	50.0	0.99	2.00
Precision Assorted Material	201	0.5	25.5	0.6	75.0	0.68	1.04
Precision Food Production	172	0.4	18.9	0.4	13.8	0.62	0.78
Plant & System Operators	61	0.2	-	-	-	-	-
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers							
Metal & Plastics Machine Operators	266	0.7	16.3	0.5	22.2	0.81	0.67
Printing Machine Operators	321	0.8	6.5	0.2	15.7	0.65	0.27
Textile & Apparel Operators	782	2.0	58.9	4.9	90.0	0.83	2.42
Machine Oper. Assorted Material	846	2.2	18.4	1.7	34.3	0.64	0.76
Fabricators, Assemblers, & Handwork.	821	2.1	9.5	0.8	28.6	0.67	0.39
Production Inspectors & Testers	390	1.0	17.2	0.7	62.5	0.65	0.71
Motor Vehicle Operators	1,478	3.8	25.3	4.0	7.9	0.67	1.04
Railroad Operators	79	0.2	5.8	0.1	-	-	0.24
Supervisors & Engineers, Material Moving Equip.	66	0.2	-	-	-	-	-
Material Moving Equip. Operators	332	0.9	13.3	0.5	3.8	1.35	0.54
Helpers - Construction	45	0.1	27.1	0.1	-	-	1.11
Construction Laborers	109	0.3	19.5	0.2	-	-	0.80
Freight, Stock, Material Handlers	578	1.5	48.3	3.0	11.6	0.88	1.98
Garage & Service Station	72	0.2	-	0.8	-	-	4.10
Vehicle Washers & Equip. Cleaners	103	0.3	78.6	0.9	20.0	1.27	3.22
Handpackers & Packagers	84	0.2	40.2	0.4	87.5	1.09	1.65
Laborers, Except Construction	199	0.5	12.4	0.3	22.6	0.80	0.51
Member of the Armed Forces	592	1.5	7.4	0.5	5.2	0.73	0.30
Others (N.E.C. and Misc.)	224	0.6	15.5	0.4	9.5		0.06

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.10: Occupational Summary and Months of Low-wage Work by Gender

Percentage of Workers	0-1 Months Low-wage in Occupation	7-12 Months Low-wage in Occupation	% of Total Low-wage Workers	Risk Factor
All Workers	53.0	22.6	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	76.9	6.6	6.5	0.51
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	46.6	25.7	25.4	0.80
Service Occupations	20.5	51.1	50.7	3.65
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	69.9	10.2	10.2	0.86
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	50.0	22.9	7.2	0.78
Transportation & Material Moving	43.4	26.8	2.7	0.31
Member of the Armed Forces	72.2	7.9	0.6	0.66
All Men	64.7	14.7	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	83.7	4.7	7.5	0.32
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	66.3	13.7	18.7	0.93
Service Occupations	32.7	37.5	29.2	2.55
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	72.1	9.1	12.3	0.62
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	66.7	11.1	7.2	0.75
Transportation & Material Moving	44.9	25.1	24.3	1.70
Member of the Armed Forces	72.6	8.5	0.9	0.58
All Women	39.0	32.2	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	68.7	8.8	6.3	0.27
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	36.1	32.1	45.1	0.98
Service Occupations	10.4	62.2	32.2	1.91
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	46.7	22.6	1.5	0.68
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	28.4	38.3	10.3	1.17
Transportation & Material Moving	33.3	37.7	3.1	1.16
Member of the Armed Forces	66.7	-	-	-

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.10: Occupational Summary and Months of Low-wage Work by Race for Men

Percentage of Workers	0-1 Months Low-wage in Occupation	7-12 Months Low-wage in Occupation	% of Total Low-wage Workers	Risk Factor
White Males	67.4	13.4	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	84.1	4.7	4.7	0.35
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	68.4	12.7	19.5	0.95
Service Occupations	36.2	36.1	26.9	2.69
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	73.4	8.8	13.6	0.66
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	70.1	9.5	6.4	0.71
Transportation & Material Moving	46.7	24.2	24.0	1.80
Member of the Armed Forces	70.5	8.0	0.8	0.59
Black Males	47.7	22.7	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	81.9	4.2	2.1	0.18
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	45.3	26.2	19.7	1.16
Service Occupations	25.4	33.3	26.8	1.47
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	52.9	11.8	7.0	0.52
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	48.7	25.7	13.4	1.13
Transportation & Material Moving	42.4	27.2	28.9	1.20
Member of the Armed Forces	73.9	13.0	2.1	0.57
Hispanic Males	48.4	22.1	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	68.5	9.3	5.2	0.42
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	53.0	15.2	10.4	0.68
Service Occupations	20.2	48.3	44.8	2.18
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	67.1	11.8	10.4	0.53
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	60.3	8.6	5.2	0.39
Transportation & Material Moving	32.5	28.8	24.0	1.30
Member of the Armed Forces	-	-	-	-
Asian Males	62.4	17.6	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	84.1	-	-	-
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	71.4	11.9	16.7	0.67
Service Occupations	22.2	50.0	60.0	2.83
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	87.0	4.3	3.3	0.25
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	38.5	15.4	6.7	0.87
Transportation & Material Moving	25.0	50.0	13.3	2.83
Member of the Armed Forces	-	-	-	-

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.10: Occupational Summary and Months of Low-wage Work by Race for Women

Percentage of Workers				
	0-1 Months Low-wage in Occupation	7-12 Months Low-wage in Occupation	% of Total Low-wage Workers	Risk Factor
White Females	39.9	31.2	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	68.4	8.4	6.8	0.27
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	35.7	32.5	49.2	1.04
Service Occupations	9.5	61.9	30.3	1.98
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	47.4	21.9	1.5	0.70
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	31.6	37.4	9.1	1.20
Transportation & Material Moving	35.0	38.7	3.1	1.24
Member of the Armed Forces	66.7	-	-	-
Black Females	34.5	35.9	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	66.4	10.9	4.9	0.30
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	39.9	29.9	30.6	0.83
Service Occupations	15.0	59.0	44.5	1.65
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	60.0	30.0	2.3	0.84
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	18.1	37.1	14.7	1.04
Transportation & Material Moving	29.2	33.3	3.0	0.93
Member of the Armed Forces	-	-	-	-
Hispanic Women	32.4	32.1	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	75.0	10.0	3.9	0.31
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	31.1	23.0	33.3	0.72
Service Occupations	8.3	70.0	41.2	2.18
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	40.0	-	-	-
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	29.2	39.6	18.6	1.23
Transportation & Material Moving	33.3	25.0	2.9	0.78
Member of the Armed Forces	-	-	-	-
Asian Women	41.4	27.1	100.0	
Managerial & Professional	83.9	6.5	5.6	0.24
Tech., Sales & Administrative Support	47.2	22.6	33.3	0.84
Service Occupations	8.3	45.8	30.6	1.69
Precision Production Craft, & Repair	-	33.3	5.6	1.23
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers	13.3	46.7	19.4	1.72
Transportation & Material Moving	-	50.0	5.6	1.85
Member of the Armed Forces	-	-	-	-

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.11: Industrial Summary and Months of Low-wage Work by Gender

Percentage for Months of Low Wage Work

	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
All Workers	100.0	51.0	21.8	27.2	84,090	-
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	0.8	1.1	0.7	0.1	633	0.16
Construction	4.7	5.1	5.9	3.1	3,967	0.69
Manufacturing	24.3	30.3	21.6	15.3	20,466	0.63
Transport.,Commun.,Public Util.	7.4	10.6	5.5	3.0	6,224	0.40
Wholesale	4.3	4.8	4.8	3.0	3,616	0.70
Retail	16.7	8.0	15.7	33.9	14,062	2.02
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	6.3	6.4	7.2	5.6	5,330	0.88
Business Services	4.3	3.4	5.2	5.2	3,598	1.21
Personal Services	2.7	0.6	2.6	6.6	2,225	2.49
Entertainment	0.9	0.5	0.9	1.5	730	1.70
Professional Services	21.5	20.6	24.8	20.6	18,089	0.96
Public Administration	5.2	7.4	4.4	1.7	4,383	0.34
Armed Forces	0.9	1.3	0.8	0.3	768	0.31
All Males	100.0	63.1	19.0	17.9	46,261	
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	1.2	1.4	1.2	0.2	535	0.16
Construction	7.9	7.2	10.8	7.8	3,647	0.99
Manufacturing	29.3	34.6	23.9	16.1	13,540	0.55
Transport.,Commun., Public Util.	10.1	12.1	8.7	4.9	4,693	0.48
Wholesale	5.7	5.7	6.7	4.9	2,649	0.86
Retail	14.7	8.5	16.8	34.2	6,803	2.33
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	4.3	4.6	3.8	3.5	1,978	0.83
Business Services	4.8	3.3	5.9	8.8	2,228	1.83
Personal Services	1.0	0.4	1.7	2.8	485	2.66
Entertainment	1.0	0.6	1.2	2.5	478	2.38
Professional Services	12.5	12.4	13.9	11.2	5,766	0.90
Public Administration	5.9	7.5	4.1	2.2	2,739	0.38
Armed Forces	1.6	1.8	1.5	0.8	720	0.51
All Females	100.0	36.1	25.3	38.6	37,830	
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.1	98	0.29
Construction	0.8	0.6	1.4	0.7	319	0.78
Manufacturing	18.3	21.2	19.4	14.9	6,927	0.81
Transport.,Commun., Public Util.	4.0	7.4	2.5	1.9	1,531	0.46
Wholesale	2.6	2.9	3.0	1.9	966	0.75
Retail	19.2	6.9	14.8	33.6	7,259	1.75
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	8.9	10.1	10.4	6.7	3,352	0.76
Business Services	3.6	3.5	4.6	3.1	1,369	0.86
Personal Services	4.6	1.0	3.5	8.8	1,739	1.90
Entertainment	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.9	252	1.37
Professional Services	32.6	38.0	34.8	26.0	12,324	0.80
Public Administration	4.3	7.2	4.7	1.5	1,644	0.34
Armed Forces	0.1	-	-	-	48	-

Table 2.11: Industrial Summary and Months of Low-wage Work by Race for Men

Percentage for Months of Low Wage Work

	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
White Males	100.0	66.0	17.9	16.1	38,084	
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	1.3	1.6	1.4	0.3	510	0.19
Construction	8.3	7.4	11.6	8.5	3,163	1.03
Manufacturing	29.5	34.7	23.7	15.0	11,246	0.51
Transport.,Commun., Public Util.	10.1	11.9	8.5	4.9	3,863	0.49
Wholesale	6.0	5.8	7.3	5.4	2,296	0.90
Retail	14.1	8.6	16.3	34.3	5,363	2.42
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	4.1	4.4	3.7	3.3	1,558	0.81
Business Services	4.5	3.3	5.5	8.3	1,720	1.84
Personal Services	0.9	0.4	1.3	2.6	334	2.92
Entertainment	1.0	0.5	1.1	2.7	371	2.78
Professional Services	12.6	12.6	13.5	11.6	4,805	0.92
Public Administration	6.1	7.5	4.6	2.3	2,331	0.37
Armed Forces	1.4	1.5	1.6	0.8	525	0.58
Black Males	100.0	46.4	24.8	28.8		
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	0.2	0.2	0.4	-	8	-
Construction	5.6	3.5	9.6	5.7	226	1.02
Manufacturing	26.7	32.4	21.9	21.7	1,072	0.81
Transport., Commun., Public Util	11.4	15.7	9.6	5.9	456	0.52
Wholesale	3.4	3.8	2.2	4.0	138	1.16
Retail	16.3	6.0	18.1	31.3	653	1.92
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	5.0	6.8	3.5	3.4	199	0.68
Business Services	6.7	3.8	7.5	10.8	270	1.61
Personal Services	1.6	-	3.0	3.0	64	1.86
Entertainment	0.7	1.0	1.1	-	29	-
Professional Services	12.1	10.7	17.8	9.4	485	0.78
Public Administration	6.6	10.3	3.3	3.4	264	0.52
Armed Forces	3.8	6.1	2.2	1.4	151	0.37
Hispanic Males	100.0	49.7	25.7	24.6	3,066	
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	0.6	0.8	0.7	-	17	-
Construction	7.4	9.9	7.1	2.7	226	0.36
Manufacturing	31.1	39.0	29.9	17.4	960	0.56
Transport. Commun., Public Util.	10.3	12.7	10.6	5.1	315	0.50
Wholesale	5.0	4.4	6.9	4.2	153	0.85
Retail	16.5	8.1	16.2	33.8	505	2.05
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	4.4	4.3	4.9	3.9	134	0.90
Business Services	6.8	4.0	7.5	11.7	209	1.72
Personal Services	1.8	0.5	2.8	3.6	55	1.98
Entertainment	2.3	1.1	2.2	5.0	72	2.13
Professional Services	10.1	9.2	10.2	11.8	310	1.17
Public Administration	3.0	5.1	1.0	0.9	92	0.29
Armed Forces	0.6	1.2	-	-	18	-
Asian Males	100.0	59.2	18.1	22.7	1,095	
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	-	-	-	-	-	-
Construction	2.9	3.8	3.5	-	32	-
Manufacturing	23.9	28.4	17.8	15.7	262	0.66
Transport. Commun., Public Util	5.4	7.7	3.7	-	59	-
Wholesale	5.7	6.6	9.4	-	62	-
Retail	25.7	14.7	29.0	55.8	282	2.17
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	7.9	8.1	5.3	9.5	87	1.21
Business Services	2.7	1.8	3.2	4.6	29	1.74
Personal Services	2.9	1.8	3.0	6.1	31	2.12
Entertainment	0.6	0.9	-	-	6	-
Professional Services	15.1	15.3	22.4	8.3	165	0.55
Public Administration	4.8	7.0	2.7	-	53	-
Armed Forces	2.4	4.0	-	-	27	-

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.11: Industrial Summary and Months of Low-wage Work by Race for Women

Percentage for Months of Low Wage Work

	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	NUMBER (000's)	RISK FACTOR
White Females	100.0	37.2	25.2	37.7	30,382	
Agric., Forestry, & Mining	0.3	0.6	0.2	0.1	87	0.18
Construction	1.0	0.8	1.5	0.8	288	0.79
Manufacturing	17.6	20.9	19.0	13.5	5,355	0.77
Transport., Commun., Public Util.	4.1	7.2	2.9	1.7	1,232	0.41
Wholesale	2.8	3.2	3.4	2.0	846	0.71
Retail	19.9	7.1	15.1	35.7	6,039	1.80
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	9.2	10.3	10.5	7.4	2,808	0.80
Business Services	3.6	3.9	4.2	2.9	1,089	0.81
Personal Services	3.7	0.8	2.8	7.3	1,127	1.95
Entertainment	0.8	0.5	0.6	1.1	230	1.47
Professional Services	33.3	38.6	35.5	26.6	10,115	0.80
Public Administration	3.7	5.9	4.2	1.1	1,118	0.30
Armed Forces	0.2	0.3	0.2	-	48	-
Black Females	100.0	31.2	25.0	43.8		
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	0.1	-	0.6	-	7	-
Construction	0.3	-	1.0	0.2	15	0.69
Manufacturing	20.6	21.2	21.8	19.6	934	0.95
Transport., Commun., Public Util.	4.5	9.7	0.5	3.1	205	0.69
Wholesale	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.1	53	0.90
Retail	15.2	4.4	13.9	23.7	689	1.56
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	6.4	6.5	10.4	4.1	289	0.64
Business Services	3.5	0.6	6.6	3.9	160	1.10
Personal Services	8.3	2.3	4.1	15.0	375	1.81
Entertainment	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.3	22	0.57
Professional Services	31.3	47.7	32.6	25.6	1,410	0.82
Public Administration	8.2	15.7	6.9	3.6	372	0.43
Armed Forces	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hispanic Females	100.0	30.4	28.4	41.2	2,140	
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	-	-	-	-	-	-
Construction	0.3	-	1.0	-	6	-
Manufacturing	22.7	29.6	20.4	19.3	487	0.85
Transport., Commun., Public Util	3.2	8.3	-	1.7	69	0.52
Wholesale	1.5	0.9	1.0	2.4	33	1.55
Retail	17.6	8.4	12.3	28.1	377	1.59
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	8.7	11.5	10.6	5.3	186	0.61
Business Services	4.3	3.4	5.9	3.8	92	0.89
Personal Services	7.7	1.3	6.3	13.4	165	1.74
Entertainment	-	-	- -	-	-	-
Professional Services	27.7	25.3	35.5	24.1	593	0.87
Public Administration	6.0	11.3	7.0	1.4	129	0.24
Armed Forces	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asian Females	100.0	37.9	27.0	35.0	776	
Agriculture Forestry, & Mining	-	-	-	-	-	-
Construction	1.3	-	2.2	2.0	10	1.54
Manufacturing	19.4	14.8	22.1	22.3	151	1.15
Transport., Commun., Public Util.	3.2	3.5	4.7	1.6	25	0.51
Wholesale	4.4	5.0	3.5	4.6	34	1.03
Retail	19.7	6.8	15.4	37.0	153	1.88
Finance, Ins, Real Estate	8.9	16.2	6.6	2.7	69	0.30
Business Services	3.7	3.8	2.6	4.5	29	1.22
Personal Services	9.4	1.5	17.6	11.8	73	1.25
Entertainment	-	-	-	-	-	-
Professional Services	26.6	43.8	22.0	11.4	206	0.43
Public Administration	3.4	4.5	3.3	2.1	26	0.63
Armed Forces	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.12: Percent of Workers Covered by Labor Union Contract and Months of Low-wage Work by Race, Ethnicity and Gender

	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000'S)
All Workers	19.9	28.6	17.3	6.5	88,999
Working Men	24.3	31.7	19.0	6.3	48,770
White	24.0	30.1	18.9	6.8	40,101
Black	28.8	48.9	21.7	6.3	4,198
Hispanic	23.6	38.7	16.4	3.2	3,369
Asian	21.7	29.5	19.9	3.1	1,103
Working Women	14.6	22.2	15.8	6.6	40,229
White	13.3	19.8	14.5	6.1	32,279
Black	21.6	39.9	21.8	8.9	4,737
Hispanic	19.4	34.7	18.6	9.0	2,317
Asian	9.8	7.1	20.0	5.4	896

Table 2.13: Annual Weeks Worked and Months of Low-wage Work by Gender

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK

	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	Risk Factor
All Workers	100.0	48.6	23.9	27.5	93,219	
1-13 Weeks	0.8	0.3	2.4	0.1	701	0.09
14-26 Weeks	5.6	2.3	16.9	1.6	5,229	0.28
27-39 Weeks	9.7	3.6	12.2	18.3	9,045	1.89
40-47 Weeks	9.3	3.6	11.6	17.5	8,672	1.88
48-49 Weeks	4.2	2.7	4.8	6.3	3,883	1.50
50-52 Weeks	70.5	87.5	52.2	56.3	65,689	0.80
Median Weeks	52	52	50	51		
Median Annual Hours	2005	2080	1880	1692		
All Males	100.0	60.1	21.0	18.9	51,332	
1-13 Weeks	0.7	0.3	2.6	0.1	382	0.09
14-26 Weeks	4.6	2.1	14.9	1.2	2,379	0.27
27-39 Weeks	8.1	3.4	12.6	18.0	4,154	2.22
40-47 Weeks	8.0	3.3	12.1	18.0	4,082	2.27
48-49 Weeks	4.0	2.6	5.2	7.0	2,037	1.77
50-52 Weeks	74.6	88.3	52.6	55.7	38,298	0.75
Median Weeks	52	52	50	51		
Median Annual Hours	2080	2080	2000	1820		
All Females	100.0	34.6	27.5	38.0	41,887	
1-13 Weeks	0.8	0.4	2.2	0.1	319	0.09
14-26 Weeks	6.8	2.8	18.8	1.8	2,850	0.26
27-39 Weeks	11.7	4.1	11.7	18.5	4,891	1.59
40-47 Weeks	11.0	4.1	11.1	17.1	4,590	1.56
48-49 Weeks	4.4	2.9	4.4	5.8	1,846	1.32
50-52 Weeks	65.4	85.8	51.8	56.7	27,391	0.87
Median Weeks	52	52	50	51		
Median Annual Hours	1914	2080	1760	1634		

Table 2.13: Annual Weeks Worked and Months of Low-wage Work by Race for Men

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK						
	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	Risk Factor
White Males	100.0	63.2	19.8	17.0	42,033	
1-13 Weeks	0.6	0.3	2.3	0.1	260	0.15
14-26 Weeks	4.2	1.9	14.0	1.1	1,756	0.25
27-39 Weeks	7.5	3.1	13.4	17.0	3,154	2.27
40-47 Weeks	7.9	3.4	12.2	19.6	3,316	2.49
48-49 Weeks	3.8	2.5	5.2	7.3	1,614	1.89
50-52 Weeks	76.0	88.9	52.9	55.0	31,933	0.72
Median Weeks	52	52	50	51		
Median Annual Hours	2080	2080	2000	1760		
Black Males	100.0	43.1	27.2	29.7	4,587	
1-13 Weeks	1.2	0.4	3.7	0.0	54	0.00
14-26 Weeks	7.8	3.2	20.1	3.2	358	0.41
27-39 Weeks	12.6	5.6	14.0	21.4	576	1.70
40-47 Weeks	8.8	3.4	12.7	13.0	402	1.48
48-49 Weeks	3.9	1.4	5.3	6.0	176	1.56
50-52 Weeks	65.9	86.0	44.3	56.4	3,021	0.86
Median Weeks	52	52	46	52		
Median Annual Hours	2080	2080	1848	1920		
Hispanic Males	100.0	46.5	27.9	25.7	3,541	
1-13 Weeks	1.9	1.0	5.3	0.0	69	0.00
14-26 Weeks	5.8	3.5	15.2	0.0	207	0.00
27-39 Weeks	9.6	6.3	6.8	18.6	340	1.94
40-47 Weeks	8.4	3.4	10.0	15.9	299	1.88
48-49 Weeks	6.4	5.3	6.6	8.0	226	1.26
50-52 Weeks	67.8	80.5	56.1	57.5	2,402	0.57
Median Weeks	52	52	52	52		
Median Annual Hours	2080	2080	2080	2014		
Asian Males	100.0	59.2	18.1	22.7	1,172	
1-13 Weeks	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-
14-26 Weeks	4.9	3.9	14.6	0.0	58	0.00
27-39 Weeks	7.3	2.1	3.1	24.0	85	3.31
40-47 Weeks	5.6	2.2	12.6	9.1	66	1.62
48-49 Weeks	1.7	2.2	0.0	2.1	20	1.18
50-52 Weeks	80.4	89.7	69.7	64.8	942	0.81
Median Weeks	52	52	52	52		
Median Annual Hours	2080	2080	2080	1960		

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

Table 2.13: Annual Weeks Worked and Months of Low-wage Work by Race for Women

PERCENTAGE FOR MONTHS OF LOW-WAGE WORK						
	TOTAL	0-1 MONTHS	2-6 MONTHS	7-12 MONTHS	NUMBER (000's)	Risk Factor
White Females	100.0	35.8	27.1	37.1	33,517	
1-13 Weeks	0.6	0.4	1.6	0.1	205	0.14
14-26 Weeks	6.2	2.4	17.5	1.7	2,087	0.27
27-39 Weeks	12.0	4.2	12.4	19.1	4,005	1.60
40-47 Weeks	10.9	4.5	10.8	17.1	3,640	1.57
48-49 Weeks	4.5	3.1	4.4	5.9	1,493	1.31
50-52 Weeks	65.9	85.5	53.3	56.2	22,087	0.85
Median Weeks	52	52	51	51		
Median Annual Hours	1910	2080	1769	1578		
Black Females	100.0	29.0	27.8	43.2	4,964	
1-13 Weeks	1.1	0.0	4.0	0.0	55	0.00
14-26 Weeks	8.9	3.6	25.9	1.6	442	0.18
27-39 Weeks	9.8	2.2	8.0	16.2	488	1.64
40-47 Weeks	10.9	2.1	9.9	17.5	542	1.60
48-49 Weeks	3.2	0.9	3.6	4.4	157	1.39
50-52 Weeks	66.1	91.2	48.6	60.4	3,280	0.91
Median Weeks	52	52	49	51		
Median Annual Hours	1941	2080	1814	1744		
Hispanic Females	100.0	28.1	31.1	40.8	2,454	
1-13 Weeks	1.8	0.0	5.6	0.0	43	0.00
14-26 Weeks	9.4	5.6	19.9	4.1	231	0.43
27-39 Weeks	10.4	4.8	9.9	14.6	255	1.41
40-47 Weeks	13.0	2.9	19.0	15.3	318	1.18
48-49 Weeks	5.9	4.1	4.3	8.3	144	1.41
50-52 Weeks	59.6	82.5	41.4	57.8	1,463	0.97
Median Weeks	52	52	45	51		
Median Annual Hours	1905	2080	1708	1740		
Asian Females	100.0	37.3	28.6	34.1	952	
1-13 Weeks	1.7	1.6	3.6	0.0	16	0.00
14-26 Weeks	9.5	7.8	22.9	0.0	90	0.00
27-39 Weeks	15.0	7.7	15.0	23.0	143	1.53
40-47 Weeks	9.6	1.7	3.7	23.0	91	2.41
48-49 Weeks	5.4	1.8	9.0	6.4	51	1.18
50-52 Weeks	59.0	79.5	45.8	47.6	561	0.81
Median Weeks	52	52	48	49		
Median Annual Hours	1922	2080	1665	1840		

Note: The percentages for cells with too few observations to calculate accurately are omitted.

TABLE 2.14: Upward Wage Mobility by Months of Low-Wage Work for Workers Paid by Hourly Wages

Wage Increases - Percentage for Months of Low-Wage Work					
ALL WORKERS	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	Number (000's)
Constant or decrease	35.9	34.3	33.4	36.3	14,412
Less than 10% increase	39.5	46.0	37.5	32.8	15,838
10-15% Increase	8.2	7.8	8.1	8.6	3,281
15-20% Increase	4.2	3.9	3.8	4.6	1,666
Wages increase over 20	12.3	7.9	17.2	14.6	4,918
Mean Starting Wage		9.94	6.59	4.24	40,115
WORKING MEN					
Constant or decrease	37.4	36.2	35.4	42.2	8,050
Less than 10% increase	37.4	43.9	32.1	25.9	8,042
10-15% Increase	7.9	7.6	8.1	8.6	1,706
15-20% Increase	3.8	3.8	3.2	4.2	807
Wages increase over 20%	13.5	8.6	21.2	19.0	2,913
Mean Starting Wage	8.39	10.51	7.00	4.30	21,518
WORKING WOMEN					
Constant or decrease	34.2	29.7	31.4	37.9	6,363
Less than 10% increase	41.9	51.1	43.2	36.5	7,797
10-15% increase	8.5	8.5	8.1	8.6	1,576
15-20% Increase	4.6	4.3	4.4	4.9	859
Wages increase over 20%	10.8	6.3	12.9	12.2	2,005
Mean Starting Wage	5.86	8.62	6.18	4.21	18,600

Note: Wages for January 1984 and December 1984 were compared for workers paid hourly wages. Salary workers were excluded due to the some fluctuation of the calculated monthly wages. Percent for Table 2.14 are calculated down the columns of the months of low-wage work.

Table 2.14: Upward Wage Mobility by Months of Low-Wage Work for Workers Paid Hourly Wages

Percentage for Months of Low-Wage Work

WHITE MEN	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	Number (000's)
Constant or decrease	36.7	36.0	33.2	41.7	6,278
Less than 10% increase	37.8	43.2	33.4	26.7	6,456
10-15% Increase	8.5	8.1	9.3	8.8	1,447
15-20% Increase	3.6	3.8	2.9	4.0	622
Wages increase over 20%	13.4	9.0	21.3	18.8	2,290
Mean Starting Wage	8.55	10.56	7.03	4.33	
BLACK MEN					
Constant or decrease	46.6	40.0	43.8	59.0	991
Less than 10% increase	31.5	44.1	33.1	11.3	669
10-15% Increase	4.8	2.7	4.6	8.1	102
15-20% Increase	6.5	6.1	5.9	7.7	139
Wages increase over 20%	10.6	7.1	12.7	13.9	225
Mean Starting Wage	7.48	9.90	7.00	4.16	
HISPANIC MEN					
Constant or decrease	34.1	32.7	44.2	26.6	639
Less than 10% increase	40.3	52.5	25.9	33.8	756
10-15% Increase	6.7	5.7	5.0	10.1	126
15-20% Increase	2.1	2.2	2.8	1.2	39
Wages increase over 20%	16.8	6.9	22.1	28.3	315
Mean Starting Wage	7.85	10.55	6.96	4.31	
ASIAN MEN					
Constant or decrease	33.7	41.0	7.4	37.4	143
Less than 10% increase	37.9	43.2	13.8	44.1	160
10-15% Increase	7.3	11.1	7.3	0.0	31
15-20% Increase	1.5	0.0	0.0	5.3	6
Wages increase over 20%	19.7	4.6	71.5	13.3	83
Mean Starting Wage	7.87	10.41	5.70	3.88	

Table 2.14: Upward Wage Mobility and Months of Low-Wage Work by Race for Women

Percentage for Months of Low-Wage Work		Details for Working Women by Race			
WHITE WOMEN	TOTAL	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	Number (000's)
Constant or decrease	33.6	29.6	30.6	37.0	4,922
Less than 10% increase	43.1	51.3	45.4	37.6	6,319
10-15% Increase	8.4	9.0	7.7	8.3	1,224
15-20% Increase	4.6	4.1	4.4	4.9	672
Wages increase over 20%	10.4	6.0	12.0	12.1	1,524
Mean Starting Wage	5.86	8.63	6.13	4.21	
BLACK WOMEN					
Constant or decrease	39.1	35.5	35.5	42.1	936
Less than 10% increase	35.8	43.8	33.6	32.9	858
10-15% Increase	9.3	6.8	12.7	9.1	222
15-20% Increase	4.4	7.5	2.7	3.6	105
Wages increase over 20%	11.5	6.4	15.4	12.4	276
Mean Starting Wage	5.72	8.27	6.29	4.26	
HISPANIC WOMEN					
Constant or decrease	35.2	23.7	40.0	38.6	417
Less than 10% increase	35.1	56.5	27.5	27.8	416
10-15% Increase	10.9	8.4	7.3	14.2	129
15-20% Increase	5.2	2.3	7.0	5.7	61
Wages increase over 20%	13.7	9.0	18.3	13.7	162
Mean Starting Wage	5.80	8.45	6.34	4.09	
ASIAN WOMEN					
Constant or decrease	24.7	14.3	7.1	38.0	88
Less than 10% increase	57.2	72.4	72.0	42.7	204
10-15% Increase	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
15-20% Increase	5.9	0.0	5.8	9.1	21
Wages increase over 20%	12.2	13.3	15.2	10.2	43
Mean Starting Wage	6.70	10.48	7.02	4.43	

TABLE 2.15: Receipt of Government Transfers and Months of Low-wage Work By Gender, Race and Ethnicity

Percent for Months of Low-wage work

	Total	0-1 Months	2-6 Months	7-12 Months	(000'S) Number
All Workers	5.4	1.4	6.8	11.3	91,916
Working Men	4.1	1.4	6.2	10.6	50,279
White	3.7	1.2	5.9	10.3	41,301
Black	6.9	2.1	7.6	12.9	4,412
Hispanic	3.4	2.8	5.7	3.2	1,120
Asian	6.2	2.2	7.6	12.2	3,447
Working Women	7.0	1.5	7.3	11.7	41,636
White	5.5	1.5	5.2	9.5	33,318
Black	17.0	2.4	19.9	25.1	4,948
Hispanic	3.0	2.7	2.3	3.9	929
Asian	8.8	0.0	11.1	13.1	2,442

TABLE 2.16: The Working Poor: Summary by Gender of Employment History and Human Capital

	ALL WORKERS	WORKERS WHO LIVE IN POVERTY	WORKING MEN	WORKING WOMEN	POOR WORKING MEN	POOR WORKING WOMEN
Percent Low-Wage 7 months or more	27.5	66.7	18.8	37.9	65.3	70.0
Percent Non-Whites	19.0	43.36	18.1	20.0	40.3	46.3
Median Age	34.0	30.0	34.0	34.0	29.0	30.0
Percent with Education beyond High School	35.6	22.8	36.2	35.0	26.3	19.5
Mean Years of Experience at same type of job	8.3	4.9	9.3	7.0	4.8	5.0
Percentage with Job Training	18.7	2.3	18.9	17.1	2.7	2.0
Mean Number of Weeks of Work in 1984	47.2	41.5	47.9	46.3	43.0	39.0
Median Numbers of Annual Hours	1,865	1,138	2,003	1,699	1,370	1,040
Percent in Service Occupations	13.9	26.6	11.5	16.8	13.0	39.7
Percent in Technical, Sales and Admin. Support	31.8	15.2	20.1	45.9	8.5	21.7
Percent in Blue Collar	30.0	29.9	43.6	12.8	48.6	11.9
Percent in Retail or Service Industries (excluding professional)	24.6	39.3	13.0	28.1	32.4	60.7
Percent in Small Firms	21.5	50.0	21.2	21.9	55.4	44.8
Percent Receiving Public Assist.	5.4	40.5	4.1	7.0	30.9	49.8
Percent with Children	48.5	66.6	48.6	48.3	63.4	69.6
Earnings	13,550	3,929	18,250	9,968	4,500	3,595
Spouse's Earning (if Applicable	14,807	3,452	10,632	20,582	2,262	3,982
Median Annual Wage	6.80	3.40	8.47	5.51	3.65	3.28
Sample Size of Low-Wage Workers	15,875	564	8,551	7,324	265	299
Weighted Numbers (000's)	91,916	3,507	50,279	41,637	1,723	1,783

TABLE 2.17: Comparison of Low-wage Displaced Homemakers with Other Women Workers

	All Women (Including Higher Wages)	All Women Low-wage	Displaced Homemakers	White Women	White Displaced Homemakers	Women of Color	Displaced Homemakers of Color
Percent of all Women who are Low-wage	32.0	-	36.5	30.2	34.8	38.7	42.0
Percent with Children	52.5	57.4	54.6	54.3	48.1	66.8	72.3
Percent with Education beyond High School	41.2	21.3	17.4	22.9	17.9	16.4	16.1
Mean Years of Work Experience	9.7	8.0	8.5	8.0	8.3	8.1	9.0
Percentage with Job Training	17.1	17.6	11.9	19.0	12.7	13.1	9.6
Mean Number of Weeks Worked in year	47.7	47.4	47.7	47.4	47.4	47.5	48.6
Mean Employed Annual Hours	1,773	1,636	1,760	1,614	1,747	1,706	1,789
Percent in							
Service Occupations	16.0	33.9	38.3	29.4	35.5	47.7	46.0
Tech., Sales, Adm. Support	41.5	39.6	36.8	44.8	41.9	23.3	22.7
Percent in							
Retail Industry	12.8	25.1	28.0	27.6	32.3	17.6	16.3
Service Industry (except professional)	8.0	13.9	16.2	10.8	13.3	23.4	24.1
Percent whose families would be in poverty without earnings	16.7	18.3	38.5	14.6	36.3	29.3	42.0
Percent in Poverty	3.5	7.7	18.6	4.4	14.3	17.3	28.0
Sample Size of Low-Wage Workers	4,420	1,368	371	1,062	264	306	107
Total Population	24,656,000	7,878,700	2,196,000	5,940,000	1,532,000	1,939,000	665,000

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1.1

	BLACK WOMEN				BLACK MEN				WHITE WOMEN				WHITE MEN			
	N	PERCENT	MEAN	STAN DEV	N	PERCENT	MEAN	STAN DEV	N	PERCENT	MEAN	STAN DEV	N	PERCENT	MEAN	STAN DEV
ALL SPELLS	2,754	100.0%	1.94	1.70	2,164	100.0%	1.85	1.61	3,314	100.0%	1.86	1.55	2,568	100.0%	1.89	1.75
ALL NON-CENSORED	1,988	77.1%	1.77	1.38	1,368	65.2%	1.63	1.13	2,417	75.0%	1.78	1.44	1,726	68.0%	1.67	1.29
ALL CENSORED:	766	22.9%	2.52	2.39	796	34.8%	2.26	2.19	897	25.0%	2.13	1.84	842	32.0%	2.37	2.39
1967 LEFT	165	3.8%	2.92	2.41	242	12.6%	2.77	2.41	77	2.5%	2.66	2.36	234	10.3%	2.61	2.70
NOT IN LEFT	88	2.0%	1.64	0.98	162	5.9%	1.51	1.03	149	3.5%	1.34	0.67	175	5.8%	1.69	1.56
1984 RIGHT	387	13.1%	2.63	2.50	248	9.8%	2.06	2.08	544	15.2%	2.24	1.98	327	11.9%	2.40	2.11
LEAVE RIGHT	112	3.5%	1.95	1.37	114	5.4%	1.91	1.38	107	3.2%	1.86	1.29	86	3.2%	1.67	1.25
1967 1984	1	0.0%	18.00	0.00	3	0.1%	18.00	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00	0.00	1	0.1%	18.00	0.00
1967 LEAVE	3	0.0%	10.80	4.80	0	0.0%	0.00	0.00	1	0.0%	5.00	0.00	8	0.3%	6.37	4.67
NOT IN 1984	5	0.0%	4.40	3.72	10	0.3%	2.50	2.43	14	0.3%	2.75	1.31	7	0.2%	7.38	4.90
NOT IN LEAVE	5	0.3%	2.02	1.81	17	0.7%	2.78	2.59	5	0.2%	3.01	1.75	4	0.1%	3.45	1.00

	WHITE MEN	
	N	PERCENT
ALL SPELLS	10,957	100.0%
ALL NON-CENSORED	7,599	72.1%
ALL CENSORED:	3,358	27.9%
1967 LEFT	735	6.1%
NOT IN LEFT	581	4.3%
1984 RIGHT	1,517	13.4%
LEAVE RIGHT	440	3.6%
1967 1984	6	0.0%
1967 LEAVE	12	0.1%
NOT IN 1984	36	0.2%
NOT IN LEAVE	31	0.2%

APPENDIX 1.2

	BLACK WOMEN				BLACK MEN				WHITE WOMEN				WHITE MEN					
	N	PERCENT	MEAN	STAN DEV	N	PERCENT	MEAN	STAN DEV	N	PERCENT	MEAN	STAN DEV	N	PERCENT	MEAN	STAN DEV	N	PERCENT
ALL SPELLS	2,754	9.5%	1.94	1.70	2,164	5.8%	1.85	1.61	3,314	48.1%	1.86	1.55	2,568	34.8%	1.89	1.75	10,957	98.2%
ALL NON-CENSORED	1,988	10.2%	1.77	1.38	1,368	5.3%	1.63	1.13	2,417	50.1%	1.78	1.44	1,726	32.8%	1.67	1.29	7,599	98.3%
ALL CENSORED:	766	7.8%	2.52	2.39	796	7.3%	2.26	2.19	897	43.0%	2.13	1.84	842	39.8%	2.37	2.39	3,358	97.9%
1967 LEFT	165	6.0%	2.92	2.41	242	12.1%	2.77	2.41	77	19.8%	2.66	2.36	234	59.3%	2.61	2.70	735	97.2%
NOT IN LEFT	88	4.5%	1.64	0.98	162	8.0%	1.51	1.03	149	38.6%	1.34	0.67	175	46.8%	1.69	1.56	581	97.9%
1984 RIGHT	387	9.3%	2.63	2.50	248	4.3%	2.06	2.08	544	54.8%	2.24	1.98	327	31.0%	2.40	2.11	1,517	99.4%
LEAVE RIGHT	112	9.4%	1.95	1.37	114	8.8%	1.91	1.38	107	43.7%	1.86	1.29	86	31.4%	1.67	1.25	440	93.3%
1967 1984	1	13.3%	18.00	0.00	3	15.0%	18.00	0.00	0	0.0%	0.00	0.00	1	60.0%	18.00	0.00	6	88.3%
1967 LEAVE	3	2.3%	10.80	4.80	0	0.0%	0.00	0.00	1	13.8%	5.00	0.00	8	83.9%	6.37	4.67	12	100.0%
NOT IN 1984	5	1.2%	4.40	3.72	10	7.5%	2.50	2.43	14	61.4%	2.75	1.31	7	29.9%	7.38	4.90	36	100.0%
NOT IN LEAVE	5	14.1%	2.02	1.81	17	20.9%	2.78	2.59	5	45.3%	3.01	1.75	4	19.7%	3.45	1.60	31	100.0%

APPENDIX 1.2A ENTRY TABLE INCLUDING RIGHT CENSORED

ALL	WITH CHILDREN						WITHOUT CHILDREN										
	MARRIED				SINGLE PARENTS		MARRIED				SINGLE					ALL		
	WOMEN		MEN				WOMEN		MEN		WOMEN		MEN					
PRIOR STATUS	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	N	%	MEAN	STAN D
CHILD	1.1%	1.38	2.4%	1.49	6.5%	1.52	6.6%	1.61	6.4%	2.15	14.5%	1.68	19.3%	1.36	797	6.6%	1.61	1.14
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.5%	1.55	2.4%	1.30	1.1%	1.26	1.1%	1.40	4.7%	1.57	3.3%	2.10	9.3%	1.37	236	2.6%	1.53	1.04
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	1.00	1.2%	1.61	1.1%	2.55	0.8%	1.28	9.0%	1.57	3.4%	1.31	2.1%	1.70	141	2.1%	1.55	1.14
WELFARE	0.8%	2.16	1.7%	1.70	10.9%	1.84	0.2%	1.07	0.1%	1.00	1.3%	1.57	1.5%	1.50	234	1.7%	1.78	1.39
LONG TERM, MIN WORK H	12.7%	1.89	0.5%	1.10	7.9%	1.63	8.3%	1.50	1.4%	1.33	4.9%	1.76	2.3%	1.49	[illegible]	6.3%	1.73	1.45
LONG TERM, WORK HISTO	22.4%	1.99	0.8%	1.03	9.4%	1.89	18.0%	2.07	0.5%	1.00	4.5%	1.93	1.5%	1.27	825	10.2%	1.97	1.70
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKI	9.9%	1.70	2.2%	1.51	5.2%	2.32	6.9%	1.85	3.8%	1.45	7.0%	1.93	5.8%	1.89	595	6.2%	1.78	1.49
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	21.5%	1.92	10.8%	2.14	23.9%	1.81	16.3%	1.83	14.0%	1.90	20.4%	2.29	18.0%	1.64	1,833	17.6%	1.95	1.60
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-W	9.5%	1.72	11.6%	1.73	10.7%	2.46	10.0%	1.57	10.1%	1.62	8.8%	1.83	12.7%	1.51	938	10.3%	1.73	1.41
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	21.7%	1.83	66.4%	1.84	23.3%	2.12	31.8%	1.80	50.1%	1.89	31.8%	1.87	27.5%	1.64	3,416	36.4%	1.85	1.56
TOTAL	100.0%	1.86	100.0%	1.82	100.0%	1.96	100.0%	1.79	100.0%	1.81	100.0%	1.91	100.0%	1.55	9,611	100.0%	1.82	1.51

APPENDIX 1.2C ENTRIES, STRICT

ALL	WITH CHILDREN						WITHOUT CHILDREN									ALL		
	MARRIED				SINGLE PARENTS		MARRIED				SINGLE							
	WOMEN		MEN				WOMEN		MEN		WOMEN		MEN					
PRIOR STATUS	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	N	%	MEAN	STAN D
CHILD	1.3%	1.39	2.5%	1.44	6.9%	1.56	7.0%	1.52	6.6%	2.03	14.0%	1.66	20.7%	1.38	632	6.8%	1.58	1.01
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.5%	1.61	2.7%	1.33	1.3%	1.23	1.0%	1.37	5.2%	1.59	3.1%	2.40	11.0%	1.39	201	2.9%	1.56	1.07
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	1.00	1.1%	1.78	0.6%	1.10	1.0%	1.27	9.6%	1.49	4.2%	1.32	1.8%	1.01	119	2.3%	1.42	0.95
WELFARE	0.9%	2.33	1.4%	1.36	11.4%	1.81	0.3%	1.00	0.1%	1.00	1.2%	1.77	1.3%	1.16	184	1.6%	1.74	1.38
LONG TERM, MIN WORK H	13.0%	1.74	0.6%	1.10	8.6%	1.55	7.6%	1.50	1.6%	1.33	5.4%	1.74	2.2%	1.55	485	6.4%	1.64	1.21
LONG TERM, WORK HISTO	23.2%	1.93	0.7%	1.05	9.1%	1.94	19.9%	2.15	0.2%	1.00	4.2%	2.13	1.0%	1.50	666	10.6%	2.00	1.68
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKI	9.4%	1.61	1.8%	1.59	4.7%	1.63	6.7%	1.74	3.4%	1.53	6.6%	1.99	5.9%	2.00	439	5.9%	1.72	1.31
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	21.0%	1.79	10.2%	2.10	23.3%	1.72	14.6%	1.73	13.7%	1.81	20.5%	2.30	17.0%	1.62	1,396	17.0%	1.87	1.50
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-W	9.7%	1.63	11.8%	1.68	11.4%	2.22	10.4%	1.62	10.3%	1.62	7.7%	1.49	12.2%	1.42	746	10.3%	1.65	1.33
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	21.0%	1.69	67.2%	1.66	22.6%	2.10	31.5%	1.72	49.3%	1.70	33.1%	1.68	26.8%	1.48	2,731	36.3%	1.69	1.34
TOTAL	100.0% 1907	1.76	100.0% 1535	1.68	100.0% 883	1.86	100.0% 953	1.76	100.0% 823	1.69	100.0% 774	1.84	100.0% 724	1.48	7,599	100.0% 7599	1.73	1.37

APPENDIX 1.3 ENTRIES, LIBERAL

	WITH CHILDREN						WITHOUT CHILDREN											
ALL	MARRIED				SINGLE PARENTS		MARRIED				SINGLE					ALL		
	WOMEN		MEN				WOMEN		MEN		WOMEN		MEN					
PRIOR STATUS	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	N	%	MEAN	STAN D
CHILD	2.2%	1.83	2.6%	1.46	8.3%	2.14	9.7%	1.65	9.1%	1.86	17.5%	2.01	23.6%	1.61	956	8.5%	1.80	1.29
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.8%	1.68	2.6%	1.25	1.1%	1.60	2.0%	1.37	7.3%	1.59	6.1%	1.99	12.7%	1.55	318	3.8%	1.61	1.00
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	1.00	1.8%	1.70	1.0%	1.23	1.0%	1.32	13.5%	1.74	6.3%	1.62	3.9%	1.22	212	3.3%	1.62	1.21
WELFARE	0.9%	2.35	1.7%	1.66	17.8%	1.89	0.4%	1.03	0.2%	1.03	1.7%	1.91	1.6%	1.39	346	2.3%	1.85	1.61
LONG TERM, MIN WORK H	22.3%	1.69	0.8%	1.57	13.1%	2.01	10.3%	1.62	2.7%	1.60	8.4%	2.45	5.3%	1.85	1,038	10.9%	1.78	1.41
LONG TERM, WORK HISTO	29.3%	2.01	0.9%	1.56	15.2%	1.88	25.8%	2.30	0.4%	1.53	7.3%	2.10	1.2%	1.34	1,142	14.8%	2.08	1.82
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKI	12.6%	1.78	3.0%	1.92	7.8%	1.68	9.1%	1.81	6.2%	1.88	8.7%	2.28	9.6%	1.87	802	8.7%	1.86	1.40
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	31.9%	1.79	86.6%	1.71	35.8%	2.10	41.8%	1.73	60.7%	1.75	44.1%	1.80	42.1%	1.63	4,391	47.8%	1.76	1.42
TOTAL	100.0% 2601	1.84	100.0% 1637	1.70	100.0% 1059	1.97	100.0% 1160	1.85	100.0% 951	1.75	100.0% 918	1.96	100.0% 879	1.62	9,205	100.0% 9205	1.81	1.57

APPENDIX 1.3A White Entries, Liberal

ALL	WITH CHILDREN						WITHOUT CHILDREN									ALL		
	MARRIED				SINGLE PARENTS		MARRIED				SINGLE							
	WOMEN		MEN				WOMEN		MEN		WOMEN		MEN					
PRIOR STATUS	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	N	%	MEAN	STAN D
CHILD	2.2%	1.82	2.3%	1.30	6.2%	2.30	10.0%	1.65	9.3%	1.85	16.9%	2.15	24.6%	1.59	515	8.4%	1.81	1.27
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.9%	1.73	2.7%	1.25	1.1%	1.53	2.3%	1.38	7.2%	1.51	7.0%	1.99	14.9%	1.56	232	4.2%	1.60	1.00
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	0.00	1.4%	2.06	1.1%	1.29	1.0%	1.26	14.0%	1.77	6.7%	1.68	4.7%	1.22	145	3.5%	1.67	1.25
WELFARE	0.9%	2.48	1.7%	1.78	12.8%	2.18	0.3%	1.00	0.2%	1.00	0.5%	1.45	0.6%	1.32	74	1.4%	2.03	1.96
LONG TERM, MIN WORK H	22.9%	1.68	0.8%	1.50	14.3%	2.23	10.6%	1.66	2.5%	1.68	8.6%	2.47	4.5%	1.83	589	11.1%	1.79	1.40
LONG TERM, WORK HISTO	29.9%	1.90	0.9%	1.53	20.6%	1.91	25.6%	2.28	0.4%	1.49	7.4%	2.28	0.8%	1.00	696	15.3%	2.03	1.76
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKI	12.3%	1.72	2.9%	1.86	5.7%	1.75	8.6%	1.85	5.3%	1.76	8.6%	2.38	7.8%	1.95	421	8.2%	1.86	1.44
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	31.0%	1.73	87.3%	1.70	38.2%	2.15	41.6%	1.71	61.1%	1.75	44.3%	1.78	42.0%	1.54	2,437	48.1%	1.73	1.37
TOTAL	100.0% 1494	1.78	100.0% 834	1.68	100.0% 269	2.09	100.0% 862	1.84	100.0% 702	1.74	100.0% 537	2.00	100.0% 411	1.58	5,109	100.0% 5109	1.80	1.54

APPENDIX 1.3B Blacks Entries, Liberal

	WITH CHILDREN						WITHOUT CHILDREN											
ALL	MARRIED				SINGLE PARENTS		MARRIED				SINGLE					ALL		
	WOMEN		MEN				WOMEN		MEN		WOMEN		MEN					
PRIOR STATUS	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	N	%	MEAN	STAN D
CHILD	1.6%	1.82	4.5%	1.97	10.8%	1.96	5.3%	1.68	6.5%	1.93	20.5%	1.48	21.3%	1.73	427	9.2%	1.74	1.43
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.4%	1.00	2.3%	1.32	1.1%	1.69	0.1%	1.00	5.5%	1.74	2.2%	2.13	5.1%	1.49	84	1.9%	1.61	0.92
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.3%	1.00	4.3%	1.04	1.0%	1.15	0.8%	2.00	9.7%	1.31	5.1%	1.18	0.9%	1.21	66	2.4%	1.21	0.98
WELFARE	0.9%	1.90	2.3%	1.16	24.5%	1.65	1.0%	1.12	0.3%	1.20	5.7%	1.95	6.0%	1.42	263	7.0%	1.64	1.19
LONG TERM, MIN WORK H	18.9%	1.86	1.4%	1.80	11.4%	1.64	8.3%	1.20	4.7%	1.20	7.3%	2.44	6.1%	2.30	432	9.8%	1.81	1.50
LONG TERM, WORK HISTO	26.5%	2.49	0.6%	1.80	7.8%	1.75	28.2%	2.52	0.6%	1.89	6.9%	1.09	3.1%	1.68	430	12.4%	2.28	2.00
SHORT TERM, NOT WORKI	13.5%	1.89	3.7%	2.20	11.0%	1.63	11.8%	1.64	12.9%	2.56	9.0%	1.88	14.9%	1.85	364	11.0%	1.87	1.25
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	37.9%	1.86	80.9%	1.61	32.3%	2.04	44.5%	1.90	59.8%	1.82	43.3%	1.70	42.5%	1.85	1,895	46.2%	1.80	1.40
TOTAL	100.0% 1055	2.03	100.0% 774	1.61	100.0% 778	1.81	100.0% 284	1.97	100.0% 239	1.84	100.0% 370	1.68	100.0% 461	1.79	3,961	100.0% 3961	1.84	1.51

APPENDIX 1.4A Exits, Strict

	WITH CHILDREN						WITHOUT CHILDREN									ALL		
ALL	MARRIED				SINGLE PARENTS		MARRIED				SINGLE							
	WOMEN		MEN				WOMEN		MEN		WOMEN		MEN					
SUBSEQUENT STATUS	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	N	%	MEAN	STAN D
DEAD	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	1.4%	1.88	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.9%	1.21	3.9%	1.44	40	0.6%	1.48	0.82
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.1%	1.03	0.1%	1.84	0.5%	1.11	0.1%	1.00	1.2%	1.67	0.4%	2.00	1.1%	1.41	31	0.4%	1.48	0.58
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.0%	0.00	0.8%	2.46	1.1%	3.07	1.9%	2.60	10.6%	1.63	6.0%	1.92	4.8%	1.57	164	3.1%	1.88	1.67
WELFARE	0.3%	1.66	1.1%	1.48	12.6%	1.30	0.0%	1.00	0.0%	0.00	0.8%	1.25	0.9%	2.84	151	1.4%	1.42	0.92
NOT WORKING	29.3%	1.54	3.3%	1.57	12.8%	1.37	26.3%	2.01	7.0%	1.64	13.3%	2.38	10.6%	2.00	1,231	16.6%	1.77	1.53
PART YEAR, LOW-WAGE	20.2%	1.57	9.5%	1.70	18.0%	1.57	18.7%	2.15	15.7%	2.02	22.9%	2.25	12.9%	1.69	1,432	17.1%	1.86	1.50
PART YEAR, MED/HIGH-W	11.2%	1.58	10.4%	1.49	12.3%	1.72	10.4%	1.84	9.0%	1.71	9.6%	1.75	14.4%	1.32	809	10.8%	1.62	1.24
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	38.9%	1.76	74.8%	1.62	41.2%	1.97	42.7%	1.71	56.5%	1.70	46.2%	1.81	51.3%	1.51	3,741	50.0%	1.70	1.28
TOTAL	100.0% 1953	1.63	100.0% 1579	1.62	100.0% 887	1.71	100.0% 920	1.90	100.0% 779	1.74	100.0% 770	1.98	100.0% 702	1.57	7599	100.0% 7599	1.73	1.31

APPENDIX 1.4B ALL Exits Liberal

ALL	WITH CHILDREN						WITHOUT CHILDREN									ALL		
	MARRIED				SINGLE PARENTS		MARRIED				SINGLE							
	WOMEN		MEN				WOMEN		MEN		WOMEN		MEN					
SUBSEQUENT STATUS	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	N	%	MEAN	STAN D
DEAD	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	1.6%	1.77	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.8%	1.23	4.1%	2.11	50	0.6%	1.89	1.56
INSTITUTION/STUDENT	0.4%	1.61	0.2%	1.31	1.8%	1.61	0.5%	1.61	2.3%	1.40	1.5%	2.08	3.0%	2.40	90	1.2%	1.75	1.26
RETIRED/DISABLED	0.1%	3.80	1.8%	1.78	1.9%	2.41	3.3%	3.60	20.5%	1.96	13.1%	2.71	7.3%	1.48	396	5.9%	2.28	2.04
WELFARE	0.4%	1.37	2.0%	1.75	18.0%	1.47	0.0%	1.17	0.0%	0.00	0.8%	1.83	0.9%	2.54	315	2.1%	1.56	1.06
NOT WORKING	47.3%	1.58	4.9%	1.79	21.9%	1.76	39.9%	2.11	9.5%	1.90	21.6%	2.48	15.8%	1.86	2,573	27.2%	1.84	1.57
MEDIUM/HIGH WAGE	51.7%	1.86	91.0%	1.65	54.8%	2.09	56.3%	1.79	67.7%	1.73	62.2%	1.81	68.9%	1.57	5,781	63.1%	1.77	1.36
TOTAL	100.0% 2662	1.72	100.0% 1696	1.66	100.0% 1126	1.89	100.0% 1079	1.98	100.0% 885	1.79	100.0% 890	2.07	100.0% 841	1.66	9205	100.0% 9205	1.81	1.42

APPENDIX [illegible].6A ALL

SPELL TYPE	MARRIED KIDS WOMEN %	MARRIED KIDS WOMEN MEAN	MARRIED KIDS MEN %	MARRIED KIDS MEN MEAN	SINGLE KIDS BOTH %	SINGLE KIDS BOTH MEAN	MARRIED NO KIDS WOMEN %	MARRIED NO KIDS WOMEN MEAN	MARRIED NO KIDS MEN %	MARRIED NO KIDS MEN MEAN	SINGLE NO KIDS WOMEN %	SINGLE NO KIDS WOMEN MEAN	SINGLE NO KIDS MEN %	SINGLE NO KIDS MEN MEAN	n	ALL %	ALL MEAN	ALL STAN DE
A: MED/HIGH INTERUPTI	16.4%	1.51	63.7%	1.57	20.6%	1.89	25.8%	1.47	44.1%	1.63	28.2%	1.44	23.7%	1.37	1,983	32.2%	1.55	1.13
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	34.9%	1.78	21.0%	1.60	34.1%	1.75	28.0%	1.63	21.4%	1.52	28.0%	1.89	43.8%	1.31	1,826	29.5%	1.66	1.18
C: DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	15.3%	1.60	4.4%	1.51	13.3%	1.50	11.7%	2.07	9.7%	1.98	14.5%	1.89	10.0%	1.76	792	11.4%	1.76	1.35
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	13.6%	1.49	9.4%	1.87	12.3%	1.47	16.6%	1.86	16.3%	1.73	17.4%	2.49	13.9%	1.73	893	14.1%	1.81	1.55
E: NON-WORK INTERUPTI	19.8%	1.49	1.5%	1.30	19.7%	1.21	17.9%	1.90	8.4%	1.22	11.9%	1.68	8.6%	1.67	762	12.8%	1.56	1.25
TOTAL	100.0% 1673	1.61	100.0% 1371	1.59	100.0% 682	1.60	100.0% 721	1.73	100.0% 618	1.62	100.0% 627	1.84	100.0% 564	1.46	6,256	100.0% 6256	1.64	1.88

APPENDIX 1.6B BLACKS

SPELL TYPE	MARRIED KIDS WOMEN		MARRIED KIDS MEN		SINGLE KIDS BOTH		MARRIED NO KIDS WOMEN		MARRIED NO KIDS MEN		SINGLE NO KIDS WOMEN		SINGLE NO KIDS MEN		ALL			
	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	STAN DE
A: MED/HIGH INTERUPTI	19.1%	1.39	55.1%	1.52	21.4%	1.82	33.3%	1.80	48.9%	1.48	27.5%	1.27	23.2%	1.71	862	30.7%	1.55	0.99
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	30.9%	2.05	24.4%	1.61	27.0%	1.84	24.3%	2.18	12.3%	1.32	26.7%	1.27	32.7%	1.32	741	26.6%	1.72	1.41
C: DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	20.4%	1.43	6.7%	1.64	13.8%	1.47	10.1%	2.17	8.7%	2.32	15.2%	1.71	12.6%	1.12	397	13.4%	1.57	1.09
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	16.4%	1.43	12.9%	1.91	10.3%	1.42	12.0%	1.98	21.8%	2.31	15.0%	1.84	16.8%	1.70	428	14.5%	1.74	1.52
E: NON-WORK INTERUPTI	13.3%	1.77	0.9%	1.05	27.4%	1.22	20.4%	2.17	8.3%	1.50	15.6%	1.28	14.8%	1.75	345	14.8%	1.54	0.97
TOTAL	100.0% 688	1.66	100.0% 642	1.60	100.0% 524	1.57	100.0% 187	2.03	100.0% 162	1.72	100.0% 266	1.42	100.0% 304	1.51	2,773	100.0% 2773	1.63	1.84

APPENDIX 1.6C WHITES

	MARRIED KIDS WOMEN		MARRIED KIDS MEN		SINGLE KIDS BOTH		MARRIED NO KIDS WOMEN		MARRIED NO KIDS MEN		SINGLE NO KIDS WOMEN		SINGLE NO KIDS MEN			ALL		
SPELL TYPE	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	n	%	MEAN	STAN DE
A: MED/HIGH INTERUPTI	16.0%	1.45	65.4%	1.58	19.1%	2.00	24.9%	1.43	43.8%	1.65	28.6%	1.47	24.4%	1.29	1,096	32.5%	1.54	1.13
B: UPWARDLY MOBILE	35.6%	1.74	20.1%	1.60	39.3%	1.71	28.5%	1.58	22.2%	1.53	28.0%	2.02	46.5%	1.32	1,057	29.9%	1.66	1.14
C: DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	14.5%	1.64	4.1%	1.48	13.2%	1.53	11.5%	2.11	9.9%	1.96	14.6%	1.93	9.6%	1.97	388	11.1%	1.81	1.40
D: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	13.1%	1.51	8.7%	1.85	13.9%	1.49	17.4%	1.85	15.8%	1.65	17.6%	2.50	13.3%	1.75	457	14.0%	1.81	1.52
E: NON-WORK INTERUPTI	20.8%	1.44	1.7%	1.32	14.4%	1.19	17.8%	1.87	8.4%	1.19	11.2%	1.80	6.2%	1.74	406	12.5%	1.55	1.30
TOTAL	100.0% 956	1.59	100.0% 706	1.60	100.0% 153	1.64	100.0% 523	1.70	100.0% 453	1.62	100.0% 357	1.91	100.0% 256	1.46	3,404	100.0% 3404	1.64	1.87

APPENDIX 1.7A STATUS CHANGES BLACK WOMEN

SPELL TYPE	WOMAN GETS MARRIED		WOMAN GETS SEPERATED		EITHER		WOMAN GAINS CHILDREN		WOMAN LOSES CHILDREN		EITHER	
	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN
A: MED/HIGH INTERUPTI	24.2%	1.55	27.9%	2.49	26.2%	2.09	28.4%	1.54	13.4%	4.17	19.8%	2.55
B: NON-WORK INTERUPTI	14.8%	1.29	17.9%	2.49	16.5%	1.99	20.8%	1.43	20.6%	1.86	20.7%	1.67
C: UPWARDLY MOBILE	30.4%	2.27	21.4%	2.78	25.5%	2.50	15.4%	1.75	32.5%	3.10	25.1%	2.74
D: DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	20.8%	2.95	30.2%	2.20	25.9%	2.48	24.6%	1.47	15.4%	2.83	19.4%	2.08
E: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	9.8%	2.12	2.7%	2.39	6.0%	2.19	10.8%	1.49	18.1%	3.32	15.0%	2.75
TOTAL	100.0% 87	2.08	100.0% 82	2.46	100.0% 169	2.29	100.0% 81	1.53	100.0% 100	2.98	100.0% 181	2.36

APPENDIX 1.7B STATUS CHANGES BLACK MEN

SPELL TYPE	MAN GETS MARRIED		MAN GETS SEPERATED		EITHER		MAN GAINS CHILDREN		MAN LOSES CHILDREN		EITHER	
	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN
A: MED/HIGH INTERUPTI	26.2%	2.16	24.8%	1.84	25.6%	2.03	34.2%	2.01	31.7%	1.71	33.1%	1.88
B: NON-WORK INTERUPTI	1.4%	1.00	11.9%	1.71	5.8%	1.61	0.2%	1.00	18.3%	1.20	8.4%	1.19
C: UPWARDLY MOBILE	52.8%	1.36	41.6%	1.58	48.1%	1.44	54.3%	1.86	24.3%	1.83	40.8%	1.85
D: DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	6.4%	1.50	14.4%	3.55	9.7%	2.77	6.1%	1.76	9.0%	2.00	7.4%	1.89
E: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	13.1%	1.76	7.4%	2.47	10.7%	1.96	5.2%	1.48	16.8%	1.88	10.4%	1.77
TOTAL	100.0% 68	1.63	100.0% 63	2.01	100.0% 131	1.79	100.0% 86	1.89	100.0% 88	1.70	100.0% 174	1.80

APPENDIX 1.7C. WHITES

	WOMAN GETS MARRIED		WOMAN GETS SEPERATED		EITHER		WOMAN GAINS CHILDREN		WOMAN LOSES CHILDREN		EITHER	
SPELL TYPE	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN
A: MED/HIGH INTERUPTI	15.1%	1.72	16.6%	1.79	15.9%	1.76	14.6%	1.68	23.0%	2.22	18.7%	2.01
B: NON-WORK INTERUPTI	4.4%	1.02	13.8%	1.55	9.5%	1.44	21.8%	1.60	18.7%	3.32	20.3%	2.38
C: UPWARDLY MOBILE	44.6%	2.25	36.1%	2.38	40.0%	2.31	20.5%	1.88	28.4%	2.90	24.4%	2.46
D: DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	21.5%	1.74	17.3%	2.91	19.2%	2.31	19.3%	1.48	13.4%	4.15	16.4%	2.55
E: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	14.5%	1.68	16.2%	2.44	15.4%	2.11	23.9%	2.11	16.4%	3.02	20.2%	2.47
TOTAL	100.0% 105	1.93	100.0% 88	2.27	100.0% 193	2.11	100.0% 158	1.77	100.0% 99	3.01	100.0% 257	2.38

APPENDIX 1.7D WHITE

	MAN GETS MARRIED		MAN GETS SEPERATED		EITHER		MAN GAINS CHILDREN		MAN LOSES CHILDREN		EITHER	
SPELL TYPE	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN	%	MEAN
A: MED/HIGH INTERUPTI	26.0%	1.25	40.2%	2.06	33.0%	1.73	32.2%	1.45	50.8%	2.09	40.1%	1.80
B: NON-WORK INTERUPTI	6.7%	1.42	4.6%	1.53	5.7%	1.47	0.7%	1.25	1.8%	3.00	1.2%	2.39
C: UPWARDLY MOBILE	47.9%	1.90	34.6%	2.16	41.3%	2.01	56.3%	1.97	16.4%	2.21	39.3%	2.02
D: DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	5.7%	1.18	9.5%	1.65	7.6%	1.47	3.0%	1.25	12.1%	2.37	6.9%	2.09
E: DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	13.7%	1.51	11.1%	2.53	12.4%	1.96	7.8%	2.48	18.9%	4.34	12.5%	3.67
TOTAL	100.0% 79	1.60	100.0% 57	2.08	100.0% 136	1.84	100.0% 128	1.82	100.0% 66	2.59	100.0% 194	2.15

APPENDIX 1.8A ALL

	POVERTY			N	% OF SPELLS
	0 1	1 0	0 0	EVER-POOR	EVER-POOR
MED/HIGH INTERUPT	7.0%	6.1%	5.2%	112	2.7%
NON-WORK INTERUPT	13.1%	25.9%	44.2%	315	27.5%
UPWARDLY MOBILE	55.2%	5.7%	7.5%	374	12.7%
DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	18.8%	21.5%	26.4%	321	26.4%
DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	5.9%	40.7%	16.7%	261	19.5%
N	565	393	425	1,383	

MEN		BLACK			WHITE			ALL		
	0 1	1 0	0 0	0 1	1 0	0 0	0 1	1 0	0 0	
MED/HIGH INTERUPT	7.4%	8.9%	10.3%	9.9%	12.2%	6.1%	10.7%	11.0%	7.3%	78
NON-WORK INTERUPT	4.3%	10.8%	37.6%	4.3%	7.8%	33.2%	4.1%	11.6%	33.7%	70
UPWARDLY MOBILE	74.1%	0.9%	4.8%	63.2%	7.0%	13.5%	65.4%	5.3%	9.8%	213
DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	10.7%	14.1%	33.8%	18.4%	27.0%	30.8%	15.9%	23.0%	30.5%	129
DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	3.4%	65.3%	13.5%	4.3%	46.0%	16.4%	3.9%	49.0%	18.8%	130
N	164	110	126	106	56	46	277	167	176	620

WOMEN		BLACK			WHITE			ALL		
	0 1	1 0	0 0	0 1	1 0	0 0	0 1	1 0	0 0	
MED/HIGH INTERUPT	4.4%	3.2%	4.3%	1.8%	2.7%	2.8%	2.8%	2.8%	3.6%	34
NON-WORK INTERUPT	28.7%	40.3%	51.9%	19.5%	32.2%	55.6%	23.4%	35.6%	52.2%	245
UPWARDLY MOBILE	36.5%	2.5%	4.0%	46.9%	7.4%	8.8%	43.6%	6.0%	5.7%	161
DUBIOUS UP MOBILE	18.4%	30.6%	26.4%	25.7%	16.2%	19.9%	22.0%	20.4%	23.4%	192
DOWNWARDLY MOBILE	12.1%	23.4%	13.3%	6.1%	41.5%	13.0%	8.2%	35.1%	15.0%	131
N	215	152	217	69	69	31	288	226	249	763

REGRESSION TABLE 2.3: Parameter Estimates for Ordinary Least Squares Model of Annual Wage by Race for Working Women

Independent Variables	WHITE WOMEN	p-value	BLACK WOMEN	p-value	HISPANIC WOMEN	p-value	ASIAN WOMEN	p-value
Intercept	-1.420	0.0011	1.483	0.1412	2.427	0.0920	0.809	0.8257
Age	0.213	0.0001	0.140	0.0018	0.207	0.0049	0.146	0.4779
Age-Squared	-0.003	0.0001	-0.002	0.0029	-0.003	0.0060	-0.002	0.4780
Education	0.302	0.0001	0.209	0.0001	0.194	0.0001	0.320	0.0061
Experience	0.119	0.0001	0.125	0.0001	0.097	0.0300	0.316	0.0184
Exp. Squared	-0.002	0.0001	-0.002	0.0161	-0.001	0.4801	-0.008	0.0842
Job Training	0.308	0.0002	-0.057	0.7448	0.127	0.6996	-0.329	0.6931
Hours (1000's)	0.645	0.0001	0.420	0.0147	0.194	0.4298	-0.186	0.7791
Union	0.682	0.0001	1.010	0.0001	1.256	0.0001	-2.761	0.0146
Large Work Site (Medium)	0.895	0.0001	0.248	0.1519	0.757	0.0066	0.308	0.6793
Small Firm Size (Medium)	-0.174	0.0590	-0.960	0.0001	-0.449	0.1527	0.102	0.9027
Tech, Etc. (Man/Prof)	-1.525	0.0001	-1.869	0.0001	-2.832	0.0001	-2.519	0.0081
Service (Man/Prof)	-2.118	0.0001	-2.867	0.0001	-3.475	0.0001	-2.923	0.0271
Blue Collar (Man/Prof)	-1.962	0.0001	-2.330	0.0001	-3.255	0.0001	-4.816	0.0013
Agric & Mining (Manufact.)	-1.993	0.0001	-2.644	0.0001	-3.581	0.0001	-2.551	0.1536
Construction (Manufact.)	-0.626	0.1072	0.154	0.9001	1.758	0.4231	3.604	0.1991
Transport, Etc. (Manufact.)	1.027	0.0001	1.868	0.0001	1.147	0.1624	0.893	0.6623
Wholesale (Manufact.)	0.142	0.5566	0.425	0.5455	-1.878	0.0335	-2.053	0.3256
Retail (Manufact.)	-1.051	0.0001	-0.742	0.0253	-1.323	0.0064	-2.261	0.1077
F.I.R.E. (Manufact.)	-0.114	0.4861	-0.115	0.7842	0.529	0.3811	-0.290	0.8684
Services (Manufact.)	-0.761	0.0001	-0.385	0.2039	-0.337	0.4493	-0.090	0.9474
Personal Ser. (Manufact.)	-1.494	0.0001	-0.615	0.1432	-0.794	0.1946	-2.183	0.1969
Public Admin (Manufact.)	-0.041	0.8548	0.539	0.1493	-0.194	0.7677	0.128	0.9541
Married	0.055	0.4759	0.183	0.2418	0.531	0.0363	0.808	0.2817
Children	-0.376	0.0001	-0.218	0.1934	-0.711	0.0131	1.115	0.1133
Inner City (Suburbs)	-0.019	0.8166	-0.014	0.9382	-0.572	0.0234	0.531	0.4058
Outside MSA (Suburbs)	-0.960	0.0001	-0.843	0.0004	-1.185	0.0219	0.726	0.5500
Model R-Squared		0.4035		0.4978		0.4997		0.3785
F-value		150.17		32.03		14.60		4.63
number		5,963		814		354		155
mean wage		6.38		5.77		5.73		6.87

REGRESSION TABLE 2.2: Parameter Estimates for Ordinary Least Squares Model of Annual Wage by Race for Working Men

Independent Variables	WHITE MEN	p-value	BLACK MEN	p-value	HISPANIC MEN	p-value	ASIAN MEN	p-value
Intercept	-5.182	0.0001	-0.162	0.9022	-0.6499	0.7001	2.682	0.5613
Age	0.337	0.0001	0.228	0.0004	0.3940	0.0001	0.133	0.6027
Age-Squared	-0.003	0.0001	-0.002	0.0042	-0.0044	0.0001	-0.002	0.5805
Education	0.576	0.0001	0.342	0.0001	0.2699	0.0001	0.415	0.0042
Experience	0.236	0.0001	0.079	0.0520	0.1522	0.0058	0.302	0.0384
Exp. Squared	-0.004	0.0001	-0.001	0.6009	-0.003	0.0635	-0.003	0.4970
Job Training	0.149	0.2088	0.242	0.3702	0.8945	0.0305	1.715	0.0879
Hours (1000's)	0.241	0.0153	0.225	0.3344	-0.4892	0.1047	0.655	0.3566
Union	0.406	0.0022	1.324	0.0001	1.7899	0.0001	-0.727	0.4657
Large Work Site (medium)	1.237	0.0001	0.839	0.0016	0.5295	0.1398	-0.241	0.7885
Small Firm Size (Medium)	-0.844	0.0001	-0.535	0.0973	-0.4579	0.2127	-1.641	0.0931
Tech, Etc.(Man/Prof)	-1.829	0.0001	-2.418	0.0001	-1.8310	0.0013	-3.655	0.0008
Service (Man/Prof)	-2.856	0.0001	-2.977	0.0001	-2.7042	0.0001	-5.631	0.0002
Blue Collar (Man/Prof)	-2.145	0.0001	-2.763	0.0001	-1.8004	0.0003	-4.810	0.0001
Agric & min (Manufact.)	-2.170	0.0001	-3.256	0.0001	-2.9339	0.0001	-5.605	0.0011
Construction (Manufact.)	0.554	0.0127	0.172	0.7599	-1.6736	0.0076	1.561	0.4946
Transport, Etc.(Manufact.)	0.384	0.0505	0.428	0.2920	0.2605	0.6625	3.331	0.0690
Wholesale (Manufact.)	-0.266	0.2913	0.210	0.7462	-1.7434	0.0170	-2.168	0.2672
Retail (Manufact.)	-1.151	0.0001	-1.373	0.0009	-0.9396	0.0696	-1.206	0.3678
F.I.R.E. (Manufact.)	0.849	0.0038	0.008	0.9900	-0.4294	0.6036	-3.326	0.0346
Services (Manufact.)	-2.156	0.0001	-1.490	0.0002	-1.5284	0.0021	-1.205	0.3099
Personal Ser. (Manufact.)	-3.215	0.0001	-2.435	0.0091	-2.3928	0.0418	-0.799	0.7449
Public Admin (Manufact.)	-1.190	0.0001	-0.132	0.7922	1.3534	0.1359	-0.573	0.7720
Married	0.786	0.0001	0.027	0.9253	0.5628	0.1580	0.478	0.6482
Children	0.064	0.6144	-0.067	0.7974	-0.7741	0.0318	0.278	0.7561
Inner City (Suburbs)	-0.493	0.0001	-0.248	0.3432	-0.9307	0.0027	-0.738	0.3321
Outside MSA (Suburbs)	-1.275	0.0001	-0.968	0.0047	0.1728	0.7699	0.365	0.8696
Model R-Squared		0.426		0.4850		0.4545		0.4678
F-value		207.00		25.20		15.80		6.88
number		7,218		668		462		174
mean wage		9.85		7.15		7.59		9.32

REGRESSION TABLE 2.1 Parameter Estimates for Ordinary Least Squares Model of Annual Wage by Gender

Independent Variables	ALL WORKERS	p-value	WORKING MEN	p-value	WORKING WOMEN	p-value
Intercept	-1.334	0.0002	-4.123	0.0001	-0.792	0.0403
Age	0.257	0.0001	0.333	0.0001	0.198	0.0001
Age-Squared	-0.003	0.0001	-0.003	0.0001	-0.002	0.0001
Education	0.433	0.0001	0.527	0.0001	0.286	0.0001
Experience	0.182	0.0001	0.222	0.0001	0.119	0.0001
Exp. Squared	-0.003	0.0001	-0.004	0.0001	-0.002	0.0001
Job Training	0.260	0.0002	0.198	0.0652	0.248	0.0009
Hours (1000's)	0.432	0.0001	0.216	0.0156	0.600	0.0001
Labor Union Coverage	0.612	0.0001	0.489	0.0001	0.717	0.0001
Large Work Site (Medium)	0.990	0.0001	1.127	0.0001	0.813	0.0001
Small Firm Size (Medium)	-0.614	0.0001	-0.815	0.0001	-0.239	0.0039
Tech,etc. (Man/Prof)	-1.753	0.0001	-1.908	0.0001	-1.636	0.0001
Service (Man/Prof)	-2.537	0.0001	-2.949	0.0001	-2.300	0.0001
Blue Collar (Man/Prof)	-2.449	0.0001	-2.324	0.0001	-2.125	0.0001
Agric & Mining (Manufact)	-2.482	0.0001	-2.386	0.0001	-2.125	0.0001
Construction (Manufact)	0.478	0.0027	0.574	0.0044	-0.466	0.1942
Transport,etc (Manufact.)	0.571	0.0001	0.401	0.0225	1.126	0.0001
Wholesale (Manufact.)	-0.315	0.0550	-0.360	0.1137	0.067	0.7597
Retail (Manufact.)	-1.315	0.0001	-1.199	0.0001	-1.032	0.0001
F.I.R.E. (Manufact.)	-0.043	0.7650	0.544	0.0353	-0.089	0.5508
Services (Manufact.)	-1.583	0.0001	-2.040	0.0001	-0.685	0.0001
Personal Serv. (Manufact.)	-1.694	0.0001	-2.807	0.0001	-1.302	0.0001
Public Admin (Manufact.)	-0.784	0.0001	-1.064	0.0001	0.013	0.9439
Female (Male)	-2.615	0.0001				
Black (White)	-1.455	0.0001	-1.393	0.0001	-0.328	0.0015
Asian (White)	-0.657	0.0025	-0.369	0.2595	0.459	0.0303
Hispanic (White)	-0.720	0.0001	-0.307	0.1452	0.053	0.7189
Women of Color	1.2451	0.0001				
Married	0.500	0.0001	0.702	0.0001	0.111	0.1002
Children	-0.033	0.6273	0.025	0.8207	-0.360	0.0001
Inner City (Suburbs)	-0.307	0.0001	-0.500	0.0001	-0.048	0.5082
Outside MSA (Suburbs)	-1.121	0.0001	-1.220	0.0001	-0.963	0.0001
Model R-Squared		0.4687		0.4362		0.4129
F-value		451.11		228.43		177.77
number		15,815		8,525		7,289
mean wage		8.02		9.50		6.29

REGRESSION TABLE 2.4: Parameter Estimates for Logistic Regression of Low-wage Worker Status by Gender

Independent Variables	ALL WORKERS			WORKING MEN			WORKING WOMEN		
	MEAN	BETAS	p-value	MEAN	BETAS	p-value	MEAN	BETAS	p-value
Intercept		7.121	0.0001		7.813	0.0001		8.376	0.0001
Age	36.63	-0.291	0.0001	36.97	-0.376	0.0001	36.20	-0.240	0.0001
Age-Squared		0.003	0.0001		0.005	0.0001		0.003	0.0001
Education	12.95	-0.208	0.0001	13.06	-0.196	0.0001	12.82	-0.224	0.0001
Experience	8.94	-0.147	0.0001	10.17	-0.144	0.0001	7.36	-0.144	0.0001
Hours (000's)	1.915	-0.511	0.0001	2.06	-0.0484	0.5314	1.737	-0.898	0.0001
Exp. Squared		0.003	0.0001		0.003	0.0001		0.003	0.0001
Job Training	0.24	-0.343	0.0001	0.26	-0.286	0.0001	0.22	-0.318	0.0008
Union	0.20	1.243	0.0001	0.25	-1.530	0.0001	0.14	-0.988	0.0001
Large Work Site	0.41	-0.650	0.0001	0.42	-0.489	0.0001	0.39	-0.809	0.0001
Small Firm Size	0.20	0.465	0.0001	0.19	0.696	0.0001	0.22	0.207	0.0503
Tech, Etc.	0.29	0.698	0.0001	0.19	0.314	0.0331	0.42	0.866	0.0001
Service	0.12	2.198	0.0001	0.08	1.588	0.0001	0.16	2.544	0.0001
Blue Collar	0.29	1.281	0.0001	0.42	0.828	0.0001	0.13	1.662	0.0001
Agric & min	0.08	0.965	0.0001	0.09	1.276	0.0001	0.07	0.613	0.0023
Construction	0.04	-0.176	0.2583	0.07	0.052	0.7789	0.01	0.361	0.4054
Transport, Etc.	0.07	-0.055	0.6887	0.10	0.375	0.0370	0.04	-0.384	0.0948
Wholesale	0.04	0.284	0.0639	0.05	0.481	0.0175	0.02	0.264	0.2982
Retail	0.15	1.585	0.0001	0.13	1.643	0.0001	0.19	1.548	0.0001
F.I.R.E.	0.06	0.376	0.0041	0.04	1.005	0.0001	0.08	0.173	0.3117
Services	0.24	0.800	0.0001	0.16	1.323	0.0001	0.34	0.496	0.0004
Personal Ser.	0.02	1.797	0.0001	0.01	2.247	0.0001	0.04	1.518	0.0001
Public Admin	0.05	-0.601	0.0012	0.06	0.040	0.8785	0.04	-0.977	0.0004
Female	0.44	1.411	0.0001						
non-white	0.16	0.558	0.0001	0.14	0.655	0.0001	0.18	0.252	0.0187
Women of color	0.08	-0.279	0.0559						
Married	0.63	-0.483	0.0001	0.69	-0.733	0.0001	0.55	-0.337	0.0001
Children	0.48	0.272	0.0001	0.50	0.179	0.0797	0.47	0.379	0.0001
Inner City	0.31	0.010	0.8868	0.29	0.098	0.3359	0.32	-0.030	0.738
Outside MSA	0.24	0.890	0.0001	0.23	0.827	0.0001	0.24	1.006	0.0001
number			12018			6743			5275
% low wage			0.35			0.23			0.51355
Sensitivity			0.75			0.67			0.818
Correct			0.851			0.885			0.818

REGRESSION TABLE 2.5: Parameter Estimates for Logistic Regression of Low-wage Worker Status by Race for Men

Independent Variables	WHITE MEN			BLACK MEN			HISPANIC MEN		
	MEAN	BETAS	p-value	MEAN	BETAS	p-value	MEAN	BETAS	p-value
Intercept		8.615	0.0001		6.995	0.0002		5.872	0.0023
Age	37.15	-0.395	0.0001	36.68	-0.347	0.0001	34.39	-0.347	0.0002
Age-Squared		0.005	0.0001		0.004	0.0001		0.004	0.0003
Education	13.23	-0.214	0.0001	12.08	-0.205	0.0007	11.10	-0.170	0.0025
Experience	10.48	-0.150	0.0001	8.89	-0.070	0.1692	7.55	-0.142	0.0316
Hours (000's)	2.07	0.064	0.4547	1.92	0.275	0.3480	1.96	0.260	0.4681
Exp. Squared		0.003	0.0001		-0.001	0.7471		0.002	0.1147
Job Training	0.27	-0.306	0.0065	0.23	-0.238	0.4790	0.16	-0.411	0.4462
Union	0.25	-1.391	0.0001	0.32	-1.938	0.0001	0.24	-2.767	0.0001
Large Work Site	0.42	-0.590	0.0001	0.47	-0.414	0.2068	0.35	-0.308	0.4809
Small Firm Size	0.19	0.707	0.0001	0.19	0.932	0.0222	0.26	0.602	0.1398
Tech, Etc.	0.20	0.199	0.0001	0.17	1.448	0.0125	0.13	0.547	0.4534
Service	0.07	1.543	0.2190	0.12	1.680	0.0110	0.14	2.175	0.0030
Blue Collar	0.41	0.672	0.0001	0.51	1.422	0.0106	0.51	1.172	0.0654
Agric & min	0.09	1.100	0.0001	0.11	2.072	0.0030	0.12	2.436	0.0014
Construction	0.07	0.043	0.8313	0.04	0.857	0.2408	0.07	-0.488	0.5241
Transport, Etc.	0.10	0.356	0.0762	0.12	0.696	0.1924	0.08	0.282	0.7397
Wholesale	0.05	0.552	0.0143	0.04	-0.013	0.9850	0.04	1.201	0.1421
Retail	0.13	1.607	0.0001	0.13	2.154	0.0001	0.15	1.944	0.0007
F.I.R.E.	0.04	1.149	0.0001	0.05	0.317	0.6475	0.04	0.892	0.3719
Services	0.16	1.324	0.0001	0.16	1.493	0.0024	0.16	1.601	0.0045
Personal Ser.	0.01	2.336	0.0001	0.01	NA	NA	0.01	2.054	0.1706
Public Admin	0.06	0.143	0.6227	0.08	-0.281	0.6869	0.04	-1.376	0.2756
Married	0.70	-0.809	0.0001	0.55	-0.210	0.5651	0.68	-0.692	0.1192
Children	0.49	0.223	0.0539	0.49	0.143	0.6803	0.63	0.285	0.4977
Inner City	0.26	0.099	0.3944	0.52	-0.256	0.4512	0.53	0.328	0.3655
Outside MSA	0.25	0.783	0.0001	0.19	1.061	0.0152	0.09	0.702	0.2610
number			5,782			481			340
% low wage			0.200			0.389			0.359
Sensitivity			0.660			0.770			0.746
Correct			0.900			0.848			0.835

NA - Coefficient is not available due to small number of observations with the characteristics. The iteration progress used in calculating the estimate was unable to converge to a reasonable estimate.

Asian men - The sample size was to small to develop a reasonable set of significant estimates. Most of the estimates did not converge to a single point.

REGRESSION TABLE 2.6: Parameter Estimates for Logistic Regression
of Low-wage Worker Status by Race for Women

Independent Variables	WHITE WOMEN MEAN	WHITE WOMEN BETAS	WHITE WOMEN p-value	BLACK WOMEN MEAN	BLACK WOMEN BETAS	BLACK WOMEN p-value	HISPANIC WOMEN MEAN	HISPANIC WOMEN BETAS	HISPANIC WOMEN p-value
Intercept		9.195	0.0001		4.979	0.0051		9.296	0.0013
Age	36.24	-0.249	0.0001	36.35	-0.200	0.0096	35.15	-0.467	0.0011
Age-Squared		0.003	0.0001		0.003	0.0054		0.006	0.0009
Education	12.96	-0.240	0.0001	12.27	-0.195	0.0016	11.45	-0.233	0.0126
Experience	7.43	-0.150	0.0001	7.31	-0.120	0.0175	6.65	-0.073	0.3323
Hours (000's)	1.74	-1.014	0.0001	1.76	-0.378	0.2541	1.72	-0.143	0.7687
Exp. Squared		0.003	0.0001		0.001	0.5037		-0.002	0.5054
Job Training	0.22	-0.379	0.0003	0.22	-0.150	0.6020	0.17	-0.661	0.2336
Union	0.13	-0.898	0.0001	0.21	-1.249	0.0001	0.18	-2.055	0.0009
Large Work Site	0.39	-0.949	0.0001	0.44	-0.134	0.6222	0.38	-0.062	0.8975
Small Firm Size	0.22	0.063	0.5858	0.17	1.583	0.0006	0.25	1.485	0.0197
Tech, Etc.	0.44	0.830	0.0001	0.35	1.040	0.0173	0.38	1.647	0.0257
Service	0.15	2.518	0.0001	0.27	2.565	0.0001	0.19	3.845	0.0001
Blue Collar	0.12	1.450	0.0001	0.18	2.223	0.0003	0.19	3.092	0.0020
Agric & min	0.07	0.356	0.1031	0.06	2.421	0.0025	0.10	3.201	0.0130
Construction	0.01	0.149	0.7409	0.00	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Transport, Etc.	0.04	-0.653	0.0144	0.05	0.737	0.2128	0.04	1.433	0.2211
Wholesale	0.02	0.160	0.5633	0.01	0.866	0.4528	0.02	3.633	0.0166
Retail	0.20	1.434	0.0001	0.14	2.424	0.0001	0.18	3.103	0.0007
F.I.R.E.	0.08	0.094	0.6121	0.05	0.797	0.1986	0.06	0.001	0.9994
Services	0.34	0.413	0.0071	0.32	0.938	0.0531	0.28	1.499	0.0760
Personal Ser.	0.04	1.545	0.0001	0.09	1.473	0.0378	0.07	3.023	0.0293
Public Admin	0.03	-1.138	0.0006	0.08	-0.135	0.8277	0.05	-0.316	0.8087
Married	0.57	-0.273	0.0038	0.38	-0.190	0.4497	0.60	-1.758	0.0002
Children	0.43	0.374	0.0002	0.63	0.610	0.0275	0.62	0.278	0.5970
Inner City	0.27	0.015	0.8860	0.58	-0.242	0.3954	0.61	0.225	0.6133
Outside MSA	0.26	0.950	0.0001	0.19	1.840	0.0001	0.05	3.994	0.0191
number			4,325			592			247
% Low wage			0.502			0.503			0.583
Sensitivity			0.816			0.852			0.854
Correct			0.823			0.828			0.838

NA - Coefficient is not available due to small number of observations with the characteristics. The iteration progress used in calculating the estimate was unable to converge to a reasonable estimate.

Asian women - The sample size was to small to develop a reasonable set of significant estimates. Most of the estimates did not converge to a single point.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO PART II:
MAPPING THE TERRAIN OF LOW-WAGE JOBS AND WORKERS

We first determined to use the 1984 Full Panel Research File and to merge this file with the Wave 3 topical module. The 1984 Full Panel Research File contains core data from all eight SIPP waves. It has the advantage of having already-merged data from all eight waves for each individual respondent. Its disadvantage is that not all variables are included from all eight of the waves. Some of the missing variables include household and family data on availability and amounts of income from a wide variety of public and private transfer programs. Because these indicators were needed to answer this study's questions about the relation between low-wage work and family well-being, some of these variables were recreated by matching the sample unit identifications of individuals on the Full Panel Research File, aggregating across individuals within households to create additional household-level variables.

Next, we chose to merge the Wave 3 topical module into the Full Panel Research File because it includes additional information on health, disability, education and work experience. These indicators are necessary for testing this study's hypothesis concerning the heterogeneity of education and experience among low-wage workers and for investigating the characteristics of low-wage jobs.

In merging these tapes we made the following decisions:

- We used a rectangular file format with the individual rather than the household as the unit of analysis. As a result of this decision, throughout the report, we present counts of workers rather than counts of households. Because more than one worker may live in the same household, the data consistently present an over-count of households.

- We attached some household variables such as number of children under age 18, spouse's earnings, and receipt of major welfare and transfer payments by any household member to relevant individuals via relational and household identifiers. As a result of this decision, we are able to link individual workers with family and household characteristics, but, as noted above, we use workers not households as the unit of analysis.

- We used only 12 rather than 32 months of data starting with January 1984 and ending with December 1984. Wave 3 topical module occurs sometime within this period for all respondents. As a result of this decision, the work patterns we examine are of shorter duration than use of the full panel would allow.

- We included only those individuals between ages 16 and 69 who worked at least 500 hours in the relevant year. As a result of this decision we undercount the number of workers with only a temporary attachment to the workforce during 1984 and focus on those with a more significant attachment.

- We include only those workers who are employed by somebody else rather than those who are self employed.